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Al-hoewel in de spelen, daer alleen het geval plaets heeft, de uytkomsten onseecker zijn, soo 
heeft nochtans de kansse, die yemandt heeft om te winnen of te verliesen, haere seeckere 
bepaling. Als bij exempel. Die met een dobbel-steen ten eersten een ses neemt te werpen, het 
is onseecker of hij het winnen sal of niet; maer hoe veel minder kans hij heeft om te winnen 
als om te verliesen, dat is in sich selven seecker, en werdt door reeckeningh uyt-gevonden.
Van Rekeningh in Spelen van Geluck, Christiaan Huygens (1660)
Although in games depending entirely upon Fortune, the Success is always uncertain; yet it 
may be exactly determin’d at the same time, how much more likely one is to win than lose. 
As, if any one shou’d lay that he wou’d throw the Number Six with a single die the first throw, 
it is indeed uncertain whether he will win or lose; but how much more probability there is 
that he shou’d lose than win, is easily determin’d, and easily calculated.
The Value of all Chances in Games of Fortune, Christiaan Hugyens (1660, English translation from 1714)
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1
GENERAL 
INTRODUCTION
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Imagine you are hiking through a narrow gorge with dense vegetation. Suddenly, out 
of the corner of your eye, you spot movement down in front of you. Something on the 
ground just rustled some leaves, and there was a flash of an indeterminate, brownish 
shape in between the shrubbery. At the same time, you clearly hear an ominous sound. 
A rattlesnake! You freeze, and trembling, consider how to proceed. Your chances of 
leaving unscathed depend on knowing where the animal is. But just as important, they 
depend on knowing how uncertain you are about the snake’s location. If the foliage 
weren’t so thick and if rattlesnakes didn’t blend in so well, you might have been quite 
confident about where you saw it, and would have deftly stepped around it. As it is, 
however, you only glimpsed the snake in your peripheral vision, and the rattling sound 
provided no more than a general direction. Based on what your senses are telling you, 
the snake could be anywhere in between the steep cliff faces that straddle your path, 
leaving no safe way to proceed (Fig. 1.1). You decide to turn back, not wanting to run 
the risk of a bite.
?
Figure 1.1: Where is the snake? You saw movement and heard a noise, all of which tells you 
there is a rattlesnake hidden somewhere on the path in front of you. But based on what your 
senses are telling you, the snake could be anywhere between the red arrows, leaving no safe 
way to proceed. Your uncertainty about the snake’s location drives you to turn around, to avoid 
treading on the animal and being bitten.
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Humans frequently face situations like this, in which the information we receive from our 
senses is incomplete, ambiguous or unreliable, and therefore consistent with multiple 
interpretations. As shown in this example, this uncertainty about what our senses 
are telling us is highly relevant in order to make good decisions. Accordingly, many 
behavioral studies have shown that humans and other animals take this uncertainty 
into account when responding to unreliable sensory information (Jacobs & Fine, 1999; 
Ernst & Banks, 2002; Battaglia, Jacobs, & Aslin, 2003; Knill & Saunders, 2003; Alais & Burr, 
2004; Gu, Angelaki, & DeAngelis, 2008; Morgan, DeAngelis, & Angelaki, 2008; Fetsch, 
Turner, DeAngelis, & Angelaki, 2009). But how does the brain achieve this feat? That 
is, how does the brain know the uncertainty associated with sensory information 
from moment to moment, and how is this uncertainty encoded in neural responses? 
These questions are at the basis of the research presented in this thesis. Specifically, 
I will investigate the hypothesis that the brain uses probabilities to encode sensory 
information, as has been suggested by several prominent theories (Barlow, 1969; 
Zemel, Dayan, & Pouget, 1998; Anastasio, Patton, & Belkacem-Boussaid, 2000; Hoyer & 
Hyvärinen, 2003; Jazayeri & Movshon, 2006; Ma, Beck, Latham, & Pouget, 2006; Fiser, 
Berkes, Orbán, & Lengyel, 2010). In this introduction, I will first explain in more detail 
what this hypothesis entails. Next, I will discuss some existing behavioral evidence that 
is consistent with probabilistic perceptual inference, but which could also be explained 
by non-probabilistic brains that make use of heuristics based on external cues. Finally, 
I will present an outline of this thesis, which employs novel methodologies in order 
to measure the trial-by-trial uncertainty with which stimuli are represented in human 
visual cortex, while external stimulus properties are held constant. By thus ruling out 
alternative, cue-based strategies, this thesis aims to address to the central question: 
does the brain represent and compute with sensory information probabilistically? 
1.1 PERCEPTION AS PROBABILISTIC INFERENCE
Perception relies on reasoning backwards from effects to causes. It involves, for 
example, determining the objects and their locations in the world that created the 
image currently on your retina. This process is called inference (von Helmholtz, 1867). 
When causes and effects are tightly linked, such that cause X always has effect Y and 
never Z, inference is deterministic: when effect Y is observed, cause X is certain to have 
occurred. The inputs we receive from the world through our senses, however, are not so 
well-behaved. For example, the same object may project different images on our retinas 
from different angles or in different lighting. And these already variable external inputs 
are further corrupted by noise in the responses of the sensory and cortical neurons that 
process them (Schiller, Finlay, & Volman, 1976; Dean, 1981). The reality of perception, 
15
G E N E R A L  I N T R O D U C T I O N
then, is a murky one, where causes and effects are not linked by exclusive, deterministic 
relationships, but rather by probabilities. Given a cause X, there is a certain probability 
that effect Y may occur, but Z is also possible, and Y and Z can both arise from other 
causes as well. Consequently, a sensory response (effect) typically has multiple possible 
interpretations (causes), each with a certain probability of being correct. 
To illustrate more concretely how uncertainty can arise, and why it might necessitate a 
probabilistic description, consider the following analogy of a scenario depicted in Fig. 1.2. 
Two people, a learned statistician and a naïve student, are playing a game in a closed 
room with five light bulbs. Each light bulb is connected to one of five switches outside 
the room. A round of the game starts with the game master activating just one of these 
switches, turning on one of the lights. Both players know which switch is connected to 
which bulb, and their job is to predict which switch was flipped. The world in this game 
is deterministic and unambiguous, and so the players can always infer with perfect 
accuracy which switch caused the current on-and-off pattern of lights. Importantly, the 
learned statistician in this case has no advantage over the naïve student.
The game master then makes some changes to the game world’s design. First, she adds 
additional connections so that each switch now controls several adjacent light bulbs. 
Secondly, she tampers with the wiring so that it becomes unreliable. Thus, each switch 
now has a certain probability of turning on any one (or several) of the bulbs; sometimes 
a bulb switches on, sometimes it doesn’t, according to the specified probabilities. To 
give the players a fair chance, the game master does inform them about these changes, 
including the probabilities of each of the switches turning on each of the lights. As 
before, the game master starts each round of the game by flipping just one of the 
switches, and the players have to work out which switch this was based on the light(s) 
that were turned on. The game world has now become ambiguous (as each light can 
be turned on by multiple switches) and stochastic (as activating a switch does not 
consistently produce the same outcome). As a result, the information in the pattern of 
lights, regarding which switch was flipped, has been rendered uncertain. This lays bare 
the difference between the learned statistician and the naïve student. The latter does 
not know or care about uncertainty, and only determines which switch is most likely 
to have produced the current pattern of lights. The former, on the other hand, uses her 
statistical knowledge to compute, for each switch, the probability that it was flipped.
16
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Figure 1.2: Inference in a certain and in an uncertain world. In each scenario, five light bulbs 
are connected to five switches. In the certain world, each switch is connected to only one bulb, 
and when pressed, a switch always turns on its light. Only one switch can be in the ‘on’ position 
at any time. When we see that the middle light is on, we can infer with complete certainty (a 
probability of 1) that the 3rd switch must have been pressed. In the uncertain world, each switch 
is connected to several bulbs, and has a probability of 0.8, 0.4 or 0.2 of turning on a connected 
light (probabilities are indicated by the color and thickness of the connections; connections for 
the middle switch are emphasized, as those for the other switches follow the same pattern). 
If we now see that only the middle light is on, this is consistent with several possibilities. As 
before, it is most likely that the 3rd switch was pressed, but it could also have been any of the 
other switches, albeit with a somewhat lower probability.
The learned statistician can now develop an advantage over the naïve student, if the 
object of the game is altered even slightly. For example, the players could be asked to 
bet money on a given switch having been flipped. The student has very little to go on in 
this scenario, as he only knows which switch is most likely, but now how likely, and he 
has no knowledge of the probabilities of other switches. As a result, he cannot evaluate 
how likely he is to win, and how much money he should bet. The statistician, on the 
other hand, knows exactly how likely she would be to either win or lose money on each 
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switch, and can adjust her decisions accordingly. If the players completed multiple 
rounds of this betting game, the statistician would almost certainly go home with more 
money than the student.
This analogy once again demonstrates the utility of knowing the uncertainty in a 
decision, and serves to illustrate some key concepts in probabilistic perceptual inference. 
The first of these is the concept of uncertainty itself, which is defined, in the broadest 
sense, as the degree to which probabilities are spread across possible inferences. When 
the game world was deterministic, all probability was concentrated on one switch, 
which therefore had a probability of 1. After introducing uncertainty to the game world, 
probability was spread over all five switches. Mathematically, we can define uncertainty 
as a number that quantifies the spread of probability within a distribution. On such 
definition is the entropy1 of the distribution, which can be applied to distributions of 
various shapes over variables that may be discrete (such as the identity of an activated 
light switch) or continuous (such as the location of a snake). However, when dealing 
with continuous variables, the variance or standard deviation of the distribution are 
often used instead. These can be thought of as measuring the width of the distribution 
(at least when distributions are approximately symmetric and unimodal). 
Another relevant concept is that of a generative model, which describes how causes 
in the world are probabilistically connected to observed effects. In perception, a cause 
is typically a stimulus, and the effect it produces is a sensory or neural response. By 
analogy, in the light bulb game, causes are switches being pressed, and effects are lights 
turning on. The generative model for this game, then, is formalized by the probabilities 
. Recall that the game master informed the players of these 
probabilities. Thus, each player has perfect knowledge of the generative model of 
the game world. As will be discussed in chapter 6, one of the ways that the learned 
statistician could be achieving her goal (to compute, for each switch, the probability 
that it was pressed, given the pattern of lights she observes), is to use her knowledge of 
this generative model. This is also the logic behind the probabilistic decoding approach 
that will be developed in chapter 3. 
Finally, the analogy of the light bulb game serves to clarify some subtleties in the central 
question of this thesis: does the brain represent and compute with sensory information 
probabilistically? In our analogy, the role of the sensory response is played by the lights 
1. The entropy of a probability density distribution over a variable x is given by H = − ∫ p(x) log p(x)dx. 
Its unit depends on the base of the logarithm (e.g. “bits” for base 2 and “nats” for base e). Low entropy values 
correspond to low uncertainty (with 0 being the lowest possible entropy, when all probability is concentrated 
in one place).
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being turned on. When the game master introduced ambiguity and stochasticity into the 
game world, this rendered the information in the pattern of lights inherently uncertain. 
Importantly, this uncertainty exists regardless of which player is observing the lights; 
the players only differ in how they “read” the lights. While the statistician calculates 
the uncertainty in each pattern of lights, and uses this to optimize her decisions, the 
naïve student does neither. Similarly, there is no doubt that the responses of sensory 
and cortical neurons carry inherently uncertain information, or that this information 
is most accurately described by a probability distribution. A very important and open 
question, however, is if the brain “knows” about this uncertainty and uses probabilities 
in its computations. Or, to phrase the question in the vocabulary of the analogy: does 
the brain play the game like the learned statistician, or like the naïve student? 
1.2 BEHAVIORAL EVIDENCE
How can we find out whether the brain operates more like the statistician or the student? 
Recall that when the objective of the game was adjusted such that uncertainty became 
important, these two players made different choices in the game. Likewise, given a 
carefully constructed perceptual task, human observers should make different choices 
under uncertainty depending on whether their perceptual inferences are probabilistic 
or not. In particular, as will be discussed below, an observer using probabilistic inference 
should give less weight to uncertain information. Most (if not all) studies on probabilistic 
perceptual inference, including the work presented in thesis, are based on this basic 
logic. Furthermore, many behavioral studies on this topic have focused on a common 
perceptual operation, which is the integration of sensory evidence from multiple sources. 
This section discusses how sensory evidence is integrated by a probabilistic observer, 
the predictions that follow from this, and existing behavioral evidence consistent with 
those predictions. 
When knowledge about a sensory variable is represented as a probability distribution, 
there is a simple mathematical rule for how knowledge from different sources about 
the same variable should be combined. As long as the information obtained from each 
source is independent, this rule holds that the probability distributions should simply 
be multiplied together. The distribution that results from this multiplication is the most 
accurate and complete representation of all the knowledge that can be gained from 
the combined sources. To see how this works in practice, we will consider the process 
of multisensory integration, in which evidence is combined from multiple sensory 
modalities. A concrete example of this is the scenario described at the beginning of this 
introduction, where we received information about the location of a rattlesnake from 
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both our eyes and our ears. The input received from each sense is consistent with a range 
of places where the snake could be. Thus, we can express our knowledge about the 
snake’s location, given each input, as a probability distribution (see Fig. 1.3). If  and  
are the visual and auditory sensory responses evoked by the snake, then our knowledge 
about its location  given each sense alone is described by the unisensory probability 
distributions  and . Following the multiplication rule mentioned earlier, 
our belief about the snake’s location given the input from both senses combined is then 
given by:
(1.1)
This multiplication is illustrated in Fig. 1.3. As can be seen in this illustration, the 
resulting distribution  has some very intuitive properties. First, it is narrower 
than either of the distributions we started with. This reflects the fact that when we 
combine information from multiple sources, our uncertainty must always decrease (or 
at the very least, it can never grow). Secondly, the new distribution is centered on a 
value of  that is in between the peaks of the original distributions. This shows that our 
best estimate of the snake’s location based on the combined sensory evidence must 
be somewhere in between the estimates given visual or auditory information alone. 
Specifically, the combined estimate is a weighted average of these individual estimates, 
and the weight given to each estimate depends on its associated uncertainty. In this 
example, our ears provided less precise information about the snake’s location than our 
eyes (as reflected by the different widths of the associated distributions), and so the 
final estimate of the snake’s position is closer to the visual estimate. If the associated 
distributions are Normal, the weighted average of the two unisensory estimates can be 
computed as follows:
(1.2)
(1.3)
where  is the multisensory, and  and  are the unisensory (auditory and visual) 
location estimates,  and  are the weights given to auditory and visual information, 
and  and  are the auditory and visual uncertainties (quantified as the variances 
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of the associated distributions). Estimates obtained by this method are often said to 
be statistically optimal. The reason for this is that compared to other estimates, which 
combine the unisensory estimates with different (e.g. equal) weights, this specific 
combination gives the most accurate results (i.e. the estimates it produces have the 
smallest amount of error, on average).
We can thus formulate a very clear prediction about how an observer performing 
probabilistic inference should combine uncertain information from different sensory 
modalities. This prediction has been borne out by a large body of behavioral work. One 
seminal experiment was performed by Ernst & Banks (2002), who had human observers 
report the width of a bar stimulus, based on visual and haptic cues. Both modalities 
were made somewhat unreliable with Gaussian noise, and the reliability of the visual
sCsV sA
Location of snake (s)
p(s |rA,rV)
p(s |rA)
p(s |rV)
savg
σA
σV
σC
Figure 1.3: Probabilistic integration of visual and auditory information. The blue and red 
distributions reflect the knowledge gained about the snake’s location from each sensory 
modality (visual and auditory) alone. The purple distribution, which is the product of the 
red and blue distributions, reflects the statistically optimal combination of this multisensory 
knowledge. The vertical dotted lines and triangles in corresponding colors indicate the 
unisensory and multisensory position estimates ( ,  and ; located at the centers of the 
associated distributions). The gray triangle shows the estimate that would be obtained by 
simply averaging the unisensory estimates ( ), without taking into account the associated 
uncertainty. The uncertainty in each distribution is illustrated by the horizontal double arrows 
at the top of the figure. 
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information was varied from trial to trial. Ernst & Banks observed that their participants 
relied less on the visual information when it carried more uncertainty. Indeed, the 
weights the participants gave to each modality were a close match to the optimal 
weights predicted by equation (1.3). Similar results have been found for the integration 
of many other sensory cues (reviewed in Trommershauser, Körding, & Landy, 2011), 
including motion- and texture-based depth cues (Jacobs & Fine, 1999), stereo and 
texture cues to surface slant (Knill & Saunders, 2003), and visual and auditory cues for 
spatial location (Battaglia et al., 2003; Alais & Burr, 2004). These findings suggest that the 
brain utilizes knowledge about the uncertainty associated with these different sensory 
cues in its perceptual inferences.
Perceptual inference does not exclusively rely on current sensory evidence, however. 
Observers can often improve their performance by relying on prior knowledge to 
constrain their perceptual inferences. This prior knowledge betrays itself in the form 
of perceptual biases, often in the direction of interpretations that are more consistent 
with the statistics of the natural world. For example, humans appear to be biased in 
their perception towards slow speeds of motion (Thompson, 1982; Weiss, Simoncelli, 
& Adelson, 2002; Stocker & Simoncelli, 2006) (but see Thompson, Brooks, & Hammett, 
2006), illumination from above (Mamassian & Goutcher, 2001) and cardinal orientations 
(Tomassini, Morgan, & Solomon, 2010; Girshick, Landy, & Simoncelli, 2011). To an observer 
performing probabilistic inference, incorporating prior knowledge is fundamentally no 
different from combining different sources of sensory evidence. Prior knowledge, too, 
can be represented by a probability distribution (termed a “prior distribution”, or simply 
“prior”) with its own uncertainty. Similar to sensory integration, this prior distribution 
can then be optimally incorporated by multiplying it with distributions representing 
sensory evidence. It also follows that an optimal observer ought to give more weight to 
prior information when sensory evidence is less reliable, and this prediction is supported 
by many behavioral studies as well. For instance, observers perceive moving stimuli with 
lower speeds when their visibility is reduced (Stocker & Simoncelli, 2006), and oriented 
lines as more cardinal when stimuli contain more noise (Tomassini et al., 2010; Girshick 
et al., 2011). Interestingly, neural correlates of the perceptual bias towards lower speed 
have been found in human visual cortex (Vintch & Gardner, 2014). Priors can also be 
learned or modified over the course of an experiment. By thus controlling the shape of 
the prior distribution, experimenters can make quantitative predictions regarding the 
weight that observers ought to assign their prior knowledge. For example, Körding & 
Wolpert (2004) had participants perform a sensorimotor task with visual feedback of 
varying reliability and an experimentally controlled prior distribution. They observed 
that reaching movements made by participants were well fit by a Bayesian model that 
optimally incorporated this prior distribution by taking into account the reliability 
22
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of visual feedback on individual trials. Together, these findings suggest that, similar 
to sensory integration, observers take into account their sensory uncertainty when 
integrating sensory evidence and prior knowledge. 
In recent years, new experimental paradigms have been devised that probe 
probabilistic inference in more complex settings. In tasks varying from visual search 
(Ma, Navalpakkam, Beck, van den Berg, & Pouget, 2011), to judgments of sameness and 
simultaneity (van den Berg, Vogel, Josić, & Ma, 2012; Magnotti, Ma, & Beauchamp, 2013), 
orientation categorization (Qamar et al., 2013) and hierarchical decision-making (Purcell 
& Kiani, 2016), observers have been found to make (near-)optimal decisions or reports 
regarding their trial-by-trial percepts. These results suggest that probabilistic inference 
in the brain is not restricted merely to the integration of information in a single stimulus 
dimension, but extends to tasks that require more intricate and often multi-layered 
perceptual inferences. 
1.3 THE HEURISTIC EXPLANATION
The behavioral findings discussed above suggest that human observers somehow take 
into account the uncertainty in sensory input, in order to make optimal decisions. That 
is, their outward behavior resembles that of the learned statistician in the light bulb 
game described earlier (see section 1.1 & Fig. 1.2). However, this does not mean that 
they achieve this by actually computing the uncertainty in the current sensory response. 
Instead, it is possible that the brain relies on heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974): 
simple rules specifying the uncertainty associated with sensory information, based on 
external cues. These rules may be learned from prior experiences. For example: “visual 
input is unreliable in the dark” is a heuristic that an observer may develop based on a 
history of perceptual errors in dark environments. Thus, to combine information from 
different sources, an observer using heuristics need only look up the right weights to 
assign to each source in a mental “lookup table”. Note, however, that a heuristics-based 
implementation of optimal inference is rather inflexible, as it can only accommodate 
fixed relationships between external cues and sensory uncertainty. These relationships 
must be learned over time, such that heuristics are ineffective in novel situations, or in 
environments with quickly changing rules. Another problem is that sensory uncertainty 
may be influenced by many factors, often simultaneously. Each cue requires its own 
heuristic rule, which must also include instructions regarding its interactions with 
other cues. This could quickly lead to a combinatorial explosion of rules, all of which 
would have to be implemented in neural circuitry. Additionally, a substantial portion 
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of sensory uncertainty (e.g. uncertainty due to internal noise) may not lend itself to a 
heuristic description, being linked to factors that cannot be measured without their 
own uncertainty, or even measured at all. 
These theoretical challenges do not rule out heuristics as a way for the brain to implement 
(near-)optimal inference, however, particularly in the context of experimental tasks, 
where all but a few variables are tightly controlled, and thus only a few simple heuristics 
might suffice. Consider, for example, an experiment in which the reliability of a visual 
stimulus is manipulated by changing its contrast. A participant in this experiment 
might develop a strategy, solely for the purpose of solving the experimental task, of 
down-weighting visual evidence when contrast is low. This is particularly germane to 
experiments in which feedback is given after every trial, which could aid participants in 
learning the appropriate cue-to-uncertainty mapping (Ma & Jazayeri, 2014). 
1.4 OUTLINE OF THIS THESIS
How, then, can we determine whether the brain really computes a trial-by-trial 
representation of the uncertainty in sensory responses, rather than “cheating” by using 
heuristics? Note that heuristic-based strategies require the availability of some external 
cue that is related to uncertainty. If external stimulus properties are held constant, an 
observer does not have access to such cues, and any remaining fluctuations in uncertainty 
must derive from internal variability in the responses of sensory and cortical neurons. If 
the brain relies exclusively on heuristics, then we should find that observers are unable 
to take this internally generated uncertainty into account in their perceptual decisions. 
If, on the other hand, the brain directly computes the uncertainty in neural population 
responses, then internal uncertainty should play a role in perceptual decisions. This, 
then, is a strong prediction that follows from the hypothesis of probabilistic sensory 
representations.  To verify this prediction experimentally, however, requires that we be 
able to measure the uncertainty in internal representations from moment to moment. 
In this thesis, I first describe the development of a new probabilistic decoding algorithm, 
which allows us to make such measurements. I then discuss several experiments using 
this new approach, in which we test the prediction that internal uncertainty weighs into 
perceptual decisions. 
Specifically, in chapter two, I first explore the structure of response variability in human 
visual cortex, and its relationship to neural tuning properties. These findings are used to 
inform the generative model of the decoding algorithm. Chapter three describes the 
details of this algorithm, which differs from conventional decoders in that it allows us to 
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estimate the uncertainty in a pattern of cortical activity. This chapter also covers various 
tests that were carried out to further verify the underlying assumptions of the algorithm. 
Having established that the decoder passes these tests, I then describe in chapter four 
the results from an fMRI experiment in which this new decoding algorithm is used to 
investigate whether human observers represent sensory information probabilistically. 
In this study, we estimate the trial-by-trial uncertainty in stimulus representations, and 
use this to predict perceptual decisions made by participants. In chapter five, the same 
novel decoding approach is used to investigate whether human observers take internal 
uncertainty into account when integrating sensory evidence from the present and 
the recent past. Finally, I will conclude in chapter six by discussing the findings of the 
previous chapters in a broader light.

2
THE STRUCTURE 
OF CORRELATED 
RESPONSE VARIABILITY 
IN HUMAN VISUAL 
CORTEX
Parts of this chapter are to be published as: 
van Bergen, R.S., & Jehee, J.F.M. (in press). 
Uncertainty in fMRI activity is revealed when forward 
models include correlated noise. NeuroImage 
 An additional paper based on this chapter is in preparation, 
by authors R.S. van Bergen, W.J. Ma, & J.F.M. Jehee
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ABSTRACT
Neurons respond differently to repeated presentations of identical stimuli. This random 
response variability, or “noise”, can be harmful to the encoding of information in neural 
responses, especially when noise is correlated between neurons with similar tuning 
properties. To fully understand how neural populations process information, it is 
therefore crucial to know the structure of their shared noise. In this study, we focus on 
activity in the human visual cortex (V1, V2 & V3), for which the covariance structure 
is largely unknown. Cortical activity evoked by randomly oriented grating stimuli was 
measured using fMRI. We estimated the degree of shared noise between fMRI voxels as a 
function of inter-voxel distance, and the similarity in orientation tuning. To appropriately 
estimate tuning similarity, we developed a new method that we show, via mathematical 
derivations and simulations, is unbiased. This is in contrast to the field’s gold standard, 
which we show is biased to reveal tuning-dependent structure in noise, even if such 
structure does not exist in reality. Applying the newly developed, unbiased analysis to 
human fMRI data, we find that noise in human visual cortex is shared between similarly 
tuned neural populations.
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
It is a curious fact that neurons, which are highly reliable when studied in isolation 
in a Petri dish (Mainen & Sejnowski, 1995), become erratic in their responses when 
embedded in neural circuits (Schiller et al., 1976; Dean, 1981). Given the same 
repeated stimulus, a neuron in vitro will generate nearly identical spike trains, while 
its in vivo counterpart will produce different responses each time. This variability, or 
“noise”, presents a challenge to both experimenters wishing to map neural response 
properties, and to the brain, which has to encode information in these responses. These 
challenges are closely related, as are their solutions. In both cases, there is a particular 
part of the response that is of interest, which is often called the “signal”. This signal is 
the portion of the neural response which depends deterministically on external input, 
and which therefore carries information about this input. For low-level visual neurons, 
this deterministic coupling is typically characterized by a tuning curve, which relates 
variations along basic stimulus dimensions (such as contrast or orientation) to changes 
in a neuron’s average response. 
Noise obscures the signal, limiting the information that a neural response can convey. 
From a neural coding perspective, when noise is independent between neurons, this 
information loss is ameliorated by redundancy in the neural code, allowing noise 
to be “averaged out” across neurons that are tuned to the same stimulus property. 
Experimenters deal with noise in a similar way, by averaging responses of the same 
neuron to repeated presentations of the same stimulus. When noise is shared between 
neurons, however, this strategy breaks down, as correlated noise cannot be averaged 
out. Moreover, if noise is shared preferentially between neurons with similar tuning 
properties, then the noise that remains after averaging may be indistinguishable from 
a tuning response, causing ambiguity in the neural code (an effect illustrated in Fig. 
2.1; see also Abbott & Dayan, 1999; Averbeck & Lee, 2006; Moreno-Bote et al., 2014; 
Shadlen & Newsome, 1998; Zohary, Shadlen, & Newsome, 1994). In order to develop 
a comprehensive model of cortical information processing, it is thus essential to 
understand the influence of noise correlations. This study therefore investigates the 
correlational structure of noise in human visual cortex.
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of the effects of independent and (tuning-dependent) correlated 
noise on neural coding. Shown are the responses of a population of neurons to a constant 
stimulus, the orientation of which is indicated by the orange dotted line. Neurons are sorted 
along the x-axis based on their preferred stimulus. Orange solid curves indicate the average 
response of each neuron (determined by its tuning preference) to the presented stimulus. 
Green dots are the responses of the neurons on a single trial. Insets depict the matrix of 
noise correlations ( ) between neurons, as a function of their preferred stimulus. In the 
left panel, noise is independent, and thus the noise correlation matrix is diagonal. Noise goes 
in all directions regardless of neural tuning preference, and thus the central tendency of the 
population’s response (the population resultant vector, green dotted lines) is not pulled in any 
particular direction in stimulus space. In the right panel, noise is positively correlated between 
neurons with similar tuning preferences, and anti-correlated between neurons that prefer 
very different (orthogonal) stimuli. The noise therefore contains structure that is related to 
the preferred stimulus, which shifts the central tendency of the population’s response in the 
stimulus dimension. Thus, even though the overall amount of noise is similar between the two 
panels, tuning-dependent correlated noise is much more harmful to the amount of stimulus 
information contained in the population’s response. 
In macaque visual cortex, noise correlations are known to be related to the distance 
between neurons, and, interestingly, to the similarity between their tuning curves 
(Zohary et al., 1994; Bair, Zohary, & Newsome, 2001; Kohn & Smith, 2005; Smith & 
Kohn, 2008). Do noise correlations in human visual cortex, which we currently know 
little about, show a similar pattern? To address this question, we measured responses 
in human visual areas to simple oriented stimuli, using functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI). We then related the degree of shared noise in these responses to the 
distance between voxels within the brain, as well as their orientation tuning properties. 
Crucially, these tuning properties have to be estimated from the same measured 
responses that we suspect may contain correlated noise. We reasoned that if voxels 
incur shared noise, which affects the similarity of their responses, this might also 
influence the estimated similarity of their tuning properties. Could standard analyses 
therefore be biased to reveal links between tuning similarity and noise correlations that 
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do not actually exist? Through mathematical derivations, verified on simulated data, 
we show that standard estimation methods are indeed subject to such a bias, which 
has hitherto been overlooked. Next, we outline a proposed solution to this bias, which 
involves cross-correlating tuning curves estimated on independent data partitions. By 
simulating fMRI data for which the true voxel tuning preferences are known, we confirm 
that this solution avoids the bias in estimated tuning similarity. 
Equipped with this unbiased method, we then return to our initial question regarding 
noise correlations in human visual cortex. Interestingly, we find that both our unbiased 
and the standard methodology indicate that noise correlations depend on both distance 
and tuning similarity. In contrast, the standard, biased approach appears to greatly 
overestimate the dependence on tuning. Our results provide important information 
on the structure of noise correlations in human visual cortex, while simultaneously 
presenting a cautionary tale regarding the estimation of neural tuning properties on 
data with shared noise.  
2.2 METHODS & MATERIALS
2.2.1 Participants
Eighteen healthy adult volunteers (aged 22-31 years, seven female) provided written 
and informed consent to participate in this study. All had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. The study was approved by the Radboud University Institutional Review Board.
2.2.2 MRI data acquisition
MRI data were acquired using a Siemens 3T Magnetom Trio scanner with an eight-
channel occipital coil located at the Donders Center for Cognitive Neuroimaging. A 
high-resolution T1-weighted magnetization-prepared rapid gradient echo anatomical 
scan (MPRAGE, FOV 256 x 256, 1 mm isotropic voxels) was acquired for each participant 
at the start of the session. Functional imaging data were collected using T2*-weighted 
gradient-echo echoplanar imaging, in 30 slices oriented perpendicular to the calcarine 
sulcus, covering all of the occipital and part of posterior parietal and temporal cortex (TR 
2000 ms, TE 30 ms, flip angle 90°, FOV 64 x 64, slice thickness 2.2 mm, in-plane resolution 
2.2 x 2.2 mm).
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2.2.3 Experimental design & stimuli
Stimuli were generated by a Macbook Pro computer running Matlab and the 
Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997), and displayed on a rear-projection 
screen using a luminance-calibrated EIKI projector (resolution 1024 x 768 pixels, refresh 
rate 60 Hz). Observers viewed the visual display through a mirror mounted on the head 
coil.  
Participants were required to maintain fixation on a central bull’s eye target (radius: 
0.25°) throughout each experimental run. Each run consisted of an initial fixation period 
(4 s), followed by 18   stimulus trials (12 s) and a final fixation period (4 s). Trials were 
separated by a 4 s inter-trial interval. Each trial started with the presentation of an 
orientation stimulus (1.5 s). Orientation stimuli were counterphasing sinusoidal gratings 
(contrast: 10%, spatial frequency: 1 cycle/°, randomized spatial phase, 2 Hz sinusoidal 
contrast modulation) presented in an annulus surrounding fixation (inner radius: 1.5°, 
outer radius: 7.5°, grating contrast decreased linearly to 0 over the outer and inner 
0.5° radius of the annulus). The orientation of the stimulus was determined pseudo-
randomly (from 0-179°) to ensure an approximately even sampling of orientations in 
each run. The grating was followed by a fixation interval (6.5 s), and then a response 
period (4 s) in which a black line (length: 2.8°, width: 0.1°) appeared at the center of the 
screen at an initially random orientation. The line disappeared gradually over the last 
1 s of the response period to indicate the approaching end of this window. Subjects 
reported the orientation of the grating by rotating the line using separate buttons for 
clockwise or counterclockwise rotation on an MRI-compatible button box. 
Participants completed 10-18 stimulus runs. Each scan session also included two visual 
localizer runs, in which flickering checkerboard patterns were presented within the 
same aperture as the gratings (check size: 0.5°, display rate: 10 Hz, contrast: 100%). 
Checkerboards were presented in 12 second blocks, interleaved with fixation blocks of 
equal duration. 
Retinotopic maps of visual cortex were acquired in a separate scan session using 
conventional retinotopic mapping procedures (Sereno et al., 1995; DeYoe et al., 1996; 
Engel, Glover, & Wandell, 1997). 
2.2.4 Functional MRI data preprocessing and regions of interest
Functional images were motion corrected using FSL’s MCFLIRT (Jenkinson, Bannister, 
Brady, & Smith, 2002) and passed through a high-pass temporal filter with a cut-off 
period of 40 seconds to remove slow drifts in the BOLD signal. Residual motion-induced 
fluctuations in the BOLD signal were removed through linear regression, based on the 
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alignment parameters generated by MCFLIRT. Functional volumes were aligned to a 
previously collected anatomical reference scan using FreeSurfer (Fischl, Sereno, & Dale, 
1999). 
Regions of interest (ROIs; V1, V2 and V3) were defined on the reconstructed cortical 
surface using standard procedures (Sereno et al., 1995; DeYoe et al., 1996; Engel et al., 
1997). Within each area, we selected all voxels that responded to the localizer stimulus 
at a lenient threshold (p < 0.05 uncorrected) for subsequent analysis, in the native space 
for each participant. 
The time series of each voxel was Z-normalized using the corresponding time points 
of all trials in a given run. Activation patterns for each trial were defined by averaging 
together the first 4 s of each trial, after adding a 4 s temporal shift to account for 
hemodynamic delay. This relatively short time window (4 s) was chosen in order to 
ensure that activity from the response window was excluded from analysis. 
2.2.5 Analysis of fMRI data
2.2.5.1 Tuning & noise. The estimation of voxel tuning properties started with the 
assumption that the response of each voxel on a given trial was a linear combination 
of the responses of eight hypothetical populations of neurons with idealized tuning 
curves, plus noise:
(2.1)
where  is the response of the -th voxel on the -th trial,  is the orientation of the 
stimulus on the -th trial,  is the tuning curve of the -th neural population,  
controls the contribution of the -th neural population to voxel ’s tuning properties, 
and  is the noise in voxel ’s response on the -th trial. Population tuning curves were 
positive-rectified cosine functions raised to the fifth power (Brouwer & Heeger, 2011):
(2.2)
where  is the preferred orientation of the -th population. We used two separate 
analyses to determine the tuning properties of the voxels, and the covariance structure 
between voxels. For the first analysis, tuning coefficients  were estimated 
using ordinary least squares regression:
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(2.3)
where  and . A matrix of tuning correlations for each voxel 
was then defined as follows:
(2.4)
where  is the tuning correlation between voxels  and . The lower triangular portion 
of this matrix (i.e.  where ) corresponds to the correlation coefficients between 
all unique non-self-pairings between voxels, and was used in subsequent analyses. 
After estimating voxel tuning properties, noise values and correlations were obtained 
as follows:
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The lower triangular portion of the matrix  corresponds to the noise 
correlations between unique non-self pairings between voxels, and was used in 
subsequent analyses.
The second analysis was developed to avoid biases in the tuning estimation procedure 
due to correlated noise in the data (see Results). For this analysis, data for each subject 
were first split into two independent partitions of trials. The first partition consisted 
of voxel activations and stimuli   from odd-numbered fMRI runs, while the 
second partition  came from even-numbered fMRI runs. Using these two 
partitions, two sets of tuning coefficients, and , were estimated. The cross-
correlation between the tuning curves corresponding to each set of estimated tuning 
coefficients was computed as follows:
(2.7)
while noise values were defined as: 
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Noise correlations were obtained using equation (2.6). 
2.2.5.2 Model comparison. To determine how noise correlations might depend on the 
Euclidean distance and tuning similarity between voxels, we first sorted pairs of voxels 
into 20 x 20 bins of similar Euclidian distances and tuning correlations. Within each bin, 
we then calculated the average noise correlation, tuning similarity, and distance, across 
all voxel pairs in the bin. This produced, for each observer, a three-dimensional “noise 
correlation surface”. To determine the best description for the shape of this surface, 
four different models were fit to the surface obtained for each individual observer. 
Each model described noise correlations as a combination of one or more exponential 
decay functions of inter-voxel distance and/or tuning similarity. In the first model, noise 
correlations in the data are described by an exponential decay as a function of inter-
voxel distance:
(2.9)
where  is the Euclidean distance between the coordinates of voxels  and ,  is 
the predicted noise correlation between those voxels,  and  determine the rate 
and starting value of the decay, and  models a constant baseline correlation among 
all voxels. In model 2, noise correlations decay exponentially with decreasing tuning 
similarity:
(2.10)
where  is the estimated tuning similarity (quantified as the correlation between 
estimated tuning curves) for voxels  and ,  and  control the rate and starting value 
of the decay (equivalent to  and  in model 1), and  again models a constant baseline. 
The third model described noise correlations by means of two independent exponential 
decay functions: a decay with distance and a decay with decreasing tuning similarity:
(2.11)
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Note that this is essentially a sum of models 1 and 2, and thus the parameters are the 
same as in those models:  and  are the initial amplitude and rate of the decay with 
distance ,  and  are the amplitude and rate of the decay with decreasing tuning 
similarity , and  is the overall baseline correlation among all voxels.
Finally, in model 4, noise correlations decline as a function of an interaction between 
distance and tuning similarity. This means they are modeled as a product of the two 
exponential decay functions that appeared in the previous models:
(2.12)
Note that while each decay function still has its own decay rate (  for distance,  for 
tuning similarity), they now share a single initial amplitude ( ). The overall baseline 
correlation between all voxels is again described by . Thus, models 1 and 2 have three 
free parameters, model 3 has five, and model 4 has four.
Model parameters were fit to the Fisher-transformed noise correlation surfaces by 
minimizing the sum of squared residuals, using Matlab’s lsqcurvefit function. Parameter 
fits were constrained such that amplitudes (  & ) and decay rates (  & ) were always 
non-negative. To assess the goodness-of-fit of each model, we computed the adjusted 
coefficient of determination (R2adj), which includes a correction for the degrees of 
freedom in each model. To determine whether a model explained a significant amount 
of variance, we employed a one-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test over the R2adj values 
across observers (note that a one-tailed test is appropriate here because R2adj is bounded 
at 0). To compare the fits of different models, we used a two-tailed version of the same 
test. 
2.2.6 Simulation procedures
To illustrate the noise correlation-dependent estimation bias in a toy example, we 
simulated data according to the following procedures. For each simulated pair of voxels, 
we first generated orientation tuning curves. Each tuning curve consisted of a set of 
mean responses to eight stimulus values “presented” in a hypothetical experiment. 
These mean responses were drawn at random from a bivariate normal distribution:
(2.13)
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where  and  are the mean responses of the pair of voxels to the -th stimulus, 
with  controlling the variance of and  the correlation between  and . 
Across-trial variability around these means was simulated by drawing at random, for 
each trial of the hypothetical experiment, from a bivariate Normal response distribution:
(2.14)
where y1ik and y2ik are the responses of the two voxels to the -th repetition of the -th 
stimulus, with  corresponding to the variance and  to the correlation in the 
across-trial response variability of the pair of voxels, around their stimulus-dependent 
mean response. 
Data were simulated according to equations (2.13) and (2.14) with various parameter 
settings. In one set of simulations, data were generated under the null hypothesis, that 
noise correlations ( ) are unrelated to tuning similarity ( ). In this case, all 
voxels within a data set were simulated to have the same, constant level of . 
In a different set of simulations, data were instead generated under the alternative 
hypothesis, that  and  are in fact linked. In this case, the signal correlation 
for a pair of voxels was defined as: .  
Another parameter that was varied in our simulations is what we call the “effective signal-
to-noise ratio”, defined as , which reflects the overall influence that noise 
in the data has on the analysis. If each stimulus is repeated only once,  equals 1, and 
the effective SNR becomes equal to the instantaneous SNR for a single response, which 
is defined as the ratio between the signal and noise variances ( ). In all simulations, 
 was set to 50, and the signal variance  was set to 1. With these parameters held 
constant,  was varied by manipulating the noise variance . 
Each combination of parameters settings was used to generate data at a range of 
different noise correlations (i.e. different values of ), starting at -0.9 and increasing 
to 0.9 in steps of 0.1. For every unique combination of parameters thus produced, we 
simulated 105 pairs of voxels, and 8 x 50 = 400 responses for each of those pairs. 
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2.3 RESULTS
In this study, we examine the structure of noise correlations in fMRI activity in human 
visual cortex, looking specifically for possible relationships with the distance and tuning 
similarity between voxels. In order to do this, voxel tuning properties must first be 
estimated from fMRI data. One straightforward approach would be to estimate tuning 
for all voxels using the same trials. Indeed, this approach is considered to be the gold 
standard in neuroscientific research, used in the majority of neurophysiological studies 
(e.g. Bair, Zohary, & Newsome, 2001; Kohn & Smith, 2005; Smith & Kohn, 2008; Zohary 
et al., 1994). However, as we will show below, this approach has a critical shortcoming: 
estimating tuning properties on data with shared noise renders the estimated tuning 
properties vulnerable to second-order estimation biases. That is, while the estimated 
tuning curves may not over- or underestimate the true tuning curves on average (i.e. no 
first-order bias), correlations between estimated tuning curves are nonetheless pulled 
towards correlations in the noise. We will first exemplify the notion that shared noise 
may induce biases in estimates of tuning similarity, before turning towards correlations 
in fMRI data from human visual cortex.
2.3.1 An rnoise-dependent estimation bias
2.3.1.1 A toy example. Consider the following hypothetical experiment (illustrated 
in Fig. 2.2). In order to estimate the tuning properties of a pair of voxels, we measure 
their simultaneous responses to repeated presentations of six different stimuli (e.g. 
stimuli of six different orientations). Each voxel has fixed tuning preferences that 
dictate its average response to each of the six stimuli, but around hat average, there is 
some random variability (or noise) in the voxel responses. Thus, when each stimulus is 
presented ten times, this elicits ten different responses. To estimate each voxel’s tuning 
strength to a given stimulus, we compute the average of these ten responses. Because 
these responses contain noise, our estimate of the mean response to each stimulus will 
contain some degree of error with respect to the true mean. The goal of the experiment 
is to estimate the tuning similarity between the two voxels, quantified as the correlation 
between their estimated tuning curves. For the sake of this example, we will assume 
that this correlation is actually zero.
Now suppose that noise is strongly anti-correlated between the two voxels: when the 
response of voxel 1 is higher than the average, the response of voxel 2 is nearly always 
lower, by a roughly equal amount. What effect does this have on the tuning estimates? 
Since we measured the responses of both voxels to each stimulus simultaneously, 
shared noise in those responses causes the errors in their tuning estimates to be linked. 
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Figure 2.2: Graphical intuition for the -dependent estimation bias in a toy example. Shown 
are the responses of two hypothetical voxels to repeated presentations of six different stimulus 
values, indicated by different colors. True tuning values , shown here as crosses, are 
uncorrelated ( ), as evident from the fact that (for illustrative purposes) they lie on 
the perimeter of a circle. Around the true mean response to each stimulus value, responses on 
individual trials (small dots) follow a noisy distribution. This noise causes the mean responses 
to be estimated with some error. In this illustration, noise is anti-correlated, and more spread 
out along the axis indicated by the light blue arrows than in the orthogonal axis of the light 
pink arrows. The mean responses tend to be misestimated along the principal direction of the 
noise. Consequently, the tuning estimates , denoted by circles, are somewhat anti-
correlated ( ), describing a more elongated shape than the true tuning values. 
Thus, anti-correlated noise causes a negative bias in the estimated tuning similarity.
If the mean response of voxel 1 to a given stimulus is overestimated because its average 
noise for that stimulus was positive, the tuning for voxel 2 to that same stimulus will 
tend to be underestimated, because it received (approximately) equal but opposite 
noise. This pattern will repeat itself across all six stimuli: whenever tuning strength is 
overestimated for voxel 1, it will tend to be underestimated for voxel 2, and vice versa. 
As a result, the correlation between the estimated tuning curves will not be zero, as it 
was for the true tuning curves, but negative, just as the noise correlation was negative.
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In general, and on average, voxels with anti-correlated noise will thus appear to have 
anti-correlated tuning preferences when analyzed using this standard approach. By the 
same token, the converse is true for voxels with positively correlated noise. Consequently, 
estimates of tuning similarity are biased to appear linked to noise correlations, even 
when tuning similarity and correlated noise are in fact unrelated.   
2.3.1.2 Mathematical derivation. In the toy example presented above, we have 
explained, intuitively, why correlated noise should bias estimates of tuning similarity. We 
will now derive this relationship more formally, for a general version of this hypothetical 
experiment. The object of this derivation is to obtain a mathematical expression for the 
expected value of the estimated tuning similarity between two voxels with correlated 
noise, under the null hypothesis that the true tuning similarity is unrelated to noise 
correlations. If it turns out that this expected value nonetheless depends on the degree 
of correlated noise in the data, then this will provide mathematical proof that estimated 
tuning similarity is biased in the direction of noise correlations in the population. 
In our hypothetical experiment, we measured the responses of a pair of voxels to  
repetitions of  different stimulus values. Each response consisted of a voxel’s mean 
response to the stimulus as dictated by its tuning properties, plus random noise. For 
simplicity, we will assume that the mean responses that make up a voxel’s tuning curve 
are drawn from a bivariate Normal distribution:
(2.15)
Where  and  are the average responses of voxels 1 and 2 to the -th stimulus, 
 controls the variance of these responses (this may be approximately interpreted as 
the amplitude of the voxel tuning curves), and  controls the correlation between 
the mean responses across the stimulus set, and thus the similarity between the voxel 
tuning curves. 
Voxel responses in the experiment were noisy. We will assume that this noise is Normally 
distributed, such that voxel responses on individual trials are drawn from another 
bivariate Normal distribution around the voxel tuning curves: 
(2.16)
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where  and  are the responses of the two voxels to the -th repetition of the 
-th stimulus value, σ2 controls the variance of the noise in the voxel responses, and 
 is the noise correlation between the two voxels. Importantly, we do not assume 
any dependency between the values of  and . This therefore corresponds 
to the null hypothesis that there is no true link between tuning similarity and noise 
correlations.
The goal of the experiment is to estimate . This estimate is obtained by computing 
the sample correlation coefficient between the voxels’ estimated mean responses to 
each stimulus value:
(2.17)
(2.18)
where  is the number of times each stimulus is presented. The estimated mean 
responses  and  are a sum of the true mean responses (  and ) and the average 
noise in the responses to each stimulus. Since the noise followed a bivariate Normal 
distribution, its average across trials follows the same bivariate Normal distribution, only 
with its covariance scaled by a factor . Thus,  and  are the sum of two bivariate 
Normally distributed variables. The distribution of a sum of Normally distributed 
variables is simply another Normal distribution, the mean and covariance of which are 
the sum of the means and covariances of the summed variables. Thus, it follows that  
and  must have the following, bivariate Normal distribution:
(2.19)
This can be simplified to:
(2.20)
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with correlation coefficient:
(2.21)
Rearranging this expression yields: 
(2.22)
where
(2.23)
In summary, we have shown that the tuning estimates  and  are sampled from 
a bivariate Normal distribution with correlation coefficient , and this correlation 
coefficient is a linear function of the noise correlation between our two voxels. This linear 
function has slope , and intercept , both of which depend on the effective signal-to-
noise ratio ( ) in the data, where . In words, this ratio represents the 
sensitivity of the tuning estimates to noise in the data, across the whole experiment. 
As such, it not only depends on the ratio of the signal and noise variances , but also 
grows with the number of stimulus repetitions . This is intuitive, as more noisy data 
lead to worse estimates, but if we gather more data, the estimates improve.
2.3.1.2 Sample correlation. Note that the quantity  derived above is the population 
correlation coefficient for the distribution of the tuning estimates. This means that if 
 (the number of different stimuli in our experiment) were infinite, the correlation 
coefficient we would measure between two voxels would have this expected value. 
In practice, we only have a finite sample of different stimuli, and we want to predict 
the correlation coefficient we would expect in this case. This expected value, for the 
sample correlation coefficient, has a standard relationship to the population correlation 
coefficient we just derived:
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This final equation thus allows us to predict the average signal correlations we should 
see in the data. 
Recall that we started from the assumption that there was no true relationship between 
 and . The result of this derivation shows that tuning curves, estimated 
on data with shared noise, will show such a relationship nevertheless. In other words: 
experiments that employ this type of analysis are biased to reject their null hypothesis. 
The derived expression also predicts how strong this bias will be: the lower the effective 
SNR of the experiment, the larger the slope  in equation (2.23), and thus the stronger 
the bias. To illustrate this effect in practice, we simulated data for the experiment 
described above, for 105 hypothetical pairs of voxels, at different values of , 
 and  (Fig. 2.3 – for details of the simulation procedures, see Methods 
& materials, section 2.2.6). The resulting average correlation estimates demonstrate 
exactly the pattern predicted by equations (2.22)–(2.24): estimated signal correlations 
grow linearly with , and the strength of this relationship depends on .
2.3.1.4 Avoiding the bias. This bias clearly poses a problem for studies wanting to relate 
shared variability to tuning properties, as it predisposes them to find relationships that 
do not exist. How can this be avoided? The solution we propose is to remove correlated 
noise from the equation (quite literally), by splitting data into two separate partitions, 
measured at different moments in time. If tuning properties for each voxel (or neuron) in 
a pair are estimated on independent data, any similarity between the estimated tuning 
curves can no longer be due to shared noise (assuming noise is uncorrelated across 
sufficiently disparate time points). This approach should therefore allow us to probe the 
true relationship between tuning similarity and noise correlations in our data.
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Figure 2.3: Simulation results and predictions for the estimation bias in a toy example. (a) 
Open circles are mean signal correlations across pairs of neurons in a hypothetical experiment. 
Signal correlations were estimated from the responses of 105 simulated pairs of neurons, for 8 
stimulus values that were presented 50 times each. Data were simulated for a range of noise 
correlations and at three levels of . Lines correspond to the expected value of  
as predicted by equation (2.24). The true value of  was 0.25, as indicated by the black 
triangle. As predicted by equation (2.22), the average estimated signal correlation increases 
linearly with , even though the true  is constant for all noise correlations. The slope 
of this relationship (i.e. the strength of the association) is diminished with increasing . (b) 
As in a, but now varying the true , while keeping  fixed at a value of 1. This changes 
only the intercept of the linear relationship. In both panels, the predictions from equation (2.24) 
are a near-perfect match to the simulation results. A detailed description of the simulation 
methods is provided in Methods & materials, section 2.2.6.
To test this proposed solution, we divided the simulated data into two independent sets 
of trials, and computed tuning estimates for each data partition. To calculate  for 
a pair of voxels, we then cross-correlated the tuning curves for voxel 1 estimated on the 
first data set, with the tuning curves for voxel 2 estimated on the second data set. The 
estimated tuning correlations were then compared to the simulated noise correlations 
for the same pairs of voxels.  For data simulated under the null hypothesis, the tuning 
similarity estimates obtained with this cross-correlation analysis were no longer linked 
to , confirming that this solution does indeed avoid the estimation bias (Fig. 
2.4a). For data generated under the alternative hypothesis, that  and  are 
in fact linked, our cross-correlation procedure correctly reveals this relationship (Fig. 
2.4b). Note, however, that as long as  is finite, the intercept in equation (2.22) 
will be smaller than the true . This means that, just like correlations produced 
by standard procedures, the estimated  values tend to be smaller in magnitude 
than the true signal correlations. Crucially, however, this bias is constant, and does not 
depend on .
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Figure 2.4: Crossed estimation of  removes the -dependent estimation bias. (a) 
Average estimated  values as a function of , from data simulated according to the 
toy example experiment, with  and  (i.e. the null hypothesis). (b) As in 
(a), but with data simulated such that  (i.e. the alternative hypothesis). In both 
panels, the values produced by the crossed estimator (blue circles) match with expected values 
(purple lines) given by equation (2.22)–(2.24), with  set to 0. This confirms that the crossed 
estimation removes the correlated noise in the voxel responses for the purpose of estimating 
, whereas the standard estimator (red circles) displays the -dependent bias as 
described in the text.
The hypothetical experiment considered here included several simplifying assumptions. 
In a further analysis, we confirmed that the estimation bias also arises when data is 
simulated under less strict assumptions, designed to more closely emulate a real fMRI 
experiment. As before, this estimation bias is avoided when data is analyzed using our 
cross-correlation procedure (Supplementary Fig. 2.1). 
2.3.2 Noise correlations in human visual cortex
With this unbiased estimation procedure in hand, we now turn to fMRI data collected 
from human observers. Are noise correlations in human visual cortex related to distance 
and tuning properties? To address this question, we collected fMRI activity from 18 
human participants, while they viewed oriented grating stimuli. Cortical activity evoked 
by each stimulus was measured in visual areas V1, V2, and V3. To avoid biases in the 
estimation procedure (see above), data were separated in two partitions of trials from 
independent fMRI runs, and two tuning curves were estimated for each voxel; one on 
each partition. Based on these partitions, tuning similarity and noise correlations were 
estimated for each pair of voxels (see Methods & Materials, section 2.2.5 for further 
details). Voxel pairs were then sorted into bins of similar Euclidean distance and tuning 
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similarity ( : the correlation between the estimated tuning curves), and averages 
were computed across the data in each bin. This yielded a three-dimensional “noise 
correlation surface” for each observer, as a function of inter-voxel distance and tuning 
similarity.
To examine how noise correlations depend on distance and tuning similarity, noise 
correlation surfaces were fit with four different models. In each model, noise correlations 
were assumed to decay exponentially. In the first model, this decay was only dependent 
on distance, while in the second, it was a function only of tuning similarity. The third 
model was a sum of the first two, modeling independent exponential decays in the 
two variables. Finally, the fourth model assumed that the exponential decay was 
governed by an interaction between tuning similarity and distance. The goodness-
of-fit of each model was quantified by computing the overfitting-adjusted coefficient 
of determination ( ), and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the  values across 
observers were used to assess whether each model explained significant variance, or 
more variance than another model.
Which of these models best describes the noise correlation structure in striate and 
extrastriate areas of human visual cortex? In striate cortex, noise correlations appear 
to depend mostly on inter-voxel distance (Fig. 2.5a & e), which by itself explained a 
significant portion of variance in the data ( ). Tuning similarity 
on its own did not explain the data well ( ), and the two factors combined did 
not provide a significantly better fit than distance alone (  and , 
for models 3 & 4, resp., compared to model 1). In extrastriate cortex (Fig. 2.5b & e), 
both distance and tuning similarity by themselves explained a significant amount of
Figure 2.5: Noise correlations in human visual cortex depend on distance and tuning similarity 
between voxels. (a-d) Noise correlation surfaces. Mesh surface shows the mean noise correlation 
across pairs of voxels, as a function of mean distance and estimated tuning similarity ( ), 
in 20 x 20 bins defined by distance and tuning similarity. Lines protruding vertically out of the 
surface indicate +1 SEM. (a-c) Noise correlation surfaces obtained with the unbiased estimation 
procedure, in (a) striate cortex, (b) extrastriate cortex and (c) areas V1-V3 combined. (d) 
Noise correlation surface obtained in the combined ROI with a standard (biased) estimation 
procedure. (e) The mean variance explained across observers for four different models of the 
noise correlation structure. For each individual observer, each of four explanatory models were 
fit to the mean noise correlation surfaces across pairs of voxels. Variance explained is quantified 
by R2adj, which incorporates a correction for differences in degrees of freedom between models. 
Bars and errorbars indicate the mean +/- 1 SEM.
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variance (  and ), and an interaction 
between the two factors provided a significantly better fit than any of the other models 
( all comparisons ). If we take striate and extrastriate areas 
together and consider all voxel pairs in this combined ROI (V1, V2 & V3), the pattern 
of results lies (predictably) in between the individual ROIs (Fig. 2.5c & e). We conclude 
that fMRI noise correlations in extrastriate areas depend on an interaction between 
tuning similarity and inter-voxel distance, while in primary visual cortex, they may be 
determined by inter-voxel distance alone.  
What pattern of results would we have observed, had we not corrected for the estimation 
bias in tuning similarity? To address this question, we reanalyzed the data from the 
combined visual ROI using standard procedures, estimating tuning similarity from 
concomitant voxel responses with shared noise. Interestingly, this analysis produced a 
strikingly different pattern of results, with tuning similarity (incorrectly) becoming the 
factor most important in describing the structure of noise correlations in cortex (Fig. 
2.5d–e), and distance explaining very little variance. These markedly different results 
underscore the practical relevance of the  -dependent bias.
2.4 DISCUSSION
This study asked two main questions: how do noise correlations affect estimates of 
tuning similarity, and how are noise correlations in human visual cortex related to 
tuning similarity and inter-voxel distance? Through a combination of mathematical 
derivations, and simulations of fMRI data, we found that standard analysis procedures 
are biased to find links between tuning similarity and noise correlations. To correct for 
this bias, we developed an unbiased estimation procedure which splits voxel responses 
into independent partitions and cross-correlates estimated tuning curves across those 
partitions. We then applied this unbiased estimation method to fMRI data from human 
visual cortex. This revealed that the strength of noise correlations in human visual cortex 
depends on both distance and tuning similarity. 
The -dependent estimation bias that we have demonstrated here is highly relevant 
for analyses that are currently performed in the field. For example, recent years have seen 
the introduction of new analysis methods in neuroimaging, which allow researchers 
to probe the functional connectivity between cortical areas (e.g. Friston, Harrison, & 
Penny, 2003; Goebel, Roebroeck, Kim, & Formisano, 2003). This functional connectivity 
is typically assessed by examining correlated, signal-independent fluctuations in fMRI 
activity. As far as the estimation bias is concerned, these spontaneous co-fluctuations 
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are equivalent to the noise correlations that were the focus of this study. Thus, the 
estimation bias will equally affect studies trying to relate functional connectivity to 
tuning properties. For example, one recent  study (Heinzle, Kahnt, & Haynes, 2011) 
found that functional connectivity between areas V1 and V3 was stronger for voxels 
tuned to similar parts of the visual field. Importantly, tuning properties were estimated 
on the same retinotopic mapping data for all voxels. Another recent study examined 
functional connectivity in auditory cortex (Cha, Zatorre, & Schönwiesner, 2016), and 
found stronger connections between voxels tuned to similar auditory frequencies. 
Here, too, tuning properties for all voxels were estimated from concurrent responses 
to auditory stimuli. The -dependent estimation bias implies that even if these 
functional connections were actually unrelated to voxel tuning properties, shared noise 
would bias the estimated tuning of connected voxels to be more similar than that of 
unconnected voxels. It would be interesting to reanalyze these data with our cross-
correlation approach, to determine to what extent these results would still hold using 
an unbiased estimation procedure. In general, we recommend that any future studies, 
wishing to relate functional connectivity to tuning, take measures to avoid or correct for 
the effects of shared noise on tuning estimates.
The analyses commonly employed in neurophysiological investigations of tuning and 
noise correlations (e.g. Bair, Zohary, & Newsome, 2001; Kohn & Smith, 2005; Smith & 
Kohn, 2008; Zohary et al., 1994) are similarly vulnerable to correlated noise, as they too 
estimate tuning properties on concomitant neural responses. Could the results from 
animal research be ascribed to a statistical bias, as well? While these studies take no 
special precautions to avoid the bias, invasive neurophysiological recordings typically 
benefit from a much higher SNR than fMRI experiments. Neural tuning curves on 
average have much stronger signal-relative-to-noise amplitudes than those of fMRI 
voxels (cf. De Valois, Yund, & Hepler, 1982; Serences, Saproo, Scolari, Ho, & Muftuler, 2009). 
Moreover, neurophysiological experiments typically achieve many more repetitions of 
the same stimulus than is feasible with fMRI. For these reasons, it is likely that noise 
has had a negligible impact on the estimated tuning preferences of neurons in these 
studies. Indeed, simulations with realistic Poisson-spiking neurons indicated that, while 
the bias could be reproduced under these conditions, it required rather implausible 
assumptions about neural tuning amplitudes and the number of stimulus repetitions 
(data not shown). While the bias may be small in neurophysiology, we nonetheless 
believe it would be good practice for neurophysiological studies to undertake more 
robust measures (such as the cross-correlation procedure we have proposed here) to 
avoid an -dependent estimation bias as shown here.  
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Our findings indicate that noise correlations in human visual cortex are related to both 
distance and tuning similarity. It is worth pointing out that the effect of distance may 
in part be due to artifacts of the imaging and pre-processing methods. The point-
spread function of fMRI is such that neighboring voxels receive signal from slightly 
overlapping regions within the scanned volume (Parkes et al., 2005). Additionally, any 
head movements made by the participants, as well as realignment steps to correct 
for those movements during data pre-processing, will further smooth the fMRI data. 
Thus, the responses of any single voxel are inevitably somewhat correlated with those 
of its neighbors. However, it remains to be seen whether such effects can explain the 
relatively long-range correlations we observed (when noise correlations were fit as an 
exponential decay with inter-voxel distance, estimated model parameters indicated 
that it took an average of 4.23 +/- 0.27 mm (mean +/- SEM) for them to decay to 50% of 
their initial magnitude). It is also difficult to reconcile an explanation based on purely 
random spatial smoothing with our findings in extrastriate cortex, where an interaction 
between distance and tuning similarity best described noise correlations.
The dependence of noise correlations on tuning similarity seems unlikely to be explained 
by artifacts, since the imaging and pre-processing methods are blind to orientation 
tuning properties. This suggests that tuning-dependent noise correlations arise from 
neural connectivity shared by similarly tuned neurons. The nature of this connectivity 
remains an open question for future research. One possibility is that it consists of 
connections (either local or global) targeting neural populations with similar tuning, 
that mediate inhibitory or modulatory influences on sensory processing (Lamme, Supèr, 
& Spekreijse, 1998). An alternative explanation is that the underlying connectivity 
spreads out equally in all directions within the cortical sheet, with no additional 
structure set by similarity in tuning. In combination with local cortical biases in tuning 
preferences, which are known to exist in visual cortex (Furmanski & Engel, 2000; Sasaki 
et al., 2006; Mannion, McDonald, & Clifford, 2010), this would lead to a preponderance 
of connections between like-tuned neurons. To further investigate these possibilities, 
it will be interesting to map noise correlations based on distance along the cortical 
sheet, rather than Euclidian distance, and compare the so obtained structure with the 
structure of tuning-based correlations observed here. 
It is important to realize that shared noise not only affects the amount of information 
contained in neural activity, but also any attempt to read out this information from the 
pattern of activity. Indeed, shared noise will affect any fMRI study that uses decoding 
algorithms to uncover properties of neural processing (e.g. Haynes & Rees, 2005; 
Kamitani & Tong, 2005). While ‘naïve’ decoders (i.e., those ignoring noise correlations) can 
produce fairly accurate estimates of the presented stimulus, they are unlikely to capture 
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all the information contained in the voxel activation pattern (Domingos & Pazzani, 1997; 
H. Zhang, 2004; Niculescu-Mizil & Caruana, 2005). Indeed, our recent work showed that 
it is possible to decode the trial-by-trial precision of cortical representations by explicitly 
incorporating into the decoder the noise covariance structure between voxels (see 
chapters 3-4 of this thesis, and van Bergen, Ma, Pratte, & Jehee, 2015), thereby opening a 
novel window onto moment-to-moment fluctuations in cortical information processing. 
In summary, we have demonstrated that the gold standard for investigating the 
relationship between neural tuning properties and correlated variability is biased 
to reveal a link not existent in reality. We also presented a solution to this estimation 
bias: dividing data into independent partitions, and cross-correlating estimated 
tuning properties across opposite halves of the data. This analysis revealed that noise 
correlations are stronger for similarly tuned neural populations, with Euclidian distance 
as an additional important factor mediating shared noise. These results not only advance 
our knowledge regarding correlated variability in human visual cortex, but also present 
a cautionary tale for studies employing similar analyses.
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2.5 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
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Supplementary Figure 2.1: Estimation bias and unbiased solution in realistic simulations 
of fMRI data. To verify that the -dependent estimation bias does not depend on 
the specifics of our hypothetical toy example experiment, we simulated data under more 
realistic fMRI conditions. Voxel responses were simulated as a linear combination of the 
responses of eight hypothetical populations of neurons with idealized tuning curves, 
plus Gaussian noise (c.f. equations (2.1)–(2.2)). Tuning coefficients  were drawn at 
random from a Normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 0.22. Noise was sampled 
from a multivariate Normal distribution, with mean  and covariance , 
where the entries of the correlation-inducing eight-column matrix  were drawn 
from a Normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 0.42. Using these equations and 
parameter values, we simulated 1000 data sets, each containing 250 trials and 2000 
voxels (resulting in approximately two million voxel pairings per data set). Signal 
correlations were estimated using the standard estimation procedure as well as the 
cross-correlation approach (see Methods & materials section 2.2.6), after which voxel 
pairs for each estimation procedure were sorted into bins based on the estimated signal 
correlations. Estimated signal and noise correlations were subsequently averaged within 
each bin, and then across all 1000 data sets. Open circles in the figure show the average 
correlations in each bin obtained by this analysis, for both the standard estimator (blue 
circles) and the cross-correlation procedure (red circles). While the standard estimator 
shows an -dependent bias (a linear relationship between   and , 
whereas no such relationship was simulated), our cross-correlation estimator correctly 
recovers the simulated null-relationship between signal and noise correlations.

3
A PROBABILISTIC, 
GENERATIVE MODEL-
BASED DECODING 
ALGORITHM
This chapter is based on the supplementary materials to:
van Bergen, R.S., Ma, W.J., Pratte, M.S., & Jehee, J.F.M. (2015). 
Sensory uncertainty decoded from visual cortex predicts behavior. 
Nature Neuroscience, 18, 1728-30.
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ABSTRACT
Brain-decoding algorithms for analyzing neuroimaging data have garnered great 
popularity in recent years, providing a window on the information encoded in 
patterns of cortical activity. Existing algorithms, however, provide only a single point 
estimate of the most likely stimulus given brain activity. The brain activation patterns 
themselves, on the other hand, may in fact be consistent with multiple interpretations. 
This additional level of information is currently unavailable to researchers, but could be 
highly relevant in that the range of possibilities may link to the precision with which 
stimuli are encoded in neural representations. To unlock this untapped information 
in cortical activity patterns, we therefore develop a probabilistic, generative-model 
based decoding algorithm. Given a pattern of fMRI activity in human visual cortex, 
this decoder computes a probability distribution over stimuli, with the width of this 
distribution reflecting the precision or uncertainty with which stimulus information is 
represented in cortical activity. In order for this distribution to accurately characterize 
the information in the data, and more specifically in the underlying neural response, we 
show that it is vital to have an appropriate model of the correlated noise between fMRI 
voxels.
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
Mind reading has long been restricted to the realms of fantasy and science fiction. 
To divine the private contents of another person’s thoughts is a prospect that has 
captured the imagination of philosophers, artists and audiences for centuries. In 
recent years, however, science fiction has started to cross over into science reality. 
Modern neuroimaging techniques (such as functional magnetic resonance imaging, or 
fMRI), which allow us to measure human brain activity with high spatial and temporal 
resolution, have been paired up with a class of machine learning methods known as 
multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA). While conventional, univariate fMRI analyses focus 
on changes in activity across entire cortical regions, multivariate analyses have made 
it possible to examine the finer-grained structure – or pattern – of activity within each 
region. This important methodological advance has enabled researchers to better 
probe the information that is represented within a given brain region. 
A particular subset of MVPA algorithms aims to predict the category or value of a 
stimulus or task, based on the pattern of activity it elicits in a participant’s brain. This is 
commonly known as “decoding”, or sometimes popularly referred to as “brain reading”. 
The bedrock on which this approach was founded was laid by Haxby & colleagues (2001) 
who showed that patterns of BOLD activity in visual cortex, evoked by stimuli belonging 
to the same object category, are more similar to each other than they are to activation 
patterns elicited by stimuli from other categories. This seminal finding established 
that different stimulus categories could elicit subtle changes in a region’s pattern of 
activity, even when the global level of activation within that area remained the same. 
Subsequent studies capitalized on this idea by using pattern recognition methods to 
“decode” these categories. They discovered that based on BOLD activity patterns, one 
could predict the category of an object viewed by a participant (Carlson, Schrater, & He, 
2003; Cox & Savoy, 2003), and even low-level features such as the orientation of a simple 
line pattern (Haynes & Rees, 2005; Kamitani & Tong, 2005).  
In recent years, decoding algorithms (or simply “decoders”) have proved themselves 
as highly valuable analysis tools, producing numerous novel findings. For example, 
decoding analyses have provided evidence that stimuli stored in visual working 
memory (VWM) are represented in early visual cortex (Harrison & Tong, 2009) and that 
these VWM representations overlap with those of mental images of the same stimuli 
(Albers, Kok, Toni, Dijkerman, & de Lange, 2013).  Increasingly, decoders have also been 
employed to probe the precision with which information is represented in cortex. This 
is a topic surrounded by mounting interest, as new discoveries continue to highlight 
the limits of neural and cognitive capacity, as well as the variable nature of neuronal 
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responses due to noise, top-down modulation from higher-level cognition, and the 
influences of learning and adaptation. Decoding methods are applied to this field of 
study with the reasoning that more precise information in cortical activation patterns 
should lead to more accurate predictions by a decoder. For instance, recent studies have 
found that oriented stimuli were more accurately represented in early visual cortex after 
participants improved their perceptual discrimination of those specific stimuli through 
extensive training (Jehee, Ling, Swisher, van Bergen, & Tong, 2012), or with top-down 
attention (Jehee, Brady, & Tong, 2011). 
However, these methods, which we call “classical decoding algorithms”, can only 
measure the information in cortical representations across multiple experimental trials, 
between conditions that have been previously defined by the experimenter. On a single 
trial, a classical decoder only produces a single-valued prediction2, which may be correct 
or incorrect (when the prediction is categorical), or deviate from the truth by a certain 
error (when the prediction is continuous). Across previously defined subsets of trials, it is 
then possible to compute overall prediction accuracies, and thus compare the average 
reliability of activation patterns in each condition. But what if we were interested in 
the reliability of cortical information on a single trial, or if we wanted to investigate 
changes in cortical representations due to internal neural variability, rather than 
external manipulations? This would require a post-hoc categorization of cortical activity 
patterns, based on the trial-by-trial predictions of a decoder. While correct predictions 
or low errors by a decoder are more likely given a more reliable activation pattern, this 
relationship is only weak; noisy patterns may also lead to accurate predictions, only less 
frequently. Thus, classical decoding approaches are not well suited to characterize the 
trial-by-trial fidelity with which information is encoded in cortex.  
In this chapter, we will develop a novel decoding algorithm that allows for a single-trial 
characterization of the information in cortical representations. Based on a generative 
model of activity in visual cortex, this algorithm computes a probability distribution 
2. Certain classification algorithms, such as support vector machines (SVMs) do produce metrics that might 
be taken to correspond to the quality of the underlying information. SVMs, for example, compute a “decision 
value” (DV) that represents the distance (in multivariate activation space) between an activation pattern and 
a classification boundary. When produced by the same, binary SVM, larger DVs indicate activity patterns that 
distinguish more clearly between the two labeled classes. Given only two classes to distinguish, however, 
this provides only a very coarse characterization of the information in these patterns. For multiple-category 
classification, DVs become entirely uninterpretable, since such classification problems are typically solved by 
dividing them in to multiple binary classification problems (e.g. each single class against all others), and DVs 
cannot be compared across different SVMs (as they have arbitrary units that are only meaningful with respect 
to the decision boundary specific to each binary classification problem). Moreover, SVMs and other classifiers 
can only predict categorical labels, and thus are not well equipped to study the representation of continuous 
variables, which are common in perception. 
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over stimulus values for every trial of fMRI data. If the assumed generative model is a 
reasonable approximation of the true generative model of the data, then the width of 
such a probability distribution should reflect the precision of the information encoded 
in an activation pattern. We will develop and compare several decoding models, and 
show that the one that is best able to characterize this information has a structure that 
is consistent with known properties of cortex. Finally, using simulated data, we will 
provide a proof-of-principle that the decoded probability distributions can recover 
the true uncertainty in neural representations, rather than merely uncertainty due to 
inaccurate model fits or irrelevant sources of noise. 
3.2 METHODS & MATERIALS
3.2.1 Participants
Eighteen healthy adult volunteers (aged 22-31 years, seven female) provided written 
and informed consent to participate in this study. All had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. The study was approved by the Radboud University Institutional Review Board.
3.2.2 MRI data acquisition
MRI data were acquired using a Siemens 3T Magnetom Trio scanner with an eight-
channel occipital coil located at the Donders Center for Cognitive Neuroimaging. A 
high-resolution T1-weighted magnetization-prepared rapid gradient echo anatomical 
scan (MPRAGE, FOV 256 x 256, 1 mm isotropic voxels) was acquired for each participant 
at the start of the session. Functional imaging data were collected using T2*-weighted 
gradient-echo echoplanar imaging, in 30 slices oriented perpendicular to the calcarine 
sulcus, covering all of the occipital and part of posterior parietal and temporal cortex (TR 
2000 ms, TE 30 ms, flip angle 90°, FOV 64 x 64, slice thickness 2.2 mm, in-plane resolution 
2.2 x 2.2 mm). 
3.2.3 Experimental design & stimuli
Stimuli were generated by a Macbook Pro computer running Matlab and the 
Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997), and displayed on a rear-projection 
screen using a luminance-calibrated EIKI projector (resolution 1024 x 768 pixels, refresh 
rate 60 Hz). Observers viewed the visual display through a mirror mounted on the head 
coil.  
Participants were required to maintain fixation on a central bull’s eye target (radius: 
0.25°) throughout each experimental run. Each run consisted of an initial fixation period 
(4 s), followed by 18 stimulus trials (12 s) and a final fixation period (4 s). Trials were 
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separated by a 4 s inter-trial interval. Each trial started with the presentation of an 
orientation stimulus (1.5 s). Orientation stimuli were counterphasing sinusoidal gratings 
(contrast: 10%, spatial frequency: 1 cycle/°, randomized spatial phase, 2 Hz sinusoidal 
contrast modulation) presented in an annulus surrounding fixation (inner radius: 1.5°, 
outer radius: 7.5°, grating contrast decreased linearly to 0 over the outer and inner 
0.5° radius of the annulus). The orientation of the stimulus was determined pseudo-
randomly (from 0-179°) to ensure an approximately even sampling of orientations in 
each run. The grating was followed by a fixation interval (6.5 s), and then a response 
period (4 s) in which a black line (length: 2.8°, width: 0.1°) appeared at the center of the 
screen at an initially random orientation. The line disappeared gradually over the last 
1 s of the response period to indicate the approaching end of this window. Subjects 
reported the orientation of the grating by rotating the line using separate buttons for 
clockwise or counterclockwise rotation on an MRI-compatible button box. 
Participants completed 10-18 stimulus runs. Each scan session also included two visual 
localizer runs, in which flickering checkerboard patterns were presented within the 
same aperture as the gratings (check size: 0.5°, display rate: 10 Hz, contrast: 100%). 
Checkerboards were presented in 12 second blocks, interleaved with fixation blocks of 
equal duration. 
Retinotopic maps of visual cortex were acquired in a separate scan session using 
conventional retinotopic mapping procedures (Sereno et al., 1995; DeYoe et al., 1996; 
Engel et al., 1997). 
3.2.4 Functional MRI data preprocessing and regions of interest
Functional images were motion corrected using FSL’s MCFLIRT (Jenkinson et al., 2002) 
and passed through a high-pass temporal filter with a cut-off period of 40 seconds 
to remove slow drifts in the BOLD signal. Residual motion-induced fluctuations in 
the BOLD signal were removed through linear regression, based on the alignment 
parameters generated by MCFLIRT. Functional volumes were aligned to a previously 
collected anatomical reference scan using FreeSurfer (Fischl et al., 1999). 
Regions of interest (ROIs; V1, V2 and V3) were defined on the reconstructed cortical 
surface using standard procedures (Sereno et al., 1995; DeYoe et al., 1996; Engel et al., 
1997). Within each area, we selected all voxels that responded to the localizer stimulus 
at a lenient threshold (p < 0.05 uncorrected) for subsequent analysis, in the native space 
for each participant. 
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The time series of each voxel was Z-normalized using the corresponding time points 
of all trials in a given run. Activation patterns for each trial were defined by averaging 
together the first 4 s of each trial, after adding a 4 s temporal shift to account for 
hemodynamic delay. This relatively short time window (4 s) was chosen in order to 
ensure that activity from the response window was excluded from analysis. 
3.2.5 Decoding analysis
3.2.5.1 The generative model. Our decoding approach started with the assumption 
that voxels in early visual cortex are selective to orientation (Haynes & Rees, 2005; 
Kamitani & Tong, 2005; Kay, Naselaris, Prenger, & Gallant, 2008; Serences et al., 2009; 
Brouwer & Heeger, 2011; Jehee et al., 2012), and that voxel activity varies across trials 
due to (correlated) noise (Smith & Kohn, 2008; Goris, Movshon, & Simoncelli, 2014). 
More specifically, we assumed that the BOLD response of voxel  to orientation  can 
be characterized as a linearly weighted combination of the idealized tuning functions 
 of  neural populations (Serences et al., 2009; Brouwer & Heeger, 2011) ( ), 
each tuned to a different orientation, combined with Gaussian noise:
(3.1)
Here,  is the mean response (or tuning curve) of the -th population as a function of 
stimulus orientation ,  is the contribution of population  to the response of voxel , 
and  is the noise in the response of the -th voxel. We assumed that this noise follows 
a multivariate normal distribution, with covariance structure , i.e. . We 
will further elaborate on this covariance structure in section 3.2.5.2 below. Population 
tuning curves (or basis functions) are half wave-rectified cosine functions, raised to the 
fifth power  (Fig. 3.1; Brouwer & Heeger, 2011):
(3.2)
where  is the preferred orientation of the -th population. Preferred orientations 
are equally spaced between 0-180°, with one basis function maximally tuned towards 
horizontal.
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Given this generative model, the probability of a voxel activation pattern is given by:
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where  is the number of voxels. 
3.2.5.2 Training & testing. Model parameters were estimated using the fMRI activation 
patterns for the orientation stimuli in a leave-one-run-out cross-validation procedure. 
Data were divided into a training dataset (consisting of data from all but one fMRI run) 
and a testing dataset (consisting of data from the remaining run). The average training 
data set consisted of 249 trials and 2480 voxels. When training the model, we estimated 
the tuning coefficients  through ordinary least squares (OLS) regression:
(3.4)
The remaining model parameters were then estimated by maximizing their likelihood, 
conditioned on the OLS estimate of , using a Matlab implementation of the conjugate 
gradient method (Rasmussen, 2006). 
After fitting model parameters to the training data set, we tested the decoder on the 
held-out (independent) testing dataset. By applying Bayes rule and using a flat stimulus 
prior (see below), we obtained for each test trial the posterior probability distribution 
over stimulus orientation given the fitted model parameters:
(3.5)
where the normalization constant  was computed numerically. 
The circular mean of the posterior served as an estimate of the presented stimulus 
orientation, and its circular standard deviation as a measure of the degree of uncertainty 
in the orientation estimate. Both of these summary statistics were computed using 
numerical integration. The cross-validation procedure was repeated until each run 
served as a test run once, resulting in a single posterior probability distribution for each 
trial of BOLD activity.
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Figure 3.1: Orientation tuning functions for each voxel were expressed as a linear combination 
of eight bell-shaped basis functions, shown here in different colors. 
3.2.5.3 The prior. Unlike our decoding algorithm, human observers appear to employ 
in their behavior a more naturalistic prior favoring cardinal orientations (Girshick et 
al., 2011). Would it have been more appropriate to apply such a non-uniform prior in 
our analyses? The answer to this question is negative. From a decoding perspective, 
a uniform prior correctly represents the a priori knowledge that all orientations were 
presented equally often in the current experiment. Had we instead used a prior favoring 
cardinal orientations, this would have (wrongfully) biased the decoder’s estimates 
towards horizontal and vertical orientations, and automatically changed the width of 
the posterior distribution for cardinal and oblique orientations, even when there was no 
evidence for an oblique effect in brain activity.
3.2.6 Noise models
3.2.6.1 Model construction. To infer which stimulus most likely generated a particular 
pattern of brain activity, our decoder uses a generative model that describes how 
different stimuli lead to different voxel activity patterns (see section 3.2.5.1). This 
generative model describes the response of every voxel on every trial as a sum of an 
orientation tuning function and Gaussian noise. Previous work, including our own 
findings described in chapter 2, indicates that noise in visual cortex is correlated 
between neural populations that are near each other in space, or have similar tuning 
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properties (see chapter 2 of this thesis, and Zohary et al., 1994; Bair et al., 2001; Kohn & 
Smith, 2005; Smith & Kohn, 2008). However, it remains to be determined which (if any) 
of these sources are relevant to decoding. For example, some sources of (correlated) 
noise can be averaged out across voxels or neural populations, and might have little 
to no effect on the amount of orientation information that can be extracted from 
population activity (Abbott & Dayan, 1999; Averbeck & Lee, 2006; Moreno-Bote et al., 
2014). To address this question, we therefore constructed and compared four candidate 
noise models, and compared these models on two benchmark tests.
The first covariance structure was defined as a diagonal matrix:
(3.6)
where  is a vector that models the standard deviation of each voxel’s Gaussian variability, 
 is the identity matrix and  denotes element-wise multiplication. This assumes that 
response variability is independent between voxels, and can be considered a “naïve” 
baseline model. 
The second covariance structure was specified by: 
(3.7)
where  models variability shared globally across voxels, irrespective of their tuning 
preference. This shared variability could arise from fluctuations in the overall BOLD 
amplitude over time.
The (co-)variability modeled in  and  so far has been restricted to noise that is 
unrelated to tuning properties. In , we separately model noise in the responses of 
neural populations with similar tuning, by adapting the generative model equation 
(3.1) as follows:
(3.8)
where  models noise in the response of the -th neural population, and  is the 
remaining noise in the response of voxel , irrespective of tuning properties (thus,  
is the noise modeled in  and ). This means that the total noise in the response of 
the -th voxel is given by . The neural population noise  is an 
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unobserved variable in our data, but we can marginalize over its distribution in order to 
derive its contribution to the voxel-by-voxel covariance structure. Assuming a Gaussian 
distribution, such that , this marginalization yields a component 
 to add to the covariance modeled so far. Thus, the third noise model becomes:
(3.9)
As the tuning coefficients  now appear in the noise covariance matrix, their likelihood 
is no longer maximized by the OLS estimate (as it was for models  and ), or indeed 
by any analytical solution. Instead, the MLE would now have to be found numerically, 
maximizing equation (3.3) using iterative procedures. However, in addition to being 
computationally unattractive, this approach runs the risk of overfitting the covariance 
structure, given that the number of free parameters is increased from order M (in 
models  and ) to order  (where  again denotes the number of voxels, 
and  the number of similarly-tuned neural populations). We therefore instead 
employed a two-step training procedure to estimate the parameters of . In the first 
step of this estimation procedure, we imposed a regularizing prior on the covariance 
matrix, assuming that . This constrains the number of free parameters in the 
covariance matrix (back to order ), but results in a predictable underestimation of 
s     in the second step of the estimation procedure, when we relaxed the prior on  (see 
below). However, simulations indicated that this did not seriously affect our ability to 
reconstruct the uncertainty present in cortical activation patterns (see Results & Fig. 
3.5). Under the assumption that , the MLE of  is simplified again to the OLS 
solution (equation (3.4)). In the second step of the estimation procedure, we relaxed 
the regularizing assumption on , and numerically maximized the likelihood of the 
remaining parameters ( , , and ), conditioned on the OLS estimate of . 
In the final noise model, we additionally include correlations between neighboring 
voxels: 
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This noise model assumed that the degree of locally-shared variability decays 
exponentially with distance, with initial amplitude  and decay rate controlled by , and 
where matrix  describe , for each pair of voxels, the absolute distance in millimeters 
between their center coordinates. These spatially local correlations could arise due to 
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local connectivity between neurons, head motion by the participant, the point spread 
function (PSF) of the imaging method (Parkes et al., 2005), smoothing induced by 
motion correction during pre-processing, or a combination of these factors.
3.2.6.2 Model comparison. We compared our decoder’s performance using each of 
the four noise models. The purpose of the decoding algorithm is to characterize the 
information in a novel pattern of BOLD activity, in the form of a probability distribution 
over stimulus orientations. We reasoned that if this distribution accurately reflected the 
trial-by-trial information in the data, two predictions should hold. First, the mean of the 
distribution (the predicted orientation) should, on average, be close to the presented 
stimulus orientation. A decoder that predicts the stimulus orientation with higher 
accuracy can only do so by leveraging information in the data, and therefore should be 
preferred over other decoders. Second, the width of the decoded distribution should 
accurately reflect the precision of the orientation information in the data. Specifically, 
if the decoded distributions accurately reflect the trial-by-trial orientation information 
in the data, then the range of decoded orientation (point) estimates should be rather 
narrow for those trials that had fairly narrow decoded probability distributions (i.e., low 
decoded uncertainty), while the range of decoded orientation estimates should be 
rather broad (imprecise) for those trials for which the decoded distribution was fairly 
broad and hence uncertain. In other words, if the decoded distributions sufficiently 
capture the trial-by-trial orientation information in the data, then there should be a 
correlation between the uncertainty in these distributions and the variability in the 
decoder’s orientation predictions around the true stimulus orientations. 
To compare our four noise models, we therefore measured their decoding performance 
on these two benchmark predictions. With respect to the first prediction, we quantified 
decoding accuracy by computing, for each observer, the circular correlation coefficient 
between presented and decoded orientations. This correlation coefficient was 
subsequently Fisher-transformed and standardized to a Z-score across observers. Its 
(two-sided) p-value was derived from the inverse cumulative normal distribution, and 
the average of the Fisher-transformed values was converted back to the correlation scale 
for reporting. To test the second prediction, we sorted each participant’s trials into four 
equally populated bins of increasing uncertainty. Within each bin, we computed the 
mean uncertainty across trials, and the variability in the decoded orientation estimates 
around the true stimulus orientations. Across participants and bins, we then computed 
the partial correlation between decoded uncertainty and decoder variability. This 
partial correlation controlled for differences between observers in the average decoded 
uncertainty and decoder variability, as well as for differences in decoded uncertainty 
that could be related to the orientation of the stimulus.
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These analyses were carried out in a cross-validated fashion (see also section 3.2.5.2), 
such that the decoder’s performance was tested on an independent set of activity 
patterns. This ensured that any increase in performance must arise from a generalizable 
improvement in model fits, rather than from overfitting to the training examples.
3.2.7 Simulation procedures
To verify that the decoding model was sufficiently sensitive to uncertainty in the 
neural population response (as opposed to uncertainty due to fMRI sources or poorly 
fitted model parameters), we simulated data according to our generative model, with 
covariance , for five hypothetical observers (i.e. data generated from five unique 
randomization seeds). Each simulated dataset consisted of 2000 voxels and 270 trials. 
To ensure a realistic distribution of tuning strengths and preferences, we simulated a 
weight matrix  for each “participant” by sampling voxels at random from a weight 
matrix estimated from the fMRI data of a real participant. Stimulus orientations for 
each dataset were generated according to the same procedures used in the actual 
fMRI experiment (see section 3.2.3). With these simulated values in hand, we then 
generated BOLD activity patterns according to equation (3.8), as a combination of a 
tuning component , Gaussian neural population noise  with variance , and 
additional multivariate Gaussian noise  with covariance . 
The parameters of the noise distributions were varied over a range of values around 
levels determined to be realistic from the real fMRI data (cf. Fig. 3.4). For the population 
noise variance , simulated values started at 0 and then increased in semi-octave steps 
from 0.022 to 2.402. The vector of voxel noise standard deviations  was drawn from a 
normal distribution with mean  and variance , where  ranged from 
0.09 to 5.60, again in semi-octave steps. The global correlation parameter  was fixed 
at 0.05 for all simulations.
3.3 RESULTS
In order to measure the trial-by-trial information in cortical activation patterns, we set 
out to develop a decoding algorithm based on a generative model of BOLD activity 
in early visual cortex. For each activation pattern, this decoder recovers a probability 
distribution over the stimuli that could have evoked this pattern (Fig. 3.2), with the 
mean of this distribution corresponding to the point estimate of the presented stimulus 
orientation (the decoded orientation), and its width reflecting the putative uncertainty 
about this point estimate (the decoded uncertainty). We reasoned that if the decoded 
probability distributions are an accurate reflection of the information in the underlying 
BOLD patterns, then (1) decoded orientation estimates should be near the true stimulus 
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orientations (quantified as the (circular) correlation coefficient between presented and 
decoded orientations), and (2) the trial-by-trial decoded uncertainty should predict the 
variability of the decoded orientations around the true values (quantified as the partial 
correlation between decoded uncertainty and the (circular) standard deviation of the 
decoder errors). These two criteria were used to evaluate the decoder’s performance, 
and are explained in detail in Methods & materials, section 3.2.6.2.
Our generative model assumes that BOLD activations consist of a mean response, which 
is a function of the stimulus, combined with correlated Gaussian noise (cf. equation (3.1)). 
To determine how best to model the structure of this noise, we compare four candidate 
noise models (denoted - ) of increasing complexity (Fig. 3.3; a detailed description 
of noise model construction is provided in Methods & materials, section 3.2.6.1). 
The first noise structure ( ) can be considered a “naïve” baseline model, as it assumes 
that noise is independent between voxels. While this model yields accurate decoded 
orientations (r = 0.57, p ≈ 0), the decoded uncertainty is not predictive of the variability 
in the orientation estimates (r = −0.03, p = 0.81). The next noise model ( ) accounts 
for variability that is shared among all voxels. Such global correlations could arise from 
overall fluctuations in the amplitude of the BOLD signal. Accounting for this shared noise 
produces a significant increase in the accuracy of the decoded orientations (r = 0.68, 
p ≈ 0; pairwise Z-test between models 1 & 2: Z = 9.11, p ≈ 0). The decoded uncertainty 
is now also reliably correlated with the variability in the decoded estimates (r = 0.28, 
p = 0.04), although this does not represent a significant increase with respect to the 
previous noise model (pairwise Z-test between models 1&2: Z = 1.63, p = 0.10). In 
the third noise structure ( ), we include a further component that models shared 
variability between neural populations with similar orientation preferences. Such 
tuning-dependent noise correlations are a well-established finding in macaque 
visual cortex (Zohary et al., 1994; Bair et al., 2001; Kohn & Smith, 2005; Smith & Kohn, 
2008), and have also been found in human visual cortex (see chapter 2 of this thesis). 
Moreover, correlations of this form are theorized to be especially detrimental to the 
precision with which information can be represented in a population response (Abbott 
& Dayan, 1999; Averbeck & Lee, 2006; Moreno-Bote et al., 2014). Indeed, although this 
noise model does not further improve the reconstruction of the presented orientations 
(r = 0.69; pairwise Z-test between models 2 & 3: Z = 0.73, p = 0.60), the correlation between 
decoded uncertainty and decoder variability increases substantially and significantly 
(r = 0.90; pairwise Z-test between models 2 & 3: Z = 6.31, p < 10-9). The final noise model 
considered here ( ) includes an additional term aimed at capturing spatially local 
noise correlations. Such correlations have also been found previously (see chapter 2 of 
this thesis and Smith & Kohn, 2008), and may arise due to shared connectivity between
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Figure 3.2: Examples of probability distributions over stimulus orientation, decoded from fMRI 
activation patterns obtained from areas V1–V3, and 5 different trials (indicated by different 
colors). These distributions were decoded using noise model .
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Figure 3.3: Noise models compared on two benchmark tests. (a) Decoding results for a 
representative subject, obtained with noise model . Each circle corresponds to a single 
trial, with the size of the circle representing the decoded uncertainty on that trial. Decoded 
orientations are highly accurate, evident from the fact that circles tend to lie near the diagonal 
(or in the far corners, due to the circularity of orientation space). Moreover, larger circles follow 
a wider distribution around the diagonal than small circles, suggesting that the decoded 
uncertainty reflects the trial-by-trial orientation information in the data. (b) Comparison of each 
model’s ability to decode the presented stimulus orientation. (c) Comparison of the accuracy 
with which each model was able to characterize the uncertainty in BOLD activity patterns. Error 
bars in b and c represent +/- 1 SE.
neighboring neurons (Smith & Kohn, 2008), head motion by the participant, the point 
spread function of the imaging method (Parkes et al., 2005), smoothing induced by 
motion correction during pre-processing, or a combination of these factors. However, 
including spatial correlations into the model leads to substantially less accurate 
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orientation estimates (r = 0.57; pairwise Z-test between models 3 & 4: Z = −9.92, p < 10-11), 
as well as a reduced correlation between decoded uncertainty and decoder variability 
(r = 0.80; pairwise Z-test between models 3 & 4: Z = 2.10, p = 0.04).
Together, these findings indicate that the third model best captured the noise covariance 
in BOLD activity relevant to orientation decoding (the estimated parameters for this 
model are summarized in Fig. 3.4).
These results show that a decoder equipped with the third noise model accurately 
characterizes the overall uncertainty with which it can recover stimulus information 
from a BOLD activity pattern. This uncertainty, however, could derive from various 
sources. The most interesting of these, from a neuroscientific perspective, is uncertainty 
that is inherent in the neural code itself. However, fMRI measures neural responses only 
indirectly. This indirect measurement processs itself introduces additional imprecision 
into the activation patterns, thereby creating further uncertainty in stimulus information. 
Additionally, when interpreting the information in a pattern of activity, the decoder 
relies on the generative model that it has learned from a limited set of training data. The 
parameter fits of this model are inevitably somewhat inaccurate, which could induce yet 
more uncertainty in the decoded distributions. (Note that this latter uncertainty does 
not derive from the activation pattern being decoded, but from the data the decoder 
was trained on.)
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Figure 3.4: Parameter estimates for noise model  obtained from the fMRI data. (a) 
Distributions across subjects of the mean estimated values for  and  (averaged across all 
training partitions of the data), shown as box plots. Boxes extend from the first to the third 
quartiles, with notches at the medians. Whiskers span the full range of the data except for 
outliers, which were defined as values deviating from the median by more than 1.5 times the 
inter-quartile range, and are shown separately as open circles. (b) Since  contained a value for 
each voxel, we plot its estimates separately, showing the distribution of values across voxels 
within each participant. For clarity of exposition, no outliers are shown here (due to the large 
number of data). Otherwise, this panel follows the same conventions as in a.
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To what degree is our decoding approach sensitive to uncertainty of neural origin, 
as opposed to other sources? To address this question, we tested our decoder on 
simulated patterns of BOLD activity, for which the true uncertainty could be calculated 
and partitioned into different sources. Specifically, we asked whether our decoder, 
given realistic data and trained using our two-step parameter estimation procedure 
(described in Methods & materials, section 3.2.5.2), could accurately recover (1) the 
true, overall uncertainty in simulated BOLD activation patterns and (2) a sufficient degree 
of uncertainty arising from the neural population response. BOLD activation patterns 
were simulated according to our generative model (as described by equation (3.1), with 
covariance ), for five different (hypothetical) observers, using realistic settings for the 
generative model parameters ( , , and ; simulation 
procedures are described in detail in Methods & materials, section 3.2.7). Each 
simulated pattern of BOLD activity contained information about stimulus orientation, 
with varying degrees of uncertainty due to noise. To assess trial-by-trial uncertainty, we 
computed, for each trial of simulated data, the probability distribution over stimulus 
orientation given the parameters of the generative model (i.e. ). We 
took the width of this distribution as the actual degree of uncertainty in the data. We 
then asked how well our decoder recovered this uncertainty, having estimated the 
model parameters from the simulated BOLD patterns. While the decoder was slightly 
biased towards smaller values of uncertainty, the correlation between actual and 
decoded uncertainty was reasonable (Fig. 3.5a; r = 0.79, p = 6.0×10–15). When the level 
of simulated noise is increased, this correlation is naturally diminished, as more noisy 
data generally results in poorer parameter estimates. However, for a reasonable range 
of noise levels around realistic values, decoded uncertainty accurately reflected the true 
uncertainty in the data (Fig. 3.5b). 
To assess whether our approach is sensitive to fluctuations in the underlying neural 
population response in particular, we additionally computed the uncertainty 
about orientation in the simulated data given only neural variability modeled by . 
Specifically, we computed for each trial of simulated data the posterior probability 
distribution , where  is the noisy population response (i.e. ; 
cf. equation (3.8)) and . The width of this distribution served as the actual 
degree of uncertainty given the neural population response alone. Interestingly, the 
correlation between decoded uncertainty and actual uncertainty reduced only slightly, 
suggesting that  and  contribute little to overall uncertainty (Fig. 3.5c). To see why 
 and  have a relatively small influence on decoded uncertainty, consider that the 
noise modeled by  is positively correlated with changes in signal (tuning curves) – 
such signal-dependent noise has the greatest impact on information (Abbott & Dayan, 
1999; Averbeck & Lee, 2006; Moreno-Bote et al., 2014). In contrast,  is unrelated to 
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voxel tuning, while the sources of noise modeled by  can, to large extent, be averaged 
out across voxels. Altogether, these simulations confirm that our decoder captures a 
sufficient degree of uncertainty in the data. 
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Figure 3.5: Our generative model and training procedure capture a sufficient degree of 
uncertainty in simulated data. (a) Decoded vs. actual uncertainty in BOLD activity patterns 
simulated according to our generative model, using noise model Ω3, the two-step estimation 
procedure for the model parameters, and realistic levels of noise. (b) Accuracy of the decoded 
uncertainty for a range of (log-spaced) noise levels around the values used in a, which are 
marked by the red cross. (c) Comparison of decoding accuracy of uncertainty due to all noise, 
vs. uncertainty due to only noise modeled by σ. Error bars indicate +/- 1 SE.
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3.4 DISCUSSION 
We have shown that a probabilistic decoding algorithm based on a generative model of 
BOLD activity in human visual cortex is able to characterize the trial-by-trial uncertainty 
in fMRI activation patterns. A generative model accounting for shared noise between 
similarly tuned voxels achieved the best results, consistent with known properties of 
visual cortex (see chapter 2 of this thesis, and Zohary et al., 1994; Shadlen & Newsome, 
1998; Bair et al., 2001; Kohn & Smith, 2005; Smith & Kohn, 2008). 
Although the findings presented in chapter 2 indicated that noise correlations in 
human visual cortex depend on the spatial separation between voxels, including these 
correlations in our decoder’s noise model decreased the decoder’s performance. This 
may be explained by a combination of factors. First, we should expect spatially local 
noise correlations to “average out” when information is pooled across large numbers 
of voxels. Thus, the information encoded in BOLD activity patterns may be relatively 
unaffected by the presence of these correlations. Additionally, given that neighboring 
voxels are known to often have similar orientation tuning properties (Furmanski & 
Engel, 2000; Sasaki et al., 2006), the tuning-dependent term in the noise model may 
already have accounted for (some of ) the variability shared between neighboring 
voxels. Adding an additional term (with two additional free parameters) to fit spatial 
correlations may have caused the noise model to overfit the training data, leading to 
poor generalization of the fitted model to novel activation patterns in the test partition.
Previous work on decoding algorithms has focused on providing single stimulus 
estimates, such as a single, most likely orientation, although some have used a 
probabilistic approach as a means to this end. In particular, a family of decoders known 
as “Naïve Bayes classifiers” assigns probabilities to possible class labels, and then selects 
the label with the highest probability as its prediction, while discarding the probabilities 
of alternative labels. An example of this approach applied to fMRI data is provided by Kay 
and colleagues (Kay et al., 2008), who used a Naïve Bayes classifier to identify the most 
likely stimulus from a set of natural images. A defining feature of Naïve Bayes is that it 
utilizes a generative model assuming strictly independent response variability between 
voxels. It may seem surprising, then, that a Naïve Bayes classifier would perform well on 
fMRI data, where this assumption is almost certainly violated (see also chapter 2 of this 
thesis). However, as long as response dependencies mostly cancel each other out over 
the space of the decoded variable (that is, as long as they do not “pull” the prediction 
in a certain direction), Naïve Bayes is known to be able to predict the most likely value 
or class accurately, while failing to correctly estimate the probabilities of alternative 
labels (Domingos & Pazzani, 1997; H. Zhang, 2004; Niculescu-Mizil & Caruana, 2005). 
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This is exactly in line with the results we obtained with our naïve noise model (Ω1): while 
this model predicted the most likely stimulus with reasonable accuracy, the estimated 
distribution of probability around this value (i.e. the uncertainty in the estimate) was 
not a faithful reflection of the information in the data. In contrast, by appropriately 
accounting for shared response variability between voxels with a richer noise model 
(Ω3), our approach is the first to be able to also decode the trial-by-trial uncertainty in 
BOLD activity patterns.
The ability to characterize the degree of uncertainty in single-trial stimulus estimates 
represents an important advance in the analysis of neuroimaging data. Knowing the 
uncertainty in a BOLD pattern is a significant step towards being able to measure the 
uncertainty in the underlying neural population response. So far, we have provided a 
proof-of-principle for this application, demonstrating that for data simulated according 
to the decoder’s generative model, with plausible noise levels, our decoding algorithm 
accurately recovers the uncertainty in the neural population response underlying 
a BOLD activation pattern. If our decoder achieves similar sensitivity for cortical 
orientation information that observers utilize in their perception, then we should find 
that decoded uncertainty values predict the accuracy with which participants perceive 
stimuli on a trial-by-trial basis. This prediction will be tested in chapter 4 of this thesis.  
The ability to measure uncertainty in neural population responses with fMRI could 
provide a unique window on internal variability in human cortex. That is, if it turns 
out that our decoder accurately tracks fluctuations in neural uncertainty for repeated 
presentations of identical stimuli (as we will test in chapter 4), then this would suggest 
that these fluctuations find their origin within the brain itself, rather than arising from 
external sources. Such internal variability is not only interesting from a functional 
perspective; aberrant internal noise has also been proposed to play a role in disorders of 
sensory and cortical functioning, such as amblyopia (Li, Levi, & Klein, 2004) and autism 
(Dinstein, Heeger, & Behrmann, 2015). Our decoding approach could provide a method 
to measure this internal noise non-invasively in human cortex, and thus help improve 
our understanding of its role in both healthy and abnormal neural processing.  
In conclusion, we have shown that a generative-model based decoding algorithm that 
accounts for correlated response variability allows us to characterize the trial-by-trial 
uncertainty in BOLD activity patterns in human visual cortex. This approach represents 
a substantial advancement on existing decoding approaches. Our novel method may 
allow us to probe the uncertainty in neural population responses, and could provide a 
window on the internal variability in those responses.

4
SENSORY UNCERTAINTY 
DECODED FROM 
VISUAL CORTEX 
PREDICTS BEHAVIOR
A version of this chapter has been published as:
van Bergen, R.S., Ma, W.J., Pratte, M.S., & Jehee, J.F.M. (2015). 
Sensory uncertainty decoded from visual cortex predicts behavior. 
Nature Neuroscience, 18, 1728-30.
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ABSTRACT
Bayesian theories of neural coding propose that sensory uncertainty is represented 
by a probability distribution encoded in neural population activity, but direct neural 
evidence supporting this hypothesis is currently lacking. Using fMRI in combination 
with a generative model-based analysis, we find that probability distributions reflecting 
sensory uncertainty can reliably be estimated from human visual cortex, and moreover, 
that observers appear to use knowledge of this uncertainty in their perceptual decisions. 
79
S E N S O R Y  U N C E R TA I N T Y  D E CO D E D  F R O M  V I S UA L  CO R T E X  P R E D I C T S  B E H AV I O R
The information that the brain receives from the senses is typically consistent with a 
range of possible stimulus values; consequently, all of our perceptual decisions have 
to be made under uncertainty. It is well known that this sensory uncertainty can affect 
behavior (Ernst & Banks, 2002; Körding & Wolpert, 2004), but how the fidelity of sensory 
knowledge is represented in cortex remains unclear. Bayesian theories of neural coding 
postulate that a probability distribution over sensory stimuli is encoded in the activity of 
a whole population of neurons, with the width of this distribution reflecting the degree 
of uncertainty about the stimulus (Jazayeri & Movshon, 2006; Ma et al., 2006; Vilares & 
Körding, 2011; Pouget, Beck, Ma, & Latham, 2013). While indirect neurophysiological 
evidence is consistent with this notion (Beck et al., 2008; Fetsch, Pouget, DeAngelis, & 
Angelaki, 2012), this hypothesis has yet to be tested directly in sensory cortex. Here, 
we use fMRI in combination with a model-based analysis to address two fundamental 
questions: first, can a probability distribution that reflects sensory uncertainty be 
extracted from population activity in human visual cortex, and second, do observers 
use knowledge of this uncertainty in their perceptual decisions? Crucially, unlike 
previous behavioral studies on probabilistically optimal inference, no external noise was 
added to the visual stimuli to manipulate uncertainty, as changes in physical stimulus 
properties could then act as external cues to reliability (Barthelme & Mamassian, 2010). 
We hypothesized that varying degrees of internal neural noise might nonetheless affect 
sensory processing on a trial-by-trial basis; if uncertainty is part of the neural sensory 
code, then these fluctuations in uncertainty should alter human perceptual decision-
making.
Participants viewed annular gratings of random orientations, while we measured 
activity in visual cortex using fMRI. Shortly after the presentation of each grating, 
observers reported its orientation by rotating a bar presented at fixation. Observers 
generally performed well on this task. The mean angular difference between reported 
and actual orientations was 4.5°, ranging between 0.003° and 37.68° on individual 
trials. These fluctuations in behavioral accuracy are often thought to arise, in part, from 
internal neural noise affecting the fidelity of cortical orientation representations. Here, 
we asked whether this trial-by-trial variability in the fidelity of internal knowledge is 
reflected in fMRI activation patterns. We addressed this question using a novel model-
based decoding approach to analyzing fMRI data (see Methods). Specifically, based 
on a generative model incorporating the orientation preferences of voxels as well 
as their (correlated) noise, we approximated on each trial the posterior probability 
distribution over orientation, given the pattern of BOLD activity. This approach differs 
from conventional fMRI decoding studies (Haynes & Rees, 2005; Kamitani & Tong, 2005; 
Jehee et al., 2011) in that it explicitly recovers a full probability distribution over stimulus 
values, rather than a single stimulus estimate. The (circular) mean of the posterior 
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distribution serves as an estimate of the presented orientation, and its width (circular 
standard deviation) as a measure of the degree of stimulus uncertainty in the cortical 
representation. Regions of interest were those portions of visual areas V1–V3 that 
corresponded to the retinotopic representation of the stimuli.
To benchmark our approach, we first tested its ability to identify the presented orientation 
from activity patterns in areas V1–V3 (Supplementary Fig. 4.1a, b). The decoded and 
presented orientations were significantly correlated (r = 0.69, p ≈ 0), consistent with 
previous findings (Serences et al., 2009; Brouwer & Heeger, 2011). We then turned to 
the degree of trial-by-trial uncertainty about orientation. The decoder’s estimates of 
uncertainty varied from trial to trial due to noise in the fMRI measurements (Fig. 4.1a). To 
the extent that our decoding approach appropriately models the fMRI data, uncertainty 
on a single trial should be related to variability across trials. Accordingly, to verify the 
decoder’s assumptions and test whether the decoded uncertainty followed the actual 
degree of noise in the fMRI data, we binned the data according to posterior width, and 
calculated the trial-by-trial variability in decoded orientation estimates for each of the 
bins (Supplementary Fig. 4.1c). We found that the decoded uncertainty was, indeed, 
significantly correlated with the across-trial variability in decoded orientations (r = 0.91, 
p ≈ 0). A comparison between different noise models indicated that the one used here 
best captured the fMRI data (see chapter 3 of this thesis). Altogether, this corroborates 
the validity of our assumptions, and shows that posterior width captured the overall 
degree of uncertainty in the data on a trial-by-trial basis.
Having established that the decoded uncertainty reflected the aggregate of all fMRI 
noise sources, we next asked whether it captured variability in cortical stimulus 
representations in particular. We addressed this question in two sets of analyses, focusing 
first on gratings of different orientations. Consistent with previous work (Appelle, 1972; 
Girshick et al., 2011), behavioral orientation judgments were more accurate for cardinal 
than oblique orientation stimuli (Fig. 4.1b; correlation between behavioral variability 
and the angle of the presented stimulus with the nearest cardinal axis: r = 0.54, 
p = 1.8×10–5). Because behavioral accuracy is directly related to uncertainty, we tested 
whether this oblique effect in behavior was paralleled in visual cortical responses. 
Indeed, the width of the decoded posterior probability distribution was narrower for 
stimulus orientations closer to the cardinal axes (Fig. 4.1b; r = 0.35, p = 0.008). Thus, 
similar to behavior, horizontal and vertical orientations are represented with greater 
precision in visual cortex.
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Figure 4.1: Stimulus uncertainty decoded from human visual cortex correlates with behavior. 
(a) Examples of probability distributions over stimulus orientation, decoded from fMRI activation 
patterns obtained from areas V1–V3, and 5 different trials (trials indicated by different colors; , 
stimulus orientation; , bold activity). (b) Both behavioral variability and decoded uncertainty 
increased for more oblique stimulus orientations in areas V1–V3 (behavioral variability, t(53) = 
4.71, p = 1.8×10–5; decoded uncertainty, t(53) = 2.75, p = 0.008). For illustrative purposes, trials 
were sorted into 12 equally spaced orientation bins. (c) Behavioral variability is significantly 
correlated with posterior width in areas V1–V3 (t(52) = 2.39, p = 0.021). (d) Behavioral biases 
increase with increasing width of the posterior distribution in areas V1–V3 (t(52) = 2.46, 
p = 0.017). In panels c and d, colors indicate four within-observer bins of increasing decoded 
uncertainty (for each of 18 observers, see text). In all plots, error bars represent +/– 1 SEM, 
dashed lines represent best linear fits, and reported r-values are partial correlation coefficients 
obtained from a linear regression analysis (see Methods). Similar results were found for visual 
areas V1, V2 and V3 (Supplementary Fig. 4.1).
For the second set of analyses, we focused on repeated presentations of physically 
identical orientation stimuli. If the posterior distribution also captures random, trial-by-
trial fluctuations in cortical activity, we reasoned, then more certain decoder estimates 
should be linked to reduced variability in the observer’s behavior, even for physically 
identical orientation stimuli (Pouget et al., 2013). To test this relationship, we divided each 
participant’s data into bins of increasing decoded uncertainty, calculated the across-
trial variability in participant behavior for each of the bins, and computed the partial 
correlation coefficient between the two (while controlling for stimulus orientation and 
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between-subject variability, see Methods). This revealed that observers clearly made 
more accurate decisions when the information decoded from their visual activity was 
more precise (Fig. 4.1c; r = 0.31, p = 0.021). By contrast, neither the error in decoded 
orientation (Supplementary Fig. 4.2), nor the amplitude or width of the estimated 
neural population response (Supplementary Fig. 4.3), reliably predicted behavioral 
variability, demonstrating the power of the posterior distribution in capturing trial-by-
trial fluctuations in cortical processing. Control analyses established that these results 
could not be accounted for by differences in eye-movements, gross BOLD amplitude, 
or subject head motion (Supplementary Fig. 4.4), and furthermore, were specific 
to voxels tuned to the retinotopic location of the stimulus (i.e. we found no reliable 
correlation between decoded uncertainty and behavioral variability when selecting 
V1–V3 voxels preferring other retinotopic locations, p = 0.17). Taken together, these 
results demonstrate that the fidelity of a sensory representation can reliably be extracted 
from fMRI activation patterns.
Armed with the ability to estimate uncertainty in sensory representations, the critical 
question is whether observers take this uncertainty into account when making 
perceptual decisions. If so, then this would provide strong empirical support for 
probabilistic models of perception (Pouget et al., 2013). To address this question, we 
relied on a well-established behavioral finding (Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Duncan, 1991; 
Jazayeri & Movshon, 2007) replicated here: orientation judgments were biased away 
from the cardinal axes (Supplementary Fig. 4.5). While the precise neural mechanisms 
underlying such repulsive biases have yet to be determined, all theoretical models 
(Jazayeri & Movshon, 2007; Stocker & Simoncelli, 2008; Wei & Stocker, 2015) of these 
biases generate the same prediction: if the observer takes into account the uncertainty 
in perceptual representations, the amount of behavioral bias should depend on the 
degree of sensory uncertainty. Indeed, we found that behavioral biases increased when 
the decoded fidelity of cortical information about the visual stimulus was low (Fig. 4.1d; 
r = 0.32, p = 0.017), consistent with a recent theoretical prediction that the repulsive 
bias should increase with increasing levels of internal uncertainty (Wei & Stocker, 2015). 
As the physical stimulus was held constant, this suggests that human observers use 
knowledge of internal uncertainty in their perceptual decision-making, and moreover, 
that they monitor fluctuations therein on a trial-by-trial basis.
A major limitation of previous work on probabilistically optimal inference has been 
the use of external sources of noise, leaving open the possibility that observers simply 
monitored certain image properties, such as blurriness or contrast, as external cues to 
uncertainty. For this reason, we held physical stimulus properties constant, and relied 
on fluctuations in internal noise to make perceptual information more or less reliable 
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to the observer. We showed that the uncertainty in perceptual representations can 
reliably be extracted as a probability distribution from human visual cortex with fMRI, 
and moreover, that human observers appear to rely on the uncertainty in this internal 
evidence when making perceptual decisions. These results suggest that neural activity 
encodes probability distributions over stimulus values, rather than merely point 
estimates, and that the brain uses this probabilistic information in its computations.
4.1 METHODS & MATERIALS
4.1.1 Participants
Eighteen healthy adult volunteers (aged 22–31, 7 female), with normal or corrected-
to-normal vision, participated in this study. All participants provided informed written 
consent. The study was approved by the Radboud University Institutional Review Board. 
Assuming effect sizes similar to those reported here, a power analysis indicated that 18 
subjects would produce a power level of 0.76–0.86. Indeed, this sample size is consistent 
with previous decoding studies (Kok, Jehee, & de Lange, 2012; Ester, Anderson, Serences, 
& Awh, 2013).
4.1.2 Data acquisition
MRI data were acquired using a Siemens 3T Magnetom Trio scanner with an eight-
channel occipital coil located at the Donders Center for Cognitive Neuroimaging. 
For each participant, a high-resolution T1-weighted magnetization-prepared rapid 
gradient echo anatomical scan (MPRAGE, FOV 256 x 256, 1 mm isotropic voxels) was 
collected at the start of the session. Functional imaging data were acquired using T2*-
weighted gradient-echo echoplanar imaging, in 30 slices oriented perpendicular to the 
calcarine sulcus, covering all of the occipital and part of posterior parietal and temporal 
cortex (TR 2000 ms, TE 30 ms, flip angle 90°, FOV 64 x 64, slice thickness 2.2 mm, in-plane 
resolution 2.2 x 2.2 mm). 
4.1.3 Experimental design & stimuli
Stimuli were generated by a Macbook Pro computer running Matlab and the 
Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997), and displayed on a rear-projection 
screen using a luminance-calibrated EIKI projector (resolution 1024 x 768 pixels, refresh 
rate 60 Hz). Observers viewed the visual display through a mirror mounted on the head 
coil.  
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Participants were required to maintain fixation on a central bull’s eye target (radius: 
0.25°) throughout each experimental run. Each run consisted of an initial fixation period 
(4 s), followed by 18 stimulus trials (12 s) and a final fixation period (4 s). Trials were 
separated by a 4 s inter-trial interval. Each trial started with the presentation of an 
orientation stimulus (1.5 s). Orientation stimuli were counterphasing sinusoidal gratings 
(contrast: 10%, spatial frequency: 1 cycle/°, randomized spatial phase, 2 Hz sinusoidal 
contrast modulation) presented in an annulus surrounding fixation (inner radius: 1.5°, 
outer radius: 7.5°, grating contrast decreased linearly to 0 over the outer and inner 
0.5° radius of the annulus). The orientation of the stimulus was determined pseudo-
randomly (from 0-179°) to ensure an approximately even sampling of orientations in 
each run. The grating was followed by a fixation interval (6.5 s), and then a response 
period (4 s) in which a black line (length: 2.8°, width: 0.1°) appeared at the center of the 
screen at an initially random orientation. The line disappeared gradually over the last 
1 s of the response period to indicate the approaching end of this window. Subjects 
reported the orientation of the grating by rotating the line using separate buttons for 
clockwise or counterclockwise rotation on an MRI-compatible button box. 
Participants completed 10–18 stimulus runs. Each scan session also included two 
visual localizer runs, in which flickering checkerboard patterns were presented within 
the same aperture as the gratings (check size: 0.5°, display rate: 10 Hz, contrast: 100%). 
Checkerboards were presented in 12 second blocks, interleaved with fixation blocks of 
equal duration. 
Retinotopic maps of visual cortex were acquired in a separate scan session using 
conventional retinotopic mapping procedures (Sereno et al., 1995; DeYoe et al., 1996; 
Engel et al., 1997). 
4.1.4 Functional MRI data preprocessing and regions of interest
Functional images were motion corrected using FSL’s MCFLIRT (Jenkinson et al., 2002) 
and passed through a high-pass temporal filter with a cut-off period of 40 seconds 
to remove slow drifts in the BOLD signal. Residual motion-induced fluctuations in 
the BOLD signal were removed through linear regression, based on the alignment 
parameters generated by MCFLIRT. Functional volumes were aligned to a previously 
collected anatomical reference scan using FreeSurfer (Fischl et al., 1999). 
Regions of interest (ROIs; V1, V2 and V3) were defined on the reconstructed cortical 
surface using standard procedures (Sereno et al., 1995; DeYoe et al., 1996; Engel et al., 
1997). Within each area, we selected all voxels that responded to the localizer stimulus 
at a lenient threshold (p < 0.05 uncorrected) for subsequent analysis, in the native 
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space for each participant. Control analyses verified that our results were not strongly 
affected by the number of voxels selected for analysis (Supplementary Fig. 4.6). In one 
of our control analyses, we tested the degree to which the decoded uncertainty was 
specific to the retinotopic location of the stimulus. For this analysis, we selected those 
voxels in areas V1–V3 combined that were not significantly activated by the localizer 
stimulus (at a statistical threshold of p > 0.2), obtaining on average 1257 voxels per 
subject (by comparison, the average number of voxels in individual ROIs was 660, see 
Supplementary Fig. 4.1).
The time series of each voxel was Z-normalized using the corresponding time points of all 
trials in a given run. Activation patterns for each trial were defined by averaging together 
the first 4 s of each trial, after adding a 4 s temporal shift to account for hemodynamic 
delay. This relatively short time window (4 s) was chosen in order to ensure that activity 
from the response window was excluded from analysis. Control analyses verified 
that this time window was close to the peak of the hemodynamic response function 
(Supplementary Fig. 4.7; time series for this analysis were normalized to percentage 
signal change units, defined relative to the average activation level across each run). In 
addition, temporally expanding the time window to include an earlier time point did 
not greatly affect any of our results. For the control analyses of Supplementary Fig. 4.4, 
mean BOLD intensity values were obtained by averaging across all voxels in a given ROI. 
Subject head motion was calculated as the Euclidian norm of the temporal derivatives of 
the realignment parameters generated by the motion correction algorithm – a quantity 
that reflects the total amount of head motion per time step. We averaged across TRs 3 
and 4 of each trial, similar to our decoding analyses.
4.1.5 Decoding analysis
4.1.5.1 The generative model. Our decoding approach started with the assumption 
that voxels in early visual cortex are selective to orientation (Haynes & Rees, 2005; 
Kamitani & Tong, 2005; Kay et al., 2008; Serences et al., 2009; Brouwer & Heeger, 
2011; Jehee et al., 2012), and that voxel activity varies across trials due to (correlated) 
noise (Smith & Kohn, 2008; Goris et al., 2014). More specifically, we assumed that the 
BOLD response of voxel  to orientation  can be characterized as a linearly weighted 
combination of the idealized tuning functions  of  neural populations (Brouwer 
& Heeger, 2011; Serences et al., 2009; K = 8), each tuned to a different orientation, 
combined with Gaussian noise: 
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(4.1)
Here,  is the mean response (or tuning curve) of the -th population as a function 
of stimulus orientation ,  is the contribution of population  to the response of 
voxel , and both  and  model sources of noise. The latent (unobserved) variable  is 
normally distributed as , and specifies the degree of noise that is shared 
among neural populations of similar orientation preference (which is why it is weighted 
by ). It models global changes in the population response due to, for example, shifts 
in response gain. The variable  was included to capture various remaining sources of 
noise, such as variability in the fMRI signal due to thermal, electrical or physiological 
noise, as well as residual sources of neural noise. The distribution of n is given by: 
(4.2)
(4.3)
Thus, n describes noise specific to individual voxels (with variance  for voxel ), as well 
as noise shared globally among voxels irrespective of their tuning properties (scaled 
by ). Population tuning curves (or basis functions)  are half wave-rectified cosine 
functions, raised to the fifth power  (Brouwer & Heeger, 2011): 
1	
𝛆𝛆 = 𝐁𝐁 −𝐖𝐖𝒇𝒇 𝐬𝐬 	 	 2.5	
	
ε)* =
𝐵𝐵)* − 𝐖𝐖)
, 𝒇𝒇 𝑠𝑠* ,			if	𝑗𝑗 ∈ ar tion	1
𝐵𝐵)* − 𝐖𝐖)
; 𝒇𝒇 𝑠𝑠* ,			if	𝑗𝑗 ∈ partition	2
	 	 	 	 	 2.8	
	
	
𝐸𝐸 𝑟𝑟?@ABCD = 𝜌𝜌 −
𝜌𝜌 1 − 𝜌𝜌;
2 𝐾𝐾 − 1
	
	
𝑝𝑝 𝐛𝐛 𝑠𝑠;𝐖𝐖,𝛀𝛀 =
1
2𝜋𝜋 L 𝛀𝛀
exp −
1
2
𝐛𝐛 −𝐖𝐖𝒇𝒇 𝑠𝑠
O
𝛀𝛀P, 𝐛𝐛 −𝐖𝐖𝒇𝒇 𝑠𝑠 			
	
	
	
𝛀𝛀Q = 𝛼𝛼	exp −𝛽𝛽𝐃𝐃 ∘ 𝛕𝛕𝛕𝛕
O + 𝜌𝜌𝛕𝛕𝛕𝛕O + (1 − 𝜌𝜌 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐈𝐈 ∘ 𝛕𝛕𝛕𝛕O + 𝜎𝜎;𝐖𝐖𝐖𝐖O	
	
	
𝑓𝑓] 𝑠𝑠 = max 0, cos 𝜋𝜋
?Pbc
de
f
	
	
	
𝑝𝑝 𝐛𝐛 𝑠𝑠, 𝛈𝛈;𝐖𝐖, 𝚺𝚺 =
1
2𝜋𝜋 L 𝚺𝚺
exp −
1
2
𝐛𝐛 −𝐖𝐖 𝒇𝒇 𝑠𝑠 + 𝛈𝛈
O
𝚺𝚺P, 𝐛𝐛 −𝐖𝐖 𝒇𝒇 𝑠𝑠 + 𝛈𝛈 	
	
𝑝𝑝 𝐛𝐛 𝑠𝑠;𝐖𝐖,𝛀𝛀 = 𝑝𝑝 𝐛𝐛 𝛈𝛈, 𝑠𝑠; 𝚺𝚺 𝑝𝑝 𝛈𝛈 𝑑𝑑𝛈𝛈 = 	
,
;j k 𝛀𝛀
exp −
,
;
𝐛𝐛 −𝐖𝐖𝒇𝒇 𝑠𝑠
O
𝛀𝛀P, 𝐛𝐛 −𝐖𝐖𝒇𝒇 𝑠𝑠 			
	
𝛈𝛈 = 𝜎𝜎;𝐖𝐖O𝛀𝛀P, 𝐛𝐛 −𝐖𝐖𝒇𝒇 𝑠𝑠 	
(3.3)	
(4.4)	
(S4.2)	
(4.6)	
(2.24)	
(3.10)	
(4.5)	
(4.4)
where  is the preferred orientation of the -th population. Preferred orientations 
are equally spaced between 0–180°, with one basis function maximally tuned towards 
horizontal. 
The conditional probability of a voxel activation pattern given a noisy population 
response   is then defined as:
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(3.3)	
(4.4)	
(S4.2)	
(4.6)	
(2.24)	
(3.10)	
(4.5)	
(4.6)
(4.7)
When developing the model, we considered four different, increasingly complex models. 
The current model was found to best capture the data on two relevant benchmark tests 
(see chapter 3). Supplementary Table 4.1 provides an overview of all parameters.
4.1.5.2 Training & testing. Model parameters were estimated using the fMRI activation 
patterns for the orientation stimuli in a leave-one-run-out cross-validation procedure. 
Data were divided into a training dataset (consisting of data from all but one fMRI 
run) and a testing dataset (consisting of data from the remaining run). The average 
training data set consisted of 249 trials and 1,981 voxels. When training the model, we 
maximized the likelihood of the model parameters given the orientation stimuli. Model 
parameters were estimated in a two-step training procedure to constrain the number 
of free parameters and prevent overfitting of the covariance matrix. In the first step of 
this estimation procedure, we imposed a regularizing prior on the covariance matrix, 
assuming that . This reduces the number of free parameters in the covariance 
matrix considerably (from  to ), but results in a predictable 
underestimation of  in the second step of the estimation procedure (see below), when 
we relaxed the prior on . However, simulations indicated that this did not seriously 
affect our ability to reconstruct the uncertainty present in the activation patterns (see 
chapter 3). Under the assumption that , the maximum likelihood estimation of 
 is simplified to an ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression: 
(4.8)
In the second step of the estimation procedure, we relaxed the regularizing assumption 
on , and maximized the likelihood of the remaining parameters ( ,  and ), 
conditioned on . This maximization step was performed numerically, using a Matlab 
implementation of the conjugate gradient method (Rasmussen, 2006). The resulting 
parameter estimates are summarized in Fig. 3.4. 
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After fitting the model to the training data set, we tested the model on the held-out 
(independent) testing dataset. By applying Bayes rule and using a flat stimulus prior 
(see below), we obtained for each test trial the posterior probability distribution over 
stimulus orientation given the fitted model parameters:
(4.9)
where , and the normalization constant  was 
computed numerically. The circular mean of the posterior served as an estimate of the 
presented stimulus orientation, and its circular standard deviation as a measure of the 
degree of uncertainty in the orientation estimate. Both of these summary statistics were 
computed using numerical integration. The cross-validation procedure was repeated 
until each run served as a test run once.
4.1.5.3 The prior. Unlike our decoding algorithm, human observers appear to employ 
in their behavior a more naturalistic prior favoring cardinal orientations (Girshick et 
al., 2011). Would it have been more appropriate to apply such a non-uniform prior in 
our analyses? The answer to this question is negative. From a decoding perspective, 
a uniform prior correctly represents the a priori knowledge that all orientations were 
presented equally often in the current experiment. Had we instead used a prior favoring 
cardinal orientations, this would have (wrongfully) biased the decoder’s estimates 
towards horizontal and vertical orientations, and automatically changed the width of 
the posterior distribution for cardinal and oblique orientations, even when there was no 
evidence for an oblique effect in brain activity.
4.1.6 Behavioral data
The observer’s behavioral error on a given trial was computed as the acute-angle 
difference between the reported orientation and the presented orientation. Behavioral 
variability was calculated after correcting for an orientation-dependent shift in mean 
(see Supplementary Fig. 4.5), by fitting a 4-degree polynomial to each observer’s 
behavioral errors as a function of stimulus orientation. We then used the residuals 
from this fit, i.e. the bias-corrected behavioral errors, in our calculation of behavioral 
variability. 
In general, participants finished adjusting the probe’s orientation well before the 
end of the response window, taking on average 2254 +/– 47 ms (mean +/– SEM) to 
respond. On 0–6 trials (out of 180–324), the behavioral error exceeded the mean error 
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(for that observer) by more than 3 standard deviations, suggesting that the participant 
randomly guessed the orientation of the grating. These trials were excluded from further 
analysis. 
4.1.7 Eye tracking
Eye tracking data were acquired for 12 out of 18 subjects, using an SR Research Eyelink 
1000 eye-tracking system. Gaze position was sampled at 1 kHz. After removing blinks, 
we applied a band-pass temporal filter with a low-frequency cut-off period of 100 
seconds, and a high-frequency cut-off period of 0.1 second. Similar to all fMRI analyses, 
the mean and standard deviation of eye position were computed for the time window 
corresponding to stimulus presentation. Specifically, with respect to mean eye position, 
we first calculated the average x- and y-coordinates of the gaze data during the first 
4 seconds of each trial, and then took the absolute distance from this average (x, y) 
position to the central fixation target. Eye movement (i.e. variability in eye position) was 
quantified by first calculating, for each sample of (x, y) gaze coordinates, the absolute 
distance to the mean (x, y) eye position. This distance was then averaged across the first 
4 seconds of each trial.
4.1.8 Statistical procedures
Decoding accuracy was computed by taking, for each individual observer, the circular 
correlation coefficient between the presented and decoded orientations. This correlation 
coefficient was subsequently Fisher transformed and standardized to a Z-score across 
observers. Its (two-sided) p-value was derived from the inverse cumulative normal 
distribution, and the average of the Fisher transformed values was converted back to 
the correlation scale for reporting. 
Many of our analyses focused on the relationship between decoded uncertainty and 
across-trial error distributions. For these analyses, data were binned and summary 
statistics were computed for each bin. When testing for an oblique effect in BOLD 
activity, trials were sorted into four equally spaced bins of increasing angle between 
the stimulus orientation and the nearest cardinal axis (for illustrative reasons, Figure 1b 
shows the data sorted into 12 equally spaced orientation bins). Behavioral variability 
was computed as the circular standard deviation of all (bias-corrected) behavioral 
errors in each of the bins. When testing for the link between decoded uncertainty and 
behavioral variability or bias, trials were sorted into four bins of increasing decoded 
uncertainty. Behavioral variability was computed as the circular standard deviation 
of all (bias-corrected) behavioral errors in each of the bins, while behavioral bias was 
calculated as the mean of all (biased) behavioral errors in the bins. We used the same 
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number of bins for each participant (four), with a constant number of samples across 
bins within each participant. To test whether decoded uncertainty was correlated with 
the variable of interest, we calculated partial correlation coefficients via a multiple linear 
regression analysis. Independent variables were distance to cardinal axis (Fig. 4.1b–d, 
Supplementary Figs. 4.1d–f) and decoded uncertainty (Fig. 4.1c–d, Supplementary 
Figs. 4.1c, e–f). All regression analyses furthermore included subject-specific 
intercepts to remove between-subject variability. Dependent variables were decoded 
uncertainty (Fig. 4.1b, Supplementary Fig. 4.1d), behavioral variability (Fig. 4.1b-c, 
Supplementary Fig. 4.1e), and behavioral bias (Fig. 4.1d, Supplementary Fig. 4.1f). 
The significance of individual regression coefficients was assessed with a (two-sided) 
t-test. We verified that the residuals of all regression analyses were independent (Durbin-
Watson test) and normally distributed (Anderson-Darling test), and that our results 
were not affected by violations of homoscedasticity. For ease of exposition, regression 
coefficients were standardized to partial correlation coefficients, and in Fig. 4.1c–d, 
data are displayed in the form of partial residual plots, showing the partial relationships 
of interest and residuals obtained from the regressions (but omitting any effects of the 
variables-of-no-interest, as well as between-subject differences in intercept).
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Supplementary Figure 4.1: Decoding results for areas V1, V2, V3, and V1–V3 combined. 
(a) Decoded and presented orientations are strongly correlated in areas V1–V3 from a 
representative observer (r = 0.74, p ≈ 0). (b) Similar results were found across observers. 
That is, decoding performance, plotted as the across-subject mean of the correlation 
between actual and decoded orientations, was highly significant in areas V1, V2, V3, 
and V1–V3 combined (all p ≈ 0). (c) Posterior width reliably predicted the variability in 
decoded orientations in all visual ROIs (V1: p = 0.2×10–15; for each of V2, V3 and V1–
V3 combined: p ≈ 0). (d) The posterior distribution is reliably broader for more oblique 
orientations in areas V1 (p = 0.003), V2 (p = 0.011), V3 (p = 0.003) and V1–V3 combined 
(p = 0.008, see also Fig. 4.1b). (e) Posterior width reliably predicts the trial-by-trial 
variability in behavioral orientation estimates in visual areas V1 (p = 0.003) and V1–V3 
combined (p = 0.021; see also Fig. 4.1c), with a trend towards significance in area V2 (p = 
0.09). (f) The strength of the behavioral bias away from the cardinal axes is significantly 
correlated with posterior width in areas V1 (p = 0.002), V2 (p = 0.005), V3 (p = 0.030) 
and V1–V3 combined (p = 0.017, see also Fig. 4.1d), with smaller behavioral biases for 
decreasing decoded uncertainty. In all plots, error bars represent +/– 1 SE.
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Supplementary Figure 4.2: Correlation between errors in decoded orientation 
estimates and errors in behavioral orientation reports, with error bars corresponding to 
+/– 1 SE. For each participant, trials were sorted into four bins of increasing signed or 
absolute decoder error. Within each bin, we calculated both the mean error (signed or 
absolute) in decoded orientation and the mean behavioral error (signed or absolute). We 
then used a multiple linear regression analysis to compute partial correlations between 
decoder and behavioral errors, controlling for mean differences between observers. 
Signed decoder errors were not significantly correlated with signed behavioral errors 
(t(53) = 1.42, p = 0.16), nor were larger decoder errors reliably associated with larger 
behavioral errors (t(53) = 0.91, p = 0.12) in areas V1–V3. Why do we nevertheless find 
that the variance of the posterior distribution is linked to behavioral biases and across-
trial variability in behavioral errors? To see why, consider that the errors themselves are 
two independent random variables. As such, the correlation between the errors must 
necessarily be relatively weak, even when the mean and variance of their underlying 
distributions are linked. This observation exemplifies the utility of our uncertainty 
metric, which directly reflects the variance of the underlying distributions.
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Supplementary Figure 4.3: Estimating the neural population response. Does a 
channel-based approach (cf. Brouwer & Heeger, 2011; Serences, Saproo, Scolari, Ho, 
& Muftuler, 2009) similarly reflect the degree of uncertainty about orientation? It is 
important to realize that the posterior probability distribution characterizes the amount 
of information contained in the pattern of BOLD responses, rather than providing a 
direct estimate of the neural population response. That said, our model does allow for 
the estimation of neural population responses at a single trial level. Specifically, the 
population response  is described as the (idealized) tuning curves of the population 
plus noise (cf. equation (4.1)):
(S4.1)
Thus, estimating  involves finding the most likely value for  by maximizing the joint 
likelihood . Differentiating this likelihood with respect to  
gives the following expression for the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE):
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With these equations in hand, we first computed for each independent test trial the most 
likely neural population response . We then calculated the dispersion (circular standard 
deviation across channels) of the estimated neural population response, as well as the 
amplitude of the channel most strongly tuned to the presented stimulus orientation. 
Trials were subsequently sorted into four bins of increasing dispersion or peak response 
amplitude value. Summary statistics (mean dispersion, mean peak amplitude, and 
behavioral variability) were computed across all trials in each bin. Multiple regression 
analysis was used to compute partial correlation coefficients between dispersion and 
behavioral variability, as well as between peak amplitude and behavioral variability 
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(regressing out distance to cardinal axes and between-subject variability). Interestingly, 
neither the dispersion, nor the peak amplitude, of the estimated population response 
reliably predicted behavioral variability (r = –0.05, p = 0.73 and r =  –0.16, p = 0.25, 
respectively). In the figure, error bars indicate +/– 1 SE. 
Why is the estimated neural population response a less reliable predictor of behavior 
than the posterior probability distribution? One reason may be that the posterior 
distribution combines many aspects of the population response in a single information 
metric. As such, the posterior distribution is more sensitive to changes in orientation 
information than any one property of the neural population response alone. It is also 
important to realize that  reflects the most likely neural population response (i.e., a 
single estimate). BOLD activity, however, is rather noisy and typically consistent with a 
whole range of neural population responses. The posterior distribution explicitly reflects 
this full range of possibilities, thereby providing greater sensitivity to subtle changes in 
BOLD activity.
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Supplementary Figure 4.4: Control analyses. Partial correlation coefficients between 
decoded uncertainty and mean BOLD signal intensity, head motion, eye position and 
eye movements. We found no significant correlation between decoded uncertainty 
and any of these variables in areas V1–V3 (p = 0.16, p = 0.55, p = 0.27 and p = 0.20, 
respectively), indicating that gross BOLD amplitude, mean eye position, (amount of ) 
eye movements, and (amount of ) subject head motion cannot account for the trial-by-
trial uncertainty in cortical stimulus representations. This furthermore rules out simple 
explanations in terms of the amount of attentional effort put into the task, as overall 
BOLD amplitude tends to increase with effort (Ress, Backus, & Heeger, 2000). Error bars 
represent +/– 1 SE.
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Supplementary Figure 4.5: Behavioral orientation reports are biased away from the 
nearest cardinal axis. Plots show the average (signed) error across observers in the 
behavioral orientation judgments, as a function of stimulus orientation. Positive errors 
indicate clockwise deviations from the veridical stimulus orientation. For each observer, 
trials were binned based on stimulus orientation, and the average behavioral error was 
calculated within each bin. Error bars indicate +/– 1 SEM.
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Supplementary Figure 4.6: Decoding results as a function of number of voxels 
included within the ROI. Within areas V1–V3, all voxels whose response to the localizer 
stimulus met a chosen threshold (x-axis, uncorrected p-values) were selected for 
subsequent analysis. Shown is the correlation between (a) decoded and actual stimulus 
orientation (decoding performance), (b) decoded uncertainty and angle between 
stimulus orientation and nearest cardinal axis (oblique effect in decoded uncertainty), 
(c) decoded uncertainty and behavioral variability and (d) decoded uncertainty and 
behavioral bias. Error bars represent +/– 1 SE. All of these results proved robust to 
reasonable variations in the number of voxels included in the analysis.
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Supplementary Figure 4.7: Hemodynamic response function and decoding window. 
(a) Time course of mean BOLD activity in areas V1–V3 over the course of a trial. Time 
points between 4–8 s were averaged for subsequent decoding analysis. This relatively 
short time window (4 s) was chosen in order to ensure that activity from the response 
window was excluded from analysis. (b) Temporally expanding the time window to 2–8s 
did not greatly affect any of our results (p = 0.004, p = 0.022 and p = 0.007, respectively). 
Error bars correspond to +/– 1 SE.
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Supplementary Table 4.1: Clarification of variables
number of voxels 
number of hypothetical neural populations
, indexes of voxels and neural populations, respectively
an vector  of voxel responses
 an  matrix , containing for each voxel  the contribution of each 
neural population k to that voxel’s orientation tuning function
stimulus orientation in degrees
the orientation tuning function of the -th neural population
noise in the response of the -th neural population
the neural population response; a  vector such that 
noise in the response of the -th voxel
an  covariance matrix for the multivariate normal distribution of 
an  covariance matrix for the multivariate normal distribution of 
an  vector, where  is the marginal variance of 
global noise correlation between all voxels
variance of independent noise in neural populations tuned to the same 
orientation 
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UNCERTAINTY IN 
CORTICAL STIMULUS 
REPRESENTATIONS 
PREDICTS SERIAL 
DEPENDENCE EFFECTS 
IN ORIENTATION 
PERCEPTION 
This chapter is in preparation for publication as:
van Bergen, R.S., & Jehee, J.F.M. 
Uncertainty in cortical stimulus representations predicts 
serial dependence effects in orientation perception.
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ABSTRACT
How does the brain make sense of variable and unreliable sensory input from an external 
world that is largely stable over short periods of time? A statistically optimal observer 
would capitalize on the world’s stability by integrating past and present sensory inputs, 
weighting each by the uncertainty in its neural representation. Here, we use fMRI in 
combination with a probabilistic decoding algorithm to test this prediction. Participants 
viewed sequences of randomly oriented gratings, and reported their orientation. 
Consistent with previous behavioral work, we find that the stimulus orientation observers 
report on the current trial is biased towards the orientation presented on the preceding 
trial, suggesting that their perception reflects a combination of current and previous 
sensory input. To test whether previously seen stimuli influence perceptual decisions 
more strongly when current sensory information is less reliable, we use a probabilistic 
decoding algorithm to estimate sensory uncertainty from stimulus representations in 
early visual cortex (V1-V3 combined). Interestingly, comparing stimulus uncertainty 
between consecutive trials reveals that behavioral biases towards previously seen 
gratings are larger when the cortical stimulus representation on the present trial is more 
uncertain. This suggests that serial dependence effects in behavior are underpinned 
by a statistically optimal sensory integration process, in which uncertain sensory 
information is given less weight.
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5.1 INTRODUCTION
The world around us possesses a large degree of constancy and continuity. While objects 
may change their position or configuration from moment to moment, such changes 
tend to be smooth and incremental. Consequently, the current state of the world 
can be predicted from the recent past (Dong & Atick, 1995). This statistical regularity 
is something the brain could exploit when making perceptual inferences about the 
current state of the world, to yield more stable and reliable results. Accordingly, several 
recent studies have found that human perception in the present moment incorporates 
sensory information from the immediate past. When presented with dots of varying 
numerosity (Cicchini, Anobile, & Burr, 2014), oriented line patterns (Fischer & Whitney, 
2014; John-Saaltink, Kok, Lau, & Lange, 2016) or pictures of faces (Liberman, Fischer, & 
Whitney, 2014), the percept of a current stimulus is biased towards recently seen stimuli.
These so-called “serial dependence” effects in perception suggest that human observers 
combine sensory information from the present and the recent past to arrive at a percept 
of the current state of the world. However, sensory inputs are known to be unreliable, 
due to various sources of ambiguity and noise. How the brain integrates various sources 
of information that have been rendered uncertain by these corrupting influences is 
a central question in perceptual decision making. One proposed answer comes from 
Bayesian theories of perception, which posit that the brain ought to give more weight 
to sensory inputs that carry less uncertainty (reviewed in Ma & Jazayeri, 2014; Pouget, 
Beck, Ma, & Latham, 2013; Vilares & Kording, 2011). Several neural coding schemes have 
been proposed in order to facilitate such “Bayes-optimal” sensory integration, some of 
which predict that the brain should account for uncertainty even when it derives from 
internal sources (e.g. Hoyer & Hyvärinen, 2003; Ma, Beck, Latham, & Pouget, 2006). 
In this study, we capitalize on a serial dependence effect in a task of orientation 
perception, as a convenient model to investigate Bayesian theories of sensory 
integration. Using a probabilistic decoding algorithm that we recently developed (van 
Bergen et al., 2015), we estimate the trial-by-trial uncertainty with which stimuli are 
encoded in cortical activation patterns measured with fMRI. This allows us to test the 
Bayesian prediction that observers should rely more on past information when current 
sensory evidence is uncertain. We test this prediction in two different ways. First, we 
compare the representation of cardinal with that of oblique orientation stimuli. It is well 
known from behavioral studies that oblique orientation stimuli are perceived with lower 
precision than cardinal orientation stimuli (Appelle, 1972). Our previous work shows 
that the cortical representation of oblique stimuli is similarly less precise (chapter 4 of 
this thesis & van Bergen et al., 2015). Accordingly, we reasoned that if participants take 
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the uncertainty in their neural stimulus representations into account, then they should 
rely more on past information when the stimulus on the current trial is more oblique. 
Consistent with this prediction, we find that participants have a stronger bias towards 
recently seen stimuli when the current stimulus has a relatively oblique orientation. 
As a second, strong test of the hypothesis that serial dependence arises from optimal 
integration of past and present sensory input, we examine whether observers take into 
account the trial-by-trial uncertainty associated with stimuli of the same orientation. To 
test this, we compare trials on which the current uncertainty is either high or low, relative 
to the previous trial, while controlling for the effect of orientation. We find that when 
cortical orientation information on the current trial is relatively uncertain, participants 
are more biased towards the orientation presented on the previous trial. This suggests 
that human observers are able to calibrate their perceptual inferences using the trial-
by-trial uncertainty in their sensory representations. Together, these findings support 
the idea that serial dependence effects in perception arise from an optimal sensory 
integration strategy, which exploits the temporal statistics of natural images. 
5.2 METHODS
5.2.1 Participants
Eighteen healthy adult volunteers (aged 22–31, 7 female), with normal or corrected-
to-normal vision, participated in this study. All participants provided informed written 
consent. The study was approved by the Radboud University Institutional Review Board. 
5.2.2 Data acquisition
MRI data were acquired using a Siemens 3T Magnetom Trio scanner with an eight-
channel occipital coil located at the Donders Center for Cognitive Neuroimaging. 
For each participant, a high-resolution T1-weighted magnetization-prepared rapid 
gradient echo anatomical scan (MPRAGE, FOV 256 x 256, 1 mm isotropic voxels) was 
collected at the start of the session. Functional imaging data were acquired using T2*-
weighted gradient-echo echoplanar imaging, in 30 slices oriented perpendicular to the 
calcarine sulcus, covering all of the occipital and part of posterior parietal and temporal 
cortex (TR 2000 ms, TE 30 ms, flip angle 90°, FOV 64 x 64, slice thickness 2.2 mm, in-plane 
resolution 2.2 x 2.2 mm). 
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5.2.3 Experimental design & stimuli
Stimuli were generated by a Macbook Pro computer running Matlab and the 
Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997), and displayed on a rear-projection 
screen using a luminance-calibrated EIKI projector (resolution 1024 x 768 pixels, refresh 
rate 60 Hz). Observers viewed the visual display through a mirror mounted on the head 
coil.  
Participants were required to maintain fixation on a central bull’s eye target (radius: 0.25°) 
throughout each experimental run. Each run consisted of an initial fixation period (4 s), 
followed by 18 stimulus trials (12 s) and a final fixation period (4 s). Trials were separated 
by a 4 s inter-trial interval. Each trial started with the presentation of an orientation 
stimulus (1.5 s). Orientation stimuli were counterphasing sinusoidal gratings (contrast: 
10%, spatial frequency: 1 cycle/°, randomized spatial phase, 2 Hz sinusoidal contrast 
modulation) presented in an annulus surrounding fixation (inner radius: 1.5°, outer 
radius: 7.5°, grating contrast decreased linearly to 0 over the outer and inner 0.5° radius 
of the annulus). The orientation of the stimulus was determined pseudo-randomly 
(from 0-179°) to ensure an approximately even sampling of orientations in each run, 
and in such a way that certain orientation differences (specifically, differences that were 
multiples of 20°) between consecutive stimuli were repeated multiple times throughout 
the experiment. This specific procedure enabled us to condition our analyses on stimuli 
with identical orientation differences. For some of our analyses (see Fig. 5.1, 5.3 & 
5.4), data were averaged within a sliding window across orientation differences (see 
Methods section 5.2.7). The width of this window (21°) was chosen to include at least 
one of the most common orientation differences.
 The grating was followed by a fixation interval (6.5 s), and then a response period (4 s) 
in which a black line (length: 2.8°, width: 0.1°) appeared at the center of the screen at 
an initially random orientation. The line disappeared gradually over the last 1 s of the 
response period to indicate the approaching end of this window. Subjects reported the 
orientation of the grating by rotating the line using separate buttons for clockwise or 
counterclockwise rotation on an MRI-compatible button box. In general, participants 
finished adjusting the probe’s orientation well before the end of the response window, 
taking on average 2254 +/– 47 ms (mean +/– SEM) to respond.
Participants completed 10–18 stimulus runs. Each scan session also included two 
visual localizer runs, in which flickering checkerboard patterns were presented within 
the same aperture as the gratings (check size: 0.5°, display rate: 10 Hz, contrast: 100%). 
Checkerboards were presented in 12 second blocks, interleaved with fixation blocks of 
equal duration. 
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Retinotopic maps of visual cortex were acquired in a separate scan session using 
conventional retinotopic mapping procedures (Sereno et al., 1995; DeYoe et al., 1996; 
Engel et al., 1997). 
5.2.4 Functional MRI data preprocessing and regions of interest
Functional images were motion corrected using FSL’s MCFLIRT (Jenkinson et al., 2002) 
and passed through a high-pass temporal filter with a cut-off period of 40 seconds 
to remove slow drifts in the BOLD signal. Residual motion-induced fluctuations in 
the BOLD signal were removed through linear regression, based on the alignment 
parameters generated by MCFLIRT. Functional volumes were aligned to a previously 
collected anatomical reference scan using FreeSurfer (Fischl et al., 1999). 
Regions of interest (ROIs; V1, V2 and V3) were defined on the reconstructed cortical 
surface using standard procedures (Sereno et al., 1995; DeYoe et al., 1996; Engel et al., 
1997). Within each area, we selected all voxels that responded to the localizer stimulus 
at a lenient threshold (p < 0.05 uncorrected) for subsequent analysis, in the native space 
for each participant. 
The time series of each voxel was Z-normalized using the corresponding time points 
of all trials in a given run. Activation patterns for each trial were defined by averaging 
together the first 4 s of each trial, after adding a 4 s temporal shift to account for 
hemodynamic delay. This relatively short time window (4 s) was chosen in order to 
ensure that activity from the response window was excluded from analysis. 
5.2.5 Decoding analysis
To characterize the trial-by-trial uncertainty in cortical activation patterns, we employed 
a generative model-based, probabilistic decoding algorithm, which we have previously 
described in detail (cf. van Bergen et al. (2015) and chapter 3 of this thesis). Briefly, 
this decoding approach assumes that voxel activations follow a multivariate Normal 
distribution around a stimulus-dependent mean, described by the orientation tuning 
function of each voxel. Voxel tuning curves were modeled as a linear combination 
 of eight bell-shaped basis functions (Brouwer & Heeger, 2011): 
(5.1)
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where  is the orientation of the stimulus and  is the preferred orientation of the -th 
basis function (both in °). These basis functions are weighed by coefficients  
for each voxel  and basis function . The covariance of the noise distribution around 
the voxel tuning functions is modeled as: 
(5.2)
This noise covariance matrix is a combination of three components. The first component 
is a diagonal of independent noise variances, where the variance of voxel  is given by 
. The second component is a constant that models fluctuations in signal shared by all 
voxels, which is described by a parameter . Finally, the term  models noise 
that is shared between voxels with similar orientation tuning preferences, with variance 
.
Together, the orientation tuning curves and the noise covariance structure make up 
the decoder’s generative model. This model specifies the generative distribution 
: the probability that a certain stimulus s will evoke an activation pattern b. This 
distribution is given by a multivariate Normal with mean  and covariance : 
(5.3)
where  are the parameters of the generative model.
To train and test the decoder, fMRI data are divided into a training dataset (consisting 
of data from all but one fMRI run) and a testing dataset (consisting of data from the 
remaining run). The parameters of the generative model are fit to the training data 
using a two-step procedure. First, tuning weights  are estimated by ordinary least-
squares regression. Second, the noise covariance parameters ( ,  and ) are estimated 
by numerically maximizing their likelihood. See (van Bergen et al., 2015) and chapter 3 
of this thesis for more details on the model and parameter-fitting procedures.
For each trial in the test dataset, we then decode the posterior distribution over stimulus 
orientation, conditioned on the estimated model parameters . Following Bayes’ rule, 
the posterior distribution is given by: 
(5.1)
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We assumed a flat stimulus prior , and the normalizing constant in the denominator 
was calculated numerically. We took the (circular) mean of the posterior function as an 
estimate of the presented orientation on that trial, while the (circular) standard deviation 
served as a metric on the degree of uncertainty in the orientation estimate. 
This leave-one-run-out cross-validation procedure is repeated until each run of fMRI 
data has served as the test set once.
5.2.6 Behavioral data pre-processing
The observer’s behavioral error on a given trial was computed as the acute-angle 
difference between the reported orientation and the presented orientation. Data were 
corrected for a repulsion bias away from the cardinal axes (van Bergen et al., 2015), by 
fitting each observer’s behavioral errors with a Gaussian/Uniform mixture distribution 
(W. Zhang & Luck, 2008) around a 4-degree polynomial function of stimulus orientation. 
The residuals from this fit were then used to analyze serial dependence effects. Trials 
for which the probability of the fitted uniform distribution was larger than p = .5 were 
assumed to be random guesses by the participant, and excluded from further analysis 
(0-10 trials out of 180-324 per observer). 
5.2.7 Statistical procedures
To analyze serial dependence effects, behavioral orientation reports were first realigned, 
such that positive errors were in the direction of the orientation presented on the 
preceding trial, while negative errors were in the opposite direction. We then sorted 
trials into bins (separately for each observer) of unique absolute orientation differences, 
and calculated the average behavioral error within each bin. Data were subsequently 
smoothed by averaging within a sliding window (see Fig. 5.1b; window width = 21°), 
and the largest cluster of orientation differences that showed a positive behavioral bias 
was selected. The size of the serial dependence bias in this cluster was calculated as 
the cumulative t-statistic across the cluster’s data points. Statistical significance was 
assessed using a cluster-based permutation test (Maris & Oostenveld, 2007). The null-
distribution of this test was obtained by randomly permuting the original data 10,000 
times. Behavioral errors in each permutation were assigned random signs, arriving 
at a distribution of permuted behavioral errors that was centered on zero. Similar 
to the original data, data were then filtered with a sliding window average, and the 
largest cluster of orientation differences for which there was a positive behavioral 
bias was selected. The serial dependence bias within this cluster was quantified as the 
cumulative t-statistic across the cluster’s behavioral data points. This produced a null-
distribution of cumulative t-statistics that would be expected from our analysis if there 
111
CO R T I C A L  U N C E R TA I N T Y  A N D  S E R I A L  D E P E N D E N C E  E F F E C T S
were no serial dependence effect in the data. To compute a (two-tailed) p-value for the 
candidate cluster identified in the original data, we compared the cumulative t-statistic 
for the candidate cluster to the estimated null distribution, calculating the fraction of 
permutations for which the orientation cluster had a higher cumulative t-score. 
To investigate whether this serial dependence effect arises from an optimal sensory 
integration process, subsequent analyses focused on the difference in strength of the 
bias between trials with relatively oblique vs. cardinal stimuli (see Fig. 5.3), or trials with 
relatively uncertain vs. certain stimulus representations (see Fig. 5.4), compared to the 
preceding trial. We first selected those orientation differences for which participant 
behavior exhibited a significant serial dependence bias (i.e., 0-57°), and divided these 
trials into a “high” (relatively oblique/uncertain) and a “low” (relatively cardinal/certain) 
bin, by a median split. The serial dependence bias for identical orientation differences 
in each of the two bins was calculated, and then averaged across trials and observers. 
To assess significance, individual-observer biases were averaged across the range of 
orientation differences (Fig. 5.3-5.4, insets), and a paired t-test was used to determine 
whether there was a significance difference between the two bins. For illustrative 
purposes, the binned data were filtered with a sliding window average, before plotting 
them as a function of orientation difference (Fig. 5.3-5.4, blue/green lines and shaded 
regions).
5.3 RESULTS
Do serial dependence effects in orientation perception arise from a probabilistically 
optimal sensory integration process that takes into account the reliability of orientation 
information? To address this question, we presented 18 human observers with randomly 
oriented grating stimuli, while activity in visual cortex was measured using fMRI. Shortly 
after each stimulus was presented, participants reported its orientation by rotating a 
bar presented at fixation.
Subjects performed well on this task, with behavioral errors (quantified as the angular 
difference between the true and reported stimulus orientation) averaging 4.5 +/- 0.2° 
(mean +/- SEM). Although behavioral error distributions were centered on zero over the 
course of the experiment, splitting the data according to the orientation offset between 
two consecutive trials revealed that responses were systematically biased towards the 
orientation seen on the previous trial (Fig. 5.1a; see also Fischer & Whitney (2014)). 
To assess the significance of this effect, behavioral errors were realigned, such that 
positive errors were in the direction of the previously seen orientation, and analyzed as 
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a function of the absolute difference in consecutive orientations (Fig. 5.1b). A cluster-
based analysis revealed a significant attraction (p = 0.01) towards the stimulus presented 
on the previous trial, for orientation differences of up to 57° between consecutive 
stimuli. Thus, observers show a serial dependence effect in their perception of stimulus 
orientations, replicating previous work (Fischer & Whitney, 2014). 
The serial dependence bias in the participants’ orientation reports suggests that 
the orientations they perceived were a weighted combination of current and recent 
sensory inputs. But are the weights given to these inputs constant, or do they depend 
on the reliability of the observer’s sensory evidence? To measure this reliability, we 
used a probabilistic decoding algorithm that we have recently developed (see chapter 
3 of this thesis, & van Bergen et al., 2015). Given an activation pattern in early visual 
cortex (areas V1, V2 & V3), this decoder estimates a probability distribution over possible 
stimuli that might have evoked this activity (Fig. 5.2). The width of this distribution 
provides an estimate of the uncertainty with which stimulus information is encoded in 
an activation pattern on a given trial, and reflects the precision of the underlying neural 
representation (chapter 4 of this thesis & van Bergen et al., 2015).
With this probabilistic decoding method in hand, we first turn towards a well-known 
phenomenon in orientation perception, known as the oblique effect (Appelle, 1972). 
That is, behavioral orientation judgments of cardinal (i.e. vertical and horizontal) 
stimulus orientations are more precise compared to oblique orientations. As we have 
shown previously using the same probabilistic decoder, cortical representations of 
oblique stimuli are similarly more uncertain (or less precise) (chapter 4 of this thesis 
& van Bergen et al., 2015). Do observers take this difference in uncertainty between 
cardinal and oblique stimuli into account in their perceptual inferences? If so, we should 
find that they have a stronger bias towards previously seen stimuli when the current 
stimulus has a more oblique orientation (hence is more uncertain) than the stimulus 
presented on the previous trial, compared to when stimuli were more cardinal (more 
certain) on the current versus previous trial. To test this prediction, trials were sorted by 
a median-split into two bins, separately for each observer. One bin consisted of trials for 
which the presented stimulus orientation was more cardinal than that of the previous 
trial, and the other bin consisted of trials for which the current orientation was more 
oblique. For each observer, we then calculated the average serial dependence bias in 
each bin and compared between the two bins. 
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Figure 5.1: The behavioral error on the current trial is biased towards the orientation presented 
on the previous trial. (a) Average behavioral errors, filtered with a sliding window average, as 
a function of the relative orientation presented on the previous trial. Line and shaded region 
represent the mean +/- 1 SEM across observers. Positive errors and orientation differences are 
in the clockwise direction. (b) As in (a), but with behavioral errors realigned such that positive 
deviations are in the direction of the orientation presented on the previous trial, and plotted 
against the absolute, rather than the signed difference in orientations. Red arrows indicate the 
extent of orientation differences for which a cluster-based analysis revealed a significant bias in 
the direction of the previous trial (i.e. positive, in this plot).
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Figure 5.2: Schematic illustration of the probabilistic decoding procedure. An orientated grating 
stimulus is presented to an observer inside an fMRI scanner, evoking a pattern of activity in early 
visual cortex. This activity pattern contains information about the stimulus that is consistent 
with multiple interpretations. The decoder estimates, for each possible stimulus orientation, 
the probability that it evoked the measured activity pattern. The (circular) mean of the resulting 
probability distribution functions as a point estimate of the presented orientations, while its 
width (the circular standard deviation) reflects the uncertainty surrounding this estimate.
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Interestingly, this revealed that the mean serial dependence bias across observers was 
significantly stronger when the current stimulus was more oblique (uncertain) compared 
to when it was more cardinal (certain) than the previous stimulus (Fig. 5.3, paired t-test: 
t(17) = 3.96, p = 0.001). This suggests that observers take into account overall differences 
in the reliability with which they perceive stimuli of different orientations.
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Figure 5.3: The serial dependence bias is stronger when the stimulus on the current trial has 
a more oblique orientation than the stimulus on the previous trial. Lines and shaded regions 
show the mean +/- 1 SEM serial dependence bias across observers, for more cardinal (blue) and 
more oblique (green) trials. Trials were averaged within bins of identical orientation differences, 
and then filtered across orientation differences with a sliding window average for illustrative 
purposes. The inset shows the mean biases for cardinal vs. oblique trials, averaged across the 
window indicated by the red arrows, for individual observers. Note that these mean biases 
were computed on the unfiltered data (see Methods). Points above the unity line (diagonal) 
indicate observers for whom the serial dependence bias was higher on more oblique trials. This 
difference was significant across observers (paired t-test: t(17) = 3.96, p = 0.001).  
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While this implies that participants take into account the average uncertainty associated 
with stimuli of different orientations, Bayesian theories of neural coding make the 
stronger prediction that observers should also adjust their decisions based on the trial-
to-trial internal variability in the quality of their stimulus representations, even if the 
physical orientations are the same. 
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Figure 5.4: The serial dependence bias is stronger when the sensory representation on the 
current trial is relatively uncertain compared to the previous trial. Lines and shaded regions 
show the mean +/- 1 SEM serial dependence bias across observers, for relatively certain (blue) 
and relatively uncertain (green) trials. Trials were averaged within bins of identical orientation 
differences, and filtered with a sliding window average for illustrative purposes. The inset 
shows the mean biases for certain vs. uncertain trials, averaged across the window indicated 
by the red arrows, for individual observers. Note that these mean biases were computed on 
the unfiltered data (see Methods). Points above the unity line (diagonal) indicate observers for 
whom the serial dependence bias was higher on uncertain trials. This difference was significant 
across observers (paired t-test: t(17) = 2.50, p = 0.023).  
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To test this prediction, we first regressed the effect of stimulus orientation out of the 
trial-by-trial ucertainty values. Trials were then sorted by median split into bins of high 
and low uncertainty relative to the preceding trial, and the average serial dependence 
bias for each observer was calculated within each bin. If observers take internal 
uncertainty into account, they should rely more on information from the preceding trial 
when the current sensory information is relatively unreliable. Interestingly, consistent 
with this prediction, we found that when the current stimulus representation was 
relatively uncertain, orientation reports were biased more strongly towards the stimulus 
presented on the preceding trial, compared to when the current representation was 
relatively certain (Fig. 5.4, paired t-test across observers: t(17) = 2.60, p = 0.023). This 
suggests that observers integrate recent and current sensory inputs in a manner that 
takes into account the trial-by-trial uncertainty in their internal representations.
5.4 DISCUSSION
Are serial dependence effects in perception the result of Bayesian integration of sensory 
information from the present and the recent past? If true, this hypothesis would predict 
that observers should rely more on past information when the present is uncertain. In this 
study, we tested this prediction by presenting participants with sequences of randomly 
oriented grating stimuli. We measured the trial-by-trial activity evoked by each stimulus 
in early visual cortex using fMRI, and estimated the uncertainty in the underlying 
stimulus representations using a probabilistic decoding algorithm. Consistent with a 
Bayesian account of serial dependence, we found that when the sensory uncertainty 
on the current trial was relatively high, observers relied more on sensory evidence from 
the preceding trial.
There is a substantial degree of behavioral evidence to support the idea that observers 
take sensory uncertainty into account to make optimal perceptual inferences, in a 
number of experimental tasks (e.g. Ernst & Banks, 2002; Knill & Saunders, 2003; Körding 
& Wolpert, 2004). How the brain might compute and represent this uncertainty, 
however, remains an open question. One answer that has been proposed is that the 
brain represents sensory information probabilistically, with uncertainty encoded in 
the variance of the represented probability distribution (theories that propose this are 
reviewed in Ma & Jazayeri, 2014; Pouget, Beck, Ma, & Latham, 2013; Vilares & Kording, 
2011). An alternative possibility, which would be less flexible but perhaps simpler to 
implement in neural circuitry, is that the brain determines uncertainty by consulting 
a “lookup table” based on overt sensory cues (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In such a 
scheme, external cues would be mapped to levels of uncertainty by simple heuristic rules 
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(e.g. “visual information is unreliable in the dark”). One of our findings, that observers put 
greater stock in their perception of cardinal stimulus orientations, could be explained 
either by the use of such heuristics (e.g. “this stimulus is near-vertical, so it carries low 
uncertainty”), or by fully probabilistic stimulus representations. Importantly, however, 
when stimulus orientation was controlled for as a potential external cue, we found that 
participants still adjusted the weights given to current and previous sensory inputs 
based on their internal uncertainty. This last finding seems unlikely to be explained by 
heuristics, and more consistent with a scheme in which uncertainty is fundamentally 
woven into the neural code, so that perceptual inference is sensitive even to changes in 
uncertainty that derive from internal perturbations of sensory representations. 
Our behavioral results indicate that observers do not always combine recent and 
present sensory information. For very large orientation differences (larger than about 
57°), there was no longer a serial dependence bias towards previously seen stimuli. 
Other studies have similarly found that the degree of serial dependence was influenced 
by the difference between consecutive stimuli (Cicchini et al., 2014; Fischer & Whitney, 
2014; Liberman et al., 2014). This may be a reflection of the beliefs that observers harbor 
about the temporal statistics of natural visual input. If a certain sensory measurement 
(such as the orientation of a visual edge) changes only a little, it is plausible to assume 
that the new sensory input is still caused by the same feature or object in the world. In 
this case, it is advantageous to combine sensory evidence from before and after the 
change, to obtain a more precise estimate of the current state of the world. On the other 
hand, if the sensory difference is large, a more likely interpretation may be that the 
world has changed to such a degree that its current state cannot be predicted from past 
sensory input. The accuracy of perceptual inferences would then be harmed by giving 
any weight to previous sensory evidence. The exact beliefs that observers have about 
the temporal statistics of the world, and how these beliefs relate to the actual temporal 
statistics of natural sensory input, pose an interesting direction for future research, and 
is the subject of ongoing studies in our lab.
In conclusion, our findings support the notion that serial dependence in orientation 
perception is underpinned by an integration of sensory evidence from the present and 
the recent past. While some details of this process remain to be determined, our results 
suggest that the integration occurs probabilistically, with current and previous sensory 
inputs weighted by the uncertainty in their internal representations.
6
GENERAL 
DISCUSSION
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6.1 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS
This thesis set out to the address the central question: does the brain represent and 
compute with sensory information probabilistically? This is important, as such a 
probabilistic coding scheme would allow the brain to perform optimal perceptual 
inference, and facilitate decisions that take sensory uncertainty into account (see 
chapter 1 for a more elaborate discussion). In order to investigate this, we reasoned 
that we should focus on internal variability in neural responses, as any external sources 
of uncertainty might betray themselves to an observer by means of simple cues, which 
could allow participants to develop experiment-specific heuristic-based strategies to 
perform optimal inference. Uncertainty originating from within the brain itself, on the 
other hand, could only be used by a participant to inform their perceptual decisions if 
the uncertainty were somehow “read out” from the associated neural responses. Thus, 
if we found that internal uncertainty predicted perceptual decisions, this would imply a 
positive answer to our main question.
This approach required that we could measure the uncertainty in internal sensory 
representations from moment to moment. Since there were no existing methodologies 
that would allow us to do this, we started our line of research by developing a new 
analysis method with this capability. Thus, our larger question was split up into two parts: 
(1) can we measure fluctuations in sensory uncertainty due to internal variability? 
and (2) if so, do observers take this internal uncertainty in sensory representations 
into account in their perceptual decisions? The first part of this thesis dealt with the 
first question, while the remainder targeted question 2. We chose the visual system as 
our model sensory modality, and we relied on functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) to measure cortical activity non-invasively in human observers. 
To address the first question, we first needed to find out more about the internal 
variability in human visual cortex. In particular, it was necessary to know the correlational 
structure of this variability, as this is highly relevant for the neural encoding of sensory 
information. Previous work had found that in macaque visual cortex, variability is 
shared between neurons that are located close together, or respond to similar stimuli 
(Zohary et al., 1994; Bair et al., 2001; Kohn & Smith, 2005; Smith & Kohn, 2008). The latter 
property means that for many neurons, correlated responses can occur either due to 
common stimulus input or due to shared noise. Thus, when these neurons fire together, 
it is ambiguous whether this response represents a stimulus-driven signal or irrelevant 
noise. This form of correlated variability is therefore particularly harmful to the fidelity of 
the neural code (Abbott & Dayan, 1999; Averbeck & Lee, 2006; Moreno-Bote et al., 2014). 
In chapter 2, we showed that this tuning-dependent correlated noise also occurs in 
122
C H A P T E R  6
human visual cortex. Additionally, we discovered a hitherto overlooked statistical bias, 
which – if not corrected for – causes noise correlations to appear to be linked to tuning 
properties even when no such relationship exists in reality. 
The noise correlation structure revealed in chapter 2 was crucial in order to develop 
a method that allowed us to measure the uncertainty in cortical activation patterns in 
human visual cortex. The logic behind this method was that if you know how visual 
stimuli can lead to patterns of cortical activity, it is possible to invert this relationship, 
and infer the probability that a certain stimulus caused a measured activation pattern 
(according to Bayes’ rule). The patterns that a certain visual stimulus can evoke are 
determined by the tuning properties of the fMRI voxels, as well as the distribution of 
the noise in their responses, and in particular the correlational structure of this noise. 
In chapter 3, we developed a new decoding algorithm based on a generative model 
of these tuning and noise properties. Given a cortical activation pattern, this algorithm 
decodes a probability distribution over the possible stimuli that could have evoked 
it. We found that the width of this distribution reflected the overall uncertainty in the 
data, but only if the decoder’s generative model accounted for tuning-dependent noise 
correlations in the data. 
The overall uncertainty in fMRI data can be thought of as a combination of the 
uncertainty in the underlying neural population response (“neural uncertainty”), and 
additional uncertainty that derives from the incomplete and noisy measurement of 
this neural response (“fMRI uncertainty”), with only the neural uncertainty being of 
empirical interest. In chapter 4, we therefore asked whether the uncertainty decoded 
from fMRI activity by our algorithm reflected the uncertainty in the underlying neural 
response. We reasoned that if it did, decoded uncertainty should predict the precision 
with which observers perceived stimuli from trial to trial. Accordingly, we found that 
participants gave less accurate estimates of the stimuli they had seen on trials when 
decoded uncertainty was high, compared to when it was low. In conclusion, these 
findings indicate that the answer to the first subquestion of this thesis is positive, and 
we can indeed measure internal uncertainty.
Having developed and successfully tested this new decoding method, we were now 
equipped to address the second subquestion: do participants take internal uncertainty 
into account as it varies from trial to trial? If they do, then the prediction would be that 
when integrating information from different sources, observers would give less weight 
to uncertain sensory evidence. We tested this prediction in two ways. In chapter 4, we 
focused on a bias in our participants’ behavioral stimulus estimates. When stimulus 
orientations were near a cardinal axis (i.e. near vertical or horizontal), the reported 
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orientations tended to be further away from this axis than the true orientations. This 
implied that participants combined their sensory evidence regarding the orientation of 
a grating with other information, which biased their perceptual judgments away from 
the cardinal axes. If so, and if in this process they weighed their sensory evidence by 
the associated uncertainty, then we predicted that this bias should be stronger when 
sensory evidence was less reliable. This prediction was borne out by our findings, 
which showed that on trials when decoded uncertainty was high, participants reported 
orientations as being further away from the nearest cardinal axis than when decoded 
uncertainty was low. 
In chapter 5, we tested the hypothesis of uncertainty-weighted perceptual decisions 
in a different framework. Here, we capitalized on a perceptual phenomenon known 
as “serial dependence”, which holds that perception in the present moment reflects a 
combination of sensory evidence from the present and the recent past (Cicchini et al., 
2014; Fischer & Whitney, 2014; Liberman et al., 2014). If this sensory integration over 
time were optimal with respect to internal uncertainty, we reasoned that participants 
ought to rely more on previous sensory information when sensory evidence on the 
current trial was relatively uncertain. In accordance with this prediction, we found that 
when decoded uncertainty on the current trial was large compared to the previous trial, 
participants reported the orientation of the current stimulus as being more similar to 
that of preceding stimulus. Together with the findings regarding the cardinal repulsion 
bias from chapter 4, this suggests that participants are able to adjust their perceptual 
decisions to the internal uncertainty in their sensory representations. 
In summary, by accounting for the structure of the internal noise in human visual cortex, 
we were able to develop a generative model-based decoding approach that allowed us 
to measure internal uncertainty in visual representations on a trial-by-trial basis. Using 
this new method, we showed that human observers take this trial-by-trial internal 
uncertainty into account when making perceptual decisions, suggesting that the brain 
represents sensory information as probability distributions. 
6.2 NEURAL CODING OF UNCERTAINTY
The experiments presented in this thesis constitute an important, direct test in cortex 
of Bayesian theories of neural coding. Such theories propose that the brain computes 
the uncertainty in a sensory response, and uses a representation of this uncertainty in 
subsequent perceptual computations in order to perform optimal inference. However, 
different theories have suggested different methods by which the brain might 
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implement the computation and representation of uncertainty. Do our results provide 
evidence for one of these implementations over the others? To address this question, 
this section will briefly review some of the most prominent Bayesian coding theories 
(for more extensive reviews, see Ma & Jazayeri, 2014; Pouget, Beck, Ma, & Latham, 2013; 
Vilares & Kording, 2011), and discuss how the findings of this thesis fit into this larger 
body of work.
In one very straightforward proposal, the brain would represent the amount of 
uncertainty in a sensory representation by means of the firing rates of a pool of neurons 
dedicated to this task  (Vilares, Howard, Fernandes, Gottfried, & Körding, 2012). Thus, 
uncertainty would be encoded in the activations of distinct “uncertainty channels” in 
the brain, in parallel with other neural channels encoding the sensory estimates that 
the uncertainty applies to. Consistent with this hypothesis, some fMRI experiments 
have found that high visual uncertainty in their tasks was associated with increased 
activation in parts of visual cortex (Helbig et al., 2012; Vilares et al., 2012). However, 
uncertainty in these experiments was linked to external stimulus properties that 
might modulate activity in visual areas independently of the uncertainty they induce. 
For instance, stimuli that are relatively blurry (as in the case of Helbig et al. (2012)) or 
spatially disperse (as in Vilares et al. (2012)) might activate more neurons in early visual 
cortex due to their increased “retinotopic footprint”, resulting in a stronger overall BOLD 
signal. Furthermore, when stimuli are less reliable, it is harder to perform a task on them, 
and increased task difficulty is known to raise the activity of certain populations of visual 
neurons (Ress et al., 2000; Chen et al., 2008). Thus, it is possible that the increased visual 
activity observed in these studies does not reflect a strictly uncertainty-related signal. 
Interestingly, in our experiments, external stimulus reliability was held constant, and 
we did not observe uncertainty-related changes in overall activity in visual cortex (see 
Supplementary Fig. 4.4). 
Note that a scalar representation of only the amount of uncertainty is somewhat limiting, 
as sensory responses can (in principle) be consistent with probability distributions of 
various shapes. For certain shapes (in particular for Normal distributions), representing 
the variance of the distribution is sufficient to perform probabilistic computations. 
This is not true in general, however, and in particular for multi-modal distributions, a 
scalar uncertainty value does not provide an accurate or complete description. In more 
powerful implementations of probabilistic coding, neural responses would therefore 
represent a full probability distribution, rather than only its mean (or mode) and width. 
One straightforward version of fully probabilistic codes that has been proposed, is 
that neurons simply fire a number of spikes in proportion to the probability that their 
preferred stimulus is present (or the log probability, which is more convenient for certain 
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computations; Anastasio, Patton, & Belkacem-Boussaid, 2000; Barlow, 1969; Deneve, 
2008; Rao, 2004). The shape of a population response would thus equal the shape of the 
encoded distribution. 
Note that uncertainty is inherently present in sensory inputs. Because of noise and 
ambiguity in the mapping between stimuli and responses, any sensory response 
is implicitly consistent with a probability distribution over possible perceptual 
interpretations. In the probabilistic coding schemes discussed above, this implicitly 
encoded distribution (or its uncertainty) is made explicit, and perceptual computations 
proceed with these explicit probability codes. But is it necessary to make implicit 
distributions explicit in order to compute with them? One encoding scheme, known as 
“probabilistic population codes” (or PPCs), posits that it is not (Ma et al., 2006). Instead, 
computations in PPCs are carried out on implicitly encoded probability distributions, 
by performing neural operations directly on the sensory responses that harbor them. 
Consider, for example, an instance of multisensory integration, where the value of 
a stimulus variable (e.g. the location of an animal) is inferred from a combination of 
inputs from several sensory modalities (e.g. visual and auditory input). Each unisensory 
response is consistent with a probability distribution over possible stimulus values, and 
the optimal way to combine these distributions is to multiply them (see also chapter 
1 & Fig. 1.3). With PPCs, this is achieved not by actually multiplying explicitly encoded 
distributions, but instead by performing an equivalent operation on the sensory 
responses themselves. Specifically, theoretical work has shown that, under certain 
assumptions3, this can be done by simply summing the sensory population responses, 
in a linear combination (Ma et al., 2006). That is, if you simply add up the responses 
of corresponding sensory neurons, you obtain a new population response which is 
implicitly consistent with a new distribution. If this sum is computed correctly, with the 
right synaptic weights, it can be shown that this new (implicitly encoded) distribution 
will be exactly the product of the original distributions. Thus, PPCs propose that it is not 
necessary to make distributions explicit in order to compute with them, and theoretical 
work has shown this to be true for several common perceptual operations (Ma et al., 
2006, 2011; Beck et al., 2008).
A final prominent theory, in which the brain is also probabilistic without explicitly 
encoded probabilities, posits that neural responses can be interpreted as samples 
from a distribution (Hoyer & Hyvärinen, 2003; Fiser et al., 2010; Moreno-Bote, Knill, & 
Pouget, 2011). Under this hypothesis, variability in neural responses is not merely 
irrelevant noise. Rather, stochastic responses cause the activity of a neural population 
3. Specifically, PPCs require that neural response variability is “Poisson-like”. More formally, this means that its 
distribution should be in the exponential family with linear sufficient statistics.
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over time to describe a random walk, similar to the dynamics of Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo (MCMC) sampling algorithms used in statistics. At each step, or “sample”, of this 
random walk, the neural response is consistent with a certain perceptual interpretation 
(e.g. the orientation of a visual edge). As the random walk unfolds over time, it explores 
a probability distribution over different interpretations of the sensory input. In parts 
of the distribution where there is a lot of probability (e.g. very likely orientations), the 
random walk is likely to spend a lot of time, while it will almost never visit parts with a 
very low density of probability (e.g. very unlikely orientations). The longer this random 
walk continues, the more closely the accumulated samples approximate the posterior 
distribution over a given sensory variable.
Can our findings distinguish between explicit probability codes, probabilistic population 
codes and sampling-based coding schemes? This question can be decomposed into 
two parts: (1) do these theories make divergent predictions? and (2) can we test these 
predictions in fMRI data? We can start by identifying a prediction that is common to 
all theories: a positive relationship between the width of a population response (i.e. its 
variance along the encoded stimulus dimension) and uncertainty. In explicit probability 
codes, this mapping is one-to-one; since the population response necessarily has the 
same shape as the encoded distribution, uncertainty cannot change independently 
from the width of the population response. For PPCs and sampling-based coding 
schemes, the relationship is not exclusive – uncertainty in these codes can also vary 
with other aspects of the population response, such as its amplitude or the amount of 
noise in the response. However, it is impossible in any of these frameworks to increase 
the width of a population response without this increasing the encoded uncertainty. 
Consequently, the width of the population response is not informative regarding these 
competing theories.
Sampling-based coding theories predict that neural response variability over time should 
be lower when there is little sensory uncertainty (Orbán, Berkes, Fiser, & Lengyel, 2016), 
but the temporal resolution of fMRI is insufficient in order to measure this variability. If 
neural responses are more variable over time, though, this should translate to a more 
noisy average response over a given time window. That is, the pattern of responses 
across voxels should show more variability around the voxel tuning curves. However, in 
PPCs a more noisy population response would also encode a wider distribution, and so 
the noise in the population response is not a distinguishing feature either. 
PPCs suggest that neural response gain plays an important role in encoding uncertainty 
(Ma et al., 2006). This theory predicts that, on the whole, population responses with larger 
gain should be associated with lower uncertainty. Unfortunately, this too is a difficult 
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prediction to test unambiguously, especially on fMRI data. As discussed previously, 
explicit probability codes posit that the shape of a population response matches the 
shape of the encoded probability distribution, and probability distributions are narrower 
when uncertainty is low. Given that the area under a probability distribution is constant, 
narrower distributions (over the same domain) must peak at higher values. Thus, explicit 
codes might also predict a negative relationship between gain and uncertainty, or at 
least a change in gain may be indistinguishable from a change in width. For sampling-
based codes, a similar logic may apply, although the lack of a detailed, agreed-upon 
formalization of sampling-based schemes leaves room for multiple predictions on 
this point. On a more practical note, fMRI is an inherently relative measurement of 
neural responses, in that activations are typically calculated against some implicit 
baseline, which is itself derived from fMRI measurements. Furthermore, fMRI measures 
neural responses indirectly, through intermediary metabolic mechanisms and nuclear 
resonance effects, which can vary in their susceptibility to neural activity. Thus, an 
absolute baseline of zero neural response can never be precisely established, and 
this largely precludes meaningful statements about the gain of the underlying neural 
signals. 
Lastly, it is worth noting that, besides the aforementioned limitations of fMRI, it is not 
trivial to infer the neural population response that caused a certain pattern of fMRI 
activity. As with any inference process, this requires certain assumptions regarding the 
generative model that links neural activity with fMRI signals, such as those that we made 
in the development of our decoding algorithm. These assumptions inevitably constrain 
the results of the inference process, such that the estimated population can only vary 
along dimensions in which the generative model leaves room for variability.  
In conclusion, while our results support the notion that the brain represents the 
uncertainty in sensory information from trial to trial, it will unfortunately be difficult to 
distinguish with fMRI between different neural implementations of this representation 
that have been proposed.
6.3 ORIGINS OF NEURAL RESPONSE VARIABILITY
A key finding of this thesis is that human observers are able to optimize their 
perceptual inferences in the face of internal variability, which renders their sensory 
representations more or less uncertain from one moment to the next. But where does 
this variability originate from? What is its structure, and why does it occur? In addressing 
these questions, it is first necessary to realize that any part of a neural response that 
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is not apparently explained by the known parameters of an experiment (such as the 
properties of a presented stimulus) is often considered random variability, and may be 
called “noise”. This designation may be defensible in the context of specific studies, but 
is misleading when interpreted to be strictly and generally accurate; neural responses 
that appear random from a particular frame of reference may in fact be an informative 
part of the neural code. 
Nevertheless, some neural variability must underlie the correlated changes in decoded 
uncertainty and behavioral accuracy that we observed. Changes in the neural 
population response must have rendered stimulus representations more or less reliable 
from one trial to the next. One useful principle we can surmise is that the variability 
responsible for this is likely to be correlated globally between neurons with similar 
tuning properties. There are two reasons for this. First, computational and mathematical 
models indicate that response variability which is independent between neurons, or 
which has a correlational structure unrelated to tuning properties, has comparatively 
little effect on the precision with which stimuli are represented in population responses 
(Zohary et al., 1994; Shadlen & Newsome, 1998; Abbott & Dayan, 1999; Averbeck & Lee, 
2006; Moreno-Bote et al., 2014). Thus, in order to noticeably influence behavior, it is 
more plausible that the underlying neural variability was shared between like-tuned 
neurons. This variability should also be shared globally, between all neurons of similar 
tuning, or it could still be mitigated by averaging. Secondly, our decoder’s generative 
model specifically accounts for response variability with global, tuning-dependent 
structure. Given that we were able to measure fluctuations in neural uncertainty, these 
are likely to have been driven by variability that the decoding algorithm “knows about”, 
rather than variability that was not explicitly accounted for in the generative model. 
What neural mechanisms could produce response variability of this nature? The 
requirement that variability ought to be shared globally in visual cortex points towards 
a top-down modulatory origin, rather than an effect of local neural interactions through 
horizontal connections. One well-studied class of top-down modulatory influences are 
those effected by selective attention. William James famously said of attention that 
“everyone knows what [it] is” (James, 1890, p. 403). Yet since James’ time, the picture that 
has emerged of attention is that it encompasses a variety of different neural operations. 
Visual attention may be oriented towards spatial locations, perceptual features, or 
objects (Posner, 1980; Duncan, 1984; Maunsell & Treue, 2006), and can have a range of 
different effects on neural responses (reviewed in Ling, Jehee, & Pestilli, 2015), although 
these effects have in common that they are thought to increase the efficiency of neural 
information transmission at the focus of attention. Interestingly, these modulatory 
effects include influences on the shape of population tuning functions, such as changes 
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in tuning width or amplitude (McAdams & Maunsell, 1999; Treue & Martinez-Trujillo, 
1999). When viewed as variability around an average tuning curve, such orchestrated 
modulations would manifest as exactly the type of globally shared, tuning-dependent 
“noise” that could underpin changes in the reliability of sensory representations. Thus, 
although selective attention was not explicitly manipulated in our experiments, it is 
possible that spontaneous fluctuations in attention may have been responsible for the 
trial-by-trial changes in uncertainty and behavior that we observed. Note, however, that 
we did not observe a greater overall amplitude of the BOLD signal when uncertainty 
was low (see Supplementary Fig. 4.4). This suggests that the changes in uncertainty 
we observed cannot be attributed to simple fluctuations in the overall level of attention, 
as overall BOLD amplitude tends to increase with attentional effort (Ress et al., 2000).
Sensory population responses may also be influenced by changes in overall brain state. 
Tonic levels of modulatory neurotransmitters throughout the brain fluctuate over time, 
under the control of autonomic brainstem nuclei (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005). The 
action of these neuromodulators is typically described as changing the level of “arousal” 
in the brain. When arousal is high, the brain is especially receptive to external stimuli, 
as reflected by cortical desynchronization and increased gain of sensory responses (Hei 
et al., 2014; Reimer et al., 2014; Zhuang et al., 2014). Increased gain across a population 
response would enhance sensory representations by boosting the amplitude of the 
population tuning function, similar to one of the possible effects of attention described 
above. Again, however, the lack of a correlation between overall BOLD amplitude and 
decoded uncertainty, as well as the fact that our results were specific to the retinotopic 
representation of the presented stimulus, appear to be at odds with an explanation 
based on a general effect of arousal, which is typically associated with wide-spread 
changes in cortical activity (Olbrich et al., 2009; Chang et al., 2016).
Thus, while attention or attention-like effects may have been responsible for the changes 
in uncertainty that we observed, simple fluctuations in the general level of attention or 
arousal appear to be unlikely candidates. Instead, it seems probable that the underlying 
modulatory influences exert more specific and subtle effects on neural stimulus 
representations. These modulatory effects could furthermore arise from more than one 
source, and different influences might exert themselves at different instances. Rather 
than taking a top-down approach that tries to trace the origin of this neural variability 
to specific candidates established in the literature, it may therefore be more fruitful to 
adopt a data-driven stance. For example, a recent neurophysiological study of neural 
response variability in macaque visual cortex (Goris et al., 2014) developed a method 
to partition putative noise in neural responses, and found that a large component of 
this apparently random variability could in fact be attributed to external modulatory 
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influences. Similarly, by decomposing cortical variability in our experiments into its 
principal or independent components, it may be possible to first identify behaviorally 
relevant sources of variability, and only then examine their functional correlates and 
neural origins. Indeed, this is a topic of ongoing work in our lab.
6.4 FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The findings reported in this thesis invite a number of questions that have yet to be 
answered. Here, I will discuss some of these questions, and give suggestions for 
directions in which future research might proceed. 
As mentioned previously, our results do not allow us to distinguish between 
competing theories of how the brain might represent uncertainty. In part, this was 
for methodological reasons, or due to overlapping predictions by different theories. 
However, to a substantial extent it is also caused, or at least complicated, by the fact 
that there are still certain gaps to be filled in each of these theories. Efforts to develop 
and formalize these theories further will help to distill more specific predictions from 
them. Additionally, we might gain more power to distinguish between possible 
implementations of probabilistic coding by recording neural responses directly, and 
applying our probabilistic decoding methodology to this direct neural data. On the 
other hand, direct neural recordings typically sample only from a subset of neurons 
contributing to a population response, which might make it difficult to characterize 
all the information available for behavior. Presumably, it would therefore be necessary 
either to capitalize on modern recording methods (such as high-throughput multi-
unit electrode arrays (e.g. Berenyi et al., 2014), or two-photon calcium imaging (e.g. 
Ohki & Reid, 2014)) that make it possible to measure the responses of many neurons 
simultaneously, or to adapt the stimulus to activate only a small number of neurons 
(while maintaining behavioral relevance).
Our findings were obtained in the context of orientation perception in early visual cortex. 
If representations of uncertainty are fundamentally woven into the neural code, these 
results should generalize to other features, modalities and cortical regions. Future work 
might investigate this by employing visual stimuli that vary along different dimensions 
(e.g. moving random dot patterns with varying directions of motion, or stimuli of 
different colors), or by switching to a different sense altogether. Note, however, that 
the question of generalization is both empirical and methodological in nature: if, like 
orientation, other stimulus variables are also represented probabilistically in cortex, this 
can only be detected with a sufficiently sensitive analysis. From a methodological point 
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of view, it will be interesting to see if the generative model we employed for activations 
in early visual areas to orientation stimuli will translate to the representation of other 
features and to other cortical regions. Additionally, it is important to consider the limits 
of fMRI. The success of any decoding approach hinges on whether or not information at 
the neural level is available in BOLD activation patterns, which in turn depends on the 
spatial organization of tuning properties in cortex. These methodological considerations 
should be taken into account when investigating the generalization of our findings to 
other domains.
We have presented evidence that human observers take into account the internal 
reliability of their sensory representations when making perceptual inferences. Other 
studies have found that humans and other primates also take sensory uncertainty 
into account in higher-level decisions about which course of action to pursue (Kiani & 
Shadlen, 2009; Mamassian & Barthelme, 2009). This suggests that brain areas involved 
in these decisions might have access to the reliability of the sensory information these 
decisions are based on, but this link has not been explicitly shown (but see Fetsch, Kiani, 
Newsome, & Shadlen, 2014). Correlating uncertainty in sensory areas, as measured 
with our decoding approach, with activity in parietal and frontal regions involved in 
decision-making, might provide the missing piece to this puzzle. For instance, neurons 
in the macaque lateral intraparietal cortex (LIP) are thought to be involved in decisions 
to make directed eye movements (Shadlen & Newsome, 2001; Roitman & Shadlen, 
2002; Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Churchland, Kiani, & Shadlen, 2008). Each LIP neuron has a 
certain preferred part of the visual field, known as its “response field”, and accumulates 
evidence in favor of an eye movement to this location. This accumulated evidence is 
encoded in the spike rate of a sustained response. When this spike rate reaches a critical 
value, there is sufficient evidence to support a decision, and an eye movement to the 
winning neuron’s response field is initiated. Bayesian theories of decision-making posit 
that evidence should accumulate faster when sensory information unambiguously 
supports a particular behavioral response (Beck et al., 2008; Kiani & Shadlen, 2009). This 
leads to the prediction that – all else being equal – when stimulus representations in 
visual cortex carry little uncertainty, LIP responses should ramp up more quickly. Our 
approach could provide a strong test of this prediction, by correlating activity in LIP (or 
its human analog) with the uncertainty in cortical representations of physically identical 
stimuli. 
Humans can not only adjust their decisions based on sensory uncertainty, but are also 
often able to report how confident they feel in a perceptual decision, and thereby 
predict the probability that the decision is correct. This metacognitive ability has been 
demonstrated by many studies (Kunimoto, Miller, & Pashler, 2001; Song et al., 2011; 
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Rademaker, Tredway, & Tong, 2012; Rahnev, Koizumi, McCurdy, D’Esposito, & Lau, 
2015), but what are the neural mechanisms underlying this accurate introspection? 
Do observers have metacognitive access to the uncertainty in their low-level sensory 
responses, or are their confidence reports based instead on simple heuristics, or on 
an awareness of higher-level influences on task performance? Future studies might 
address this open question by asking participants to give confidence reports regarding 
their perception of identical stimuli, and correlating reported confidence with trial-by-
trial uncertainty decoded from the associated stimulus-evoked activation patterns. 
6.5 CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the findings presented in this thesis suggest that the brain represents 
sensory information probabilistically, allowing observers to adjust their perceptual 
inferences to the uncertainty in sensory representations, as it varies from moment 
to moment due to internal neural variability. The origins of this variability remain an 
open question for future research, although it seems likely that they can be ascribed 
to modulatory influences on neural stimulus representations. It also remains to be 
determined exactly how the brain represents sensory uncertainty at the detailed 
neuronal level. Future work might further explore the links between sensory 
uncertainty and higher-level cognition and decision-making processes, and investigate 
to what extent representations of uncertainty generalize to other sensory features and 
modalities. 
I began this thesis with the central question: does the brain represent and compute 
with sensory information probabilistically? Using a new, probabilistic decoding 
analysis, I demonstrated that sensory uncertainty can be read out from cortical activity 
patterns measured in visual cortex. I then presented converging evidence from two 
experiments, suggesting that human observers take this trial-by-trial uncertainty 
into account in their perceptual decisions. Together, these findings point towards 
a positive answer to the main question: the brain appears to rely on probabilistic 
representations of sensory information, in order to optimize its perceptual 
inferences.
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N E D E R L A N D S TA L I G E  S A M E N VAT T I N G
NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING
Stel je voor: je zit achter het stuur, en je probeert een veilige afstand te bewaren tot de 
auto voor je. Maar hoe ver weg is die auto eigenlijk? De precieze afstand is moeilijk in te 
schatten: je denkt dat het waarschijnlijk rond de 40 meter is, maar misschien vijf meter 
meer of minder. Gelukkig is ook 35 meter nog een veilige afstand, dus je rijdt rustig 
verder door het zonovergoten landschap. Maar niet veel later kom je een mistbank 
tegen. Opeens is het moeilijk te zien hoe ver dingen van je vandaan zijn. De auto voor 
je? Je schat nog altijd ongeveer 40 meter, maar je bent niet meer zo zeker van je zaak: 
het zou ook wel 60 kunnen zijn. Of misschien maar 20, en dat zou gevaarlijk kunnen zijn. 
Om dus zeker een veilige afstand te houden, minder je snelheid. 
In dit voorbeeld werd een belangrijke beslissing over je (rij-)gedrag beïnvloed door de 
onzekerheid in je waarneming van wat er om je heen gebeurde. Zowel in de zon als in de 
mist dacht je dat de volgende auto waarschijnlijk 40 meter verderop was – daar lag het 
dus niet aan. De reden dat je actie ondernam was dat je in het laatste geval niet zo zeker 
was van deze inschatting. In ons dagelijks leven komen dit soort situaties geregeld voor. 
De informatie die we binnenkrijgen van onze zintuigen is niet altijd even betrouwbaar, 
en dus weten we soms niet precies hoe we haar het beste kunnen interpreteren. In dat 
geval is het goed om rekening te houden met meerdere mogelijkheden die allemaal 
consistent zijn met wat je zintuigen je vertellen (bijv. afstanden tussen de 20-60 meter), 
in plaats van alleen de meest waarschijnlijke interpretatie (bijv. je schatting van 40 
meter). Maar hoe weet je eigenlijk hoe onzeker je bent? Dat wil zeggen, hoe rekenen de 
hersenen de foutmarge uit in hun eigen inschattingen? En waar komt die onzekerheid 
eigenlijk vandaan? Dat zijn de vragen die ik in mijn promotieonderzoek heb bestudeerd. 
Waarschijnlijkheden en kansberekening
In wiskundige termen kunnen we onzekerheid beschrijven met waarschijnlijkheden. 
Blijven we bij het voorbeeld achter het stuur, in zonnige omstandigheden, dan kunnen 
we bijvoorbeeld zeggen dat de volgende auto hóógstwaarschijnlijk 40 meter ver is. Maar 
het zou ook kunnen dat de afstand 38 of 42 meter is. Deze afstanden zijn iets minder 
waarschijnlijk, maar nog wel plausibel. En ook 35 of 45 meter zouden nog kunnen, 
maar zijn wel een stuk minder aannemelijk dan 40 meter. Op elk van deze afstanden 
kunnen we een getal plakken, dat de waarschijnlijkheid aangeeft dat de volgende auto 
zo ver van ons vandaan is. En van die getallen kunnen we een grafiek maken, zoals 
geïllustreerd in Figuur 1. Zo’n grafiek noemen we een kansverdeling, of ook wel een 
waarschijnlijkheidsdistributie. De breedte van deze distributie geeft de onzekerheid over 
(in dit geval) de afstand aan. Is de distributie smal, dan zijn er maar een paar afstanden 
consistent met de zintuiglijke informatie, en ben je dus vrij zeker van je zaak. 
146
APPENDICES
Afstand (m)
40 4535302520 50 55 60
W
aa
rs
ch
ijn
lij
kh
ei
d
?
Afstand (m)
40 4535302520 50 55 60
W
aa
rs
ch
ijn
lij
kh
ei
d
?
Onzekerheid
Onzekerheid
Figuur 1: Hoe ver is de volgende auto van je verwijderd? Je weet dit nooit helemaal precies, maar 
in zonnige omstandigheden (boven) ben je zekerder dan als je in de mist rijdt (onder). In het 
eerste geval schat je misschien dat de afstand 40 meter is, +/- 5 meter. Je acht een afstand van 40 
meter dus het meest waarschijnlijk, terwijl afstanden van 35 of 45 meter nog net mogelijk, maar 
een stuk minder waarschijnlijk zijn. Wiskundig gezien kun je deze onzekerheid beschrijven met 
een zogenaamde kansverdeling (ook wel waarschijnlijkheidsdistributie genoemd), die van elke 
mogelijke afstand de waarschijnlijkheid (of kans) aangeeft dat deze de juiste is. Rechtsboven zie 
je bijvoorbeeld de kansverdeling die bij de zonnige situatie hoort. Horizontaal (op de x-as) staan 
de mogelijke afstanden, en verticaal (op de y-as) de waarschijnlijkheid. De dikke zwarte lijn is 
de grafiek van de kansverdeling. Zoals je ziet heeft 40 meter (aangegeven met een verticale 
stippellijn) inderdaad de hoogste kans, en wordt de waarschijnlijkheid steeds lager naarmate je 
verder van deze beste schatting vandaan komt. Rechtsonder zie je de kansverdeling behorend 
bij het mistige scenario. Hoewel deze nog steeds gecentreerd is op 40 meter, zie je dat er nu 
een veel breder bereik aan afstanden is met een redelijke waarschijnlijkheid. De breedte van de 
kansverdeling geeft dus de mate van onzekerheid aan. 
Maar rijd je nu een mistbank in, dan wordt je visuele waarneming in de war gebracht, en 
zijn er opeens veel meer afstanden plausibel. De kansverdeling wordt dus breder, wat 
duidt op een grotere onzekerheid.
Een kansverdeling is dus een wiskundige representatie van onzekere informatie. 
Maar waarom zou je zo’n ogenschijnlijk ingewikkelde representatie gebruiken? Het 
voordeel hiervan is dat, als je eenmaal met waarschijnlijkheden werkt, je principes van 
kansberekening kan gaan toepassen. Als je bijvoorbeeld weet hoe waarschijnlijk het is 
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dat de volgende auto gevaarlijk dichtbij is, dan kun je ook de kans berekenen op een 
botsing. En dat is natuurlijk een risico dat je zo laag mogelijk wilt houden. Dit soort 
kansberekeningen komen ook in andere situaties goed van pas. Neem bijvoorbeeld een 
voetballer die moet beslissen of ze de bal afspeelt aan haar teamgenoot, of zelf een 
schot op doel waagt.  De beste optie is datgene wat de hoogste kans op een doelpunt 
geeft. Of denk aan een consument in de supermarkt die een avocado uitkiest. Hij kan 
het beste het exemplaar mee naar huis nemen dat de hoogste kans heeft om rijp te zijn. 
Kortom, in een wereld van onzekere uitkomsten zijn kansen en waarschijnlijkheden de 
voertaal, en wie deze taal spreekt kan daar veel voordeel uit halen.
Als je dit eenmaal weet lijkt het misschien niet verwonderlijk dat van het brein gedacht 
wordt dat het ook in deze taal communiceert, als het gaat om onzekere informatie. Toch 
is dit een vrij recente theorie, die nog niet direct in de hersenen was getest. In mijn 
onderzoek heb ik deze theorie daarom op de proef gesteld. Hierbij heb ik me toegespitst 
op onzekere informatie die we binnenkrijgen via onze ogen: visuele informatie dus. De 
theorie zegt dat hersencellen, ook wel “neuronen” genoemd, deze informatie met elkaar 
delen in de vorm van waarschijnlijkheden. Maar om deze theorie te begrijpen moet je 
eerst wat meer weten over hoe visuele waarneming werkt in onze hersenen.
Visuele waarneming in de hersenen
Over hoe het brein visuele informatie verwerkt kun je een heel boek schrijven, maar 
de basisprincipes zijn vrij eenvoudig. Een goede vergelijking om mee te beginnen is 
die met een digitale camera. Zonder al te veel te vereenvoudigen kunnen we namelijk 
stellen dat je ogen foto’s maken van de wereld, die bestaan uit pixels. Eén zo’n pixel is 
uiteindelijk niets meer dan een getal, dat de kleur aangeeft van een heel klein vakje in 
de foto. En zo is een digitale foto dus ook eigenlijk gewoon een grote tabel met getallen. 
In het geval van een digitale camera worden die getallen opgeslagen, en daar houdt het 
op. De camera doet vervolgens niets meer met die informatie. Maar waar het verhaal 
voor de camera ophoudt, begint het pas voor onze hersenen. Onze ogen sturen deze 
getallen namelijk door naar de primaire visuele hersenschors4, helemaal achterin het 
hoofd (Fig. 2). In dit hersengebied wordt de “foto” opgedeeld in kleine stukjes. Elk stukje 
wordt geanalyseerd door een groep neuronen, die vervolgens het resultaat van deze 
analyse rapporteren aan neuronen in andere hersengebieden.
4. De primaire visuele cortex maakt deel uit van de neocortex, ook wel bekend als de hersenschors of kortweg 
cortex. De hersenschors is de buitenste laag van de grote hersenen. Dit is wat de meeste mensen voor zich 
zien als ze denken aan “het brein”. De hersenschors is verantwoordelijk voor het analyseren van zintuiglijke 
informatie en het uitvoeren van hogere cognitieve en motorische functies. Dit deel van de hersenen is bij 
mensen bijzonder sterk ontwikkeld, in vergelijking met andere diersoorten.
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Figuur 2: Eerste stadia van de verwerking van visuele informatie in de hersenen. De ogen 
maken een “foto” van de wereld, die wordt doorgestuurd naar de visuele cortex, achterin het 
brein. De informatie komt in eerste instantie binnen in de primaire visuele cortex (V1), en wordt 
van daaruit doorgestuurd naar de secundaire visuele cortex (V2) en verdere hersengebieden. 
Hersengebieden zoals V1 en V2 die aan het begin van deze keten liggen noemen we ook wel de 
“vroege visuele cortex”. In de visuele cortex wordt het visuele beeld opgedeeld in kleine stukjes, 
en elk beeldstukje wordt geanalyseerd door een groep neuronen (hersencellen). Elk neuron in 
deze groep vergelijkt hetzelfde beeldstukje met een template, een voorbeeldplaatje waarvoor 
dat neuron een voorkeur heeft. Als het beeldstukje sterk lijkt op zijn template, vuurt het neuron 
een elektrisch signaaltje af. In de vroege visuele cortex zijn de templates vaak randen, waar licht 
en donker of verschillende kleuren elkaar afwisselen. In deze illustratie zijn een paar neuronen 
uit dezelfde groep afgebeeld, samen met hun templates. In het vakje boven elk neuron zie je 
de vergelijking tussen het beeldstukje en het template van dat neuron. Zoals je ziet komen 
sommige templates vrij goed overeen met het beeldstukje dat door deze neuronen wordt 
beoordeeld, terwijl andere templates helemaal geen gelijkenis hebben. 
Stel je voor dat jij zo’n neuron bent. Je taak is dan vrij simpel. Elke keer dat de ogen een 
“foto” maken van de wereld krijg jij een klein stukje daarvan te zien. Dit kleine stukje 
foto moet jij vergelijken met een template, een soort voorbeeldplaatje waarvoor jij nu 
eenmaal een voorkeur hebt (Fig. 2). Lijkt het fotostukje dat je nu onder ogen hebt op 
deze template? Dan stuur je een elektrisch signaaltje door naar weer andere neuronen. 
In de primaire visuele hersenschors (ook wel kortweg “V1” genoemd), vergelijken de 
neuronen hun fotostukjes met vrij simpele voorbeeldplaatjes. Zo kijken ze bijvoorbeeld 
of er in hun fotostukje een rand zit, waar lichte pixels afgewisseld worden door donkere, 
of waar de pixels van kleur veranderen. Uiteindelijk levert dit een heleboel signaaltjes 
op, van neuronen die allemaal vertellen dat ze hun template wel of niet hebben gezien, 
voor elk stukje van de foto. Deze signaaltjes uit V1 worden vervolgens doorgestuurd 
naar V2 (de secundaire visuele hersenschors), en van daaruit weer naar een volgend 
hersengebied, enzovoort. Elk van deze gebieden analyseert de foto op net een wat 
grotere schaal. De randjes die de V1-neuronen hadden ontdekt kunnen bijvoorbeeld 
aan elkaar gepuzzeld worden tot grotere lijnstukken, hoeken en rondingen, die op hun 
beurt weer samengevoegd kunnen worden tot vormen en objecten. Aan het eind van 
deze analysestroom is er dan een neuron dat als template niet een klein randje heeft, 
maar bijvoorbeeld het gezicht van je oma herkent. Zo doet ons brein dus een stuk 
meer dan een digitale camera. Het analyseert de beelden die binnenkomen, herkent de 
dingen die zich in die beelden bevinden, en ook wáár die dingen zich bevinden. Deze 
informatie hebben we nodig om te interacteren met de wereld om ons heen – iets wat 
digitale camera’s, of zelfs geavanceerde robots die zo’n camera ingebouwd hebben, nog 
altijd niet (goed) kunnen.
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Waarschijnlijkheden en onzekerheid in het brein
Terug naar onze onderzoeksvraag. In de vorige alinea’s heb ik je een idee gegeven 
van het soort informatie dat visuele neuronen met elkaar uitwisselen, over wat ze 
hebben herkend in het beeld dat via de ogen binnenkwam. De theorie die ik heb 
onderzocht stelt dat neuronen deze informatie aan elkaar doorgeven in de vorm van 
waarschijnlijkheden. Maar wat houdt dat eigenlijk in? 
Laten we daarvoor even teruggaan naar de neuronen in V1. Elk V1-neuron analyseert 
een klein stukje van het visuele beeld, en kijkt of het hierin zijn voorkeursplaatje 
herkent. En ieder stukje van het beeld wordt beoordeeld door meerdere neuronen, elk 
met hun eigen lievelingsplaatje. Deze neuronen moeten vervolgens aan hun collega’s 
in V2 doorgeven welk van deze plaatjes in het beeldstukje te zien was. Was het een 
zwart/witte rand die schuin naar linksboven liep? Of liep die rand toch meer recht 
naar boven? De klassieke denkwijze over hoe dit werkt, is dat er uiteindelijk maar één 
antwoord doorgespeeld wordt naar V2, namelijk dat wat het meest plausibel is. De V1-
neuronen geven dan bijvoorbeeld door “wij hebben een horizontale rand gezien”. De 
nieuwe, probabilistische5 theorie zegt iets anders. Volgens deze hypothese geven de 
neuronen van elke template door hoe waarschijnlijk zij het achten dat die de juiste is. In 
dit geval communiceren ze dus iets als “er is een kans van 10% dat de rand horizontaal 
was, en een kans van 5% dat hij meer schuin naar linksboven liep…”, enzovoort (Fig. 3). 
Dit stelt de neuronen in V2 vervolgens in staat om met al deze mogelijkheden rekening 
te houden, wanneer zij de informatie uit V1 verder verwerken. En deze V2-neuronen 
zouden dan op hun beurt ook weer waarschijnlijkheden gebruiken om de resultaten 
van hun eigen analyse door te geven. Dit gaat zo door tot in de laatste stadia van de 
visuele informatieverwerking in het brein, waar de neuronen bijvoorbeeld de kans 
doorgeven dat het gezicht dat je voor je ziet toebehoort aan je oma, of juist je tandarts, 
of je buurvrouw, etc.
Kortom, volgens de probabilistische theorie van informatieverwerking in de hersenen 
houden neuronen rekening met alle mogelijke interpretaties van de informatie die zij 
binnenkrijgen. Voor elk van deze mogelijkheden geven ze vervolgens de kans door 
dat deze de juiste is. Deze kansen vormen samen een kansverdeling, zoals je je die 
misschien nog herinnert van een paar alinea’s geleden. Zo’n kansverdeling was handig 
als je moeilijke beslissingen moest nemen, omdat je dan goed rekening kon houden 
met alle mogelijkheden. En de breedte van zo’n verdeling gaf aan hoe onzeker je ergens 
over was (bijvoorbeeld over de afstand tot de auto voor je). 
5. De term “probabilistisch” wil zoveel zeggen als “gebruikmakend van of te-maken-hebbend met 
waarschijnlijkheden”.
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Klassieke theorie Probabilistische theorie
Onzekerheid
Figuur 3: Twee verschillende theorieën over hoe het brein omgaat met (onzekere) zintuiglijke 
informatie. De “klassieke” theorie zegt dat neuronen alleen aangeven welke interpretatie van 
de informatie het meest waarschijnlijk is. In dit geval gaat het om visuele informatie die (zoals in 
Fig. 2) het meest consistent is met een schuine rand tussen licht en donker. Maar hoewel deze 
interpretatie de grootste kans heeft om juist te zijn, zijn er ook andere interpretaties mogelijk. 
Volgens de probabilistische theorie geven neuronen in hun signalen ook de waarschijnlijkheden 
van deze alternatieven aan. Door voor elke mogelijkheid de kans door te geven ontstaat een 
kansverdeling, waarvan de breedte overeenkomt met de mate van onzekerheid over de 
interpretatie van de zintuiglijke informatie (zie ook Fig. 1).
De theorie zegt dus eigenlijk dat het brein onzekere informatie ook uitdrukt in de 
vorm van zo’n kansverdeling. Door de informatie op die manier te verpakken weten je 
hersenen (en dus jij) vanzelf hoe zeker ze kunnen zijn van datgene wat je zintuigen je 
vertellen.
“Gedachtelezen” met fMRI
In mijn promotieonderzoek heb ik geprobeerd uit te vinden of de bovenstaande theorie 
klopt met de werkelijkheid. Hiervoor heb ik gebruik gemaakt van functional magnetic 
resonance imaging, afgekort bekend als “fMRI”. Dit is een techniek waarmee we (indirect) 
hersenactiviteit kunnen meten terwijl mensen in een MRI-scanner liggen. De meeste 
mensen kennen zo’n scanner wel van het ziekenhuis. Met ‘gewone’ MRI (dus zonder de “f” 
ervoor), kun je namelijk gedetailleerde foto’s maken van binnenin het lichaam. Zo’n foto 
is driedimensionaal, en bestaat dan ook niet uit platte pixels, maar uit driedimensionale 
voxels. Elke foto is opgebouwd uit duizenden van zulke voxels: kleine ‘dobbelsteentjes’ 
van ongeveer een millimeter groot. Met fMRI doen we eigenlijk hetzelfde, alleen maken 
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we net een ander soort foto. Een gewone MRI-foto laat namelijk het contrast zien tussen 
verschillende lichaamsweefsels, zoals bijvoorbeeld bot, spier of huid. Het soort foto dat 
we met fMRI maken om hersenactiviteit te meten is echter vooral gevoelig voor de 
hoeveelheid zuurstof in het bloed. De gedachte hierachter is dat wanneer hersencellen 
erg actief zijn (d.w.z. als ze veel elektrische signaaltjes produceren), ze relatief veel 
zuurstof verbruiken, die ze halen uit het bloed in hun directe omgeving. Zo kun je dus 
op de fMRI-foto zien in welke stukjes van het brein de neuronen op dat moment erg 
actief zijn. Door elke twee seconden zo’n foto te maken kunnen we deze hersenactiviteit 
koppelen aan wat de proefpersoon op dat moment aan het doen was in de scanner.
Klassieke fMRI-experimenten maken hiervan gebruik door mensen een taakje te 
laten uitvoeren, en dan te kijken welke gebieden er in de hersenen actief worden. Zo 
is er bijvoorbeeld een hersengebied dat zich vooral bezighoudt met het verwerken 
van gezichten. Laat je een proefpersoon een plaatje van een gezicht zien, dan wordt 
dat specifieke hersengebied hierdoor geactiveerd (Fig. 4). Maar met geavanceerde 
computeranalyses kunnen we tegenwoordig dieper kijken dan alleen de vraag of een 
bepaald hersengebied wel of niet actief is, en kunnen we ook bestuderen wat dat 
gebiedje precies aan het doen is.
Figuur 4: Een klassiek fMRI-experiment. De proefpersoon ziet een foto van een gezicht, en 
as gevolg hiervan wordt de zogenaamde fusiform face area in de hersenen (meer) actief. Dit 
hersengebied is betrokken bij het herkennen van gezichten. Het (meer) actieve deel van de 
hersenen is aangeduid met rode en gele kleuren.
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Neem bijvoorbeeld het eerdergenoemde “gezichtsgebied”. De hersencellen in dit gebied 
zijn niet alleen bezig met de vraag “is dit een gezicht?”, maar proberen ook uit te vinden 
wiens gezicht het is. Is het gezicht van je oma, dan worden sommige gezichtsneuronen 
actief. 
Behoort het echter toe aan je hypotheekadviseur, dan zijn de oma-neuronen stil en 
vuurt een ander clubje hersencellen elektrische signalen af. Op een fMRI-foto is dit te 
herkennen door te kijken naar welke voxels in het gezichts-gebied precies “oplichten” na 
het tonen van het gezicht. Elk gezicht gaat gepaard met net een ander patroon van voxels 
die meer of minder actief zijn. Deze verschillende patronen zijn echter nogal subtiel en 
bestaan bovendien uit honderden of zelfs duizenden voxels. Daarom gebruiken we een 
computerprogramma om ze te herkennen en te ontcijferen. Zo’n programma noemen 
we een decoder. Hiermee kunnen we dus een beetje gedachtelezen, omdat zo’n decoder 
aan een fMRI-foto kan zien wat voor informatie je hersenen op dat moment aan het 
verwerken waren6.
De decodeer-programma’s die bestonden aan het begin van mijn onderzoek 
probeerden eigenlijk hersenactiviteit te ontcijferen aan de hand van de klassieke kijk op 
het brein, waarin de activiteit van een groep neuronen alleen de meest waarschijnlijke 
interpretatie reflecteert van de zintuiglijke informatie. Je stopt een fMRI-foto in zo’n 
programmaatje, en wat eruit komt is wat de decoder denkt dat de hersenactiviteit 
op de foto waarschijnlijk betekent. Maar de nieuwe theorie zei nu juist dat deze 
hersenactiviteit eigenlijk een heel scala aan interpretaties zou moeten herbergen, elk 
met een bepaalde waarschijnlijkheid. Om deze theorie te testen hebben wij daarom 
een nieuw computerprogramma ontwikkeld7, dat de hersenactiviteit in een fMRI-foto 
vertaalt naar zo’n kansverdeling over mogelijke interpretaties. Geef je ons programma 
6. Voor wie zich nu zorgen maakt over zijn privacy, een geruststellende voetnoot. Hoewel we met dit soort 
software veel kunnen leren over het brein, werkt het namelijk lang niet perfect. Zo heeft de decoder het 
bijvoorbeeld best vaak mis, en denkt dan bijvoorbeeld dat jouw hersenactiviteit overeenkomt met een 
plaatje van een kat, terwijl je eigenlijk naar een pianokruk lag te kijken. Dit komt omdat fMRI geen perfect 
volledig of nauwkeurig beeld geeft van wat er in de hersenen gebeurt. Zo kunnen we niet elke individuele 
hersencel meten, maar alleen de gemiddelde activiteit van de enkele honderdduizenden cellen die binnen 
een voxel vallen. Daarnaast meten we deze hersenactiviteit alleen indirect, via de hoeveelheid zuurstof in 
het bloed, en wordt deze indirecte meting ook nog eens geplaagd door ruis: willekeurige verstoringen in 
het signaal (zoals de “sneeuw” op een slecht afgestelde televisie). Bovendien kan dit soort software niet 
vanzelf je hersenactiviteit ontcijferen. Voor elke persoon, en voor elk gegeven dat je wilt “decoderen”, moet 
het programma dit eerst leren. Dit gebeurt aan de hand van tientallen of zelfs honderden voorbeelden van 
fMRI-foto’s van jouw hersenactiviteit, waarvan het bekend is wat je op dat moment aan het doen was. Je kunt 
dus wel nagaan dat dit alleen werkt als jij hier als proefpersoon aan meewerkt. Doe of denk jij tijdens die “leer-
metingen” iets anders dan wat het programma verwachtte, dan kan het onmogelijk de juiste manier vinden 
om jouw hersenactiviteit te ontcijferen. Voorlopig is de kans dus zeer klein dat een wetenschapper met een 
fMRI-scanner geheime informatie van jou kan ontfutselen.
7. Dit wordt beschreven in hoofdstukken 2 & 3 van dit proefschrift.
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een foto van hersenactiviteit in de visuele hersenschors, dan verkondigt het dus niet 
heel stellig “dit betekent dat de proefpersoon een plaatje van een horizontale lijn heeft 
gezien”, maar zegt het eerder iets als “op basis van deze hersenactiviteit is er een kans van 
32% dat het een horizontale lijn was, maar ook een kans van 14% dat de lijn schuin naar 
linksboven liep, en een kans van 5% dat het bijna verticaal was”, enzovoort (Fig. 5). Als 
er veel mogelijke interpretaties zijn van het activatiepatroon (hoge onzekerheid), dan 
zal onze decoder dus veel mogelijkheden een redelijke kans toedichten, en resulteert 
dit in een vrij brede kansverdeling. Zijn er maar een paar plausibele interpretaties (lage 
onzekerheid), dan zal de decoder een klein aantal mogelijkheden een grote kans geven, 
en is de kansverdeling dus relatief smal. De breedte van de gedecodeerde kansverdeling 
noemen we daarom de gedecodeerde onzekerheid.  
Beste schatting
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Figuur 5: Visuele hersenactivatie en het “decoderen” daarvan. Het lijnenpatroon dat we op 
het scherm laten zien activeert hersengebieden in de visuele cortex, achterin het hoofd. Deze 
hersenactiviteit is in de MRI-foto afgebeeld met rood/gele kleuren. Hieruit kunnen we dus 
opmaken welke hersengebieden betrokken zijn bij het verwerken van deze visuele informatie. 
Maar met een speciaal computerprogramma (een zogenaamde “decoder”) kunnen we ook 
kijken welke informatie in een bepaald gebied verwerkt wordt. Zo’n decoder kijkt verder dan 
alleen de aanwezigheid van hersenactiviteit, naar de specifieke voxels die meer of minder actief 
worden. Een voorbeeld van zo’n patroon van voxel-activaties is hier afgebeeld. Meer actieve 
voxels zijn meer donkerrood tot zwart gekleurd. Minder actieve voxels zijn oranje tot lichtgeel. 
Aan het patroon van voxel-activaties kan de decoder herkennen welke oriëntatie het lijnpatroon 
had, volgens de informatie in de visuele hersenschors. Onze decoder geeft van elke mogelijke 
oriëntatie aan hoe waarschijnlijk die is op basis van de informatie in het activatiepatroon. In dit 
voorbeeld zien we bijvoorbeeld dat een schuine oriëntatie van linksboven naar rechtsonder 
het meest waarschijnlijk is. Dit is volgens de decoder dus de beste schatting. Maar andere 
oriëntaties daaromheen zijn ook redelijk plausibel. De mate van onzekerheid over de oriëntatie 
van het lijnenpatroon wordt aangegeven door de breedte van de gedecodeerde kansverdeling. 
Als de hersenactiviteit consistent is met een breed scala aan oriëntaties, moet de kansverdeling 
ook erg breed zijn, en is er dus een hoge onzekerheid. Bij lage onzekerheid zijn er maar een paar 
oriëntaties mogelijk, en moet de kansverdeling dus vrij smal zijn.
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We kunnen visuele onzekerheid meten in het brein
Deze nieuwe software zou ons in staat moeten stellen om onzekerheid te meten 
in de hersenactivatie in de visuele hersenschors. Dat was tenminste de bedoeling. 
Maar kunnen we dit ook echt? Of is dit iets wat je met fMRI gewoon niet kunt meten, 
omdat de techniek daarvoor niet gevoelig genoeg is? Of misschien kan het wel met 
fMRI, maar hebben we dan wel de juiste decoder hiervoor ontworpen? Met andere 
woorden: onze decoder geeft weliswaar een schatting van de onzekerheid in een fMRI-
activatiepatroon, maar zegt die geschatte onzekerheid ook werkelijk iets over wat er in 
de hersenen gebeurt? Of betekent het eigenlijk helemaal niks? Om dit te testen hebben 
we een experiment opgezet. In dit experiment lieten we proefpersonen heel simpele 
plaatjes zien, van zwart-witte patronen van evenwijdige lijnen8 (Fig. 6a). Ondertussen 
maten we de hersenactiviteit in hun visuele cortex. De oriëntatie van de lijnen (dat wil 
zeggen, in welke richting ze over het scherm liepen) veranderde van plaatje tot plaatje. 
Soms stonden de lijnen bijvoorbeeld vrijwel horizontaal, terwijl ze een andere keer 
meer schuin of verticaal waren. In alle andere opzichten waren de plaatjes identiek. De 
taak van de proefpersoon was om, nadat ze zo’n lijnenpatroon hadden gezien, ons te 
vertellen wat precies de oriëntatie van de lijnen was. Dit deden ze door een nieuw lijntje, 
dat op het scherm was verschenen, te draaien (door op knoppen te drukken voor links- 
of rechtsom), totdat het de gewenste oriëntatie had (Fig. 6b). Proefpersonen konden 
dit vrij goed, maar natuurlijk niet perfect. Elke keer dat ze deze taak deden, week hun 
antwoord dus een klein beetje af van de werkelijke oriëntatie die we ze hadden laten 
zien.
Bij het doen van deze taak waren proefpersonen aangewezen op de informatie over het 
lijnenpatroon die ze binnenkregen via hun ogen. Bij het verwerken van deze informatie 
in de hersenen treedt altijd een beetje ruis op. Dit wil zeggen dat er willekeurige 
verstoringen optreden, in de elektrische signalen waarmee neuronen communiceren. 
Hierdoor gaat er wat informatie verloren, en weet je dus niet precies wat je hebt gezien, 
zelfs al was het oorspronkelijke beeld eigenlijk heel duidelijk. Zo kun je bijvoorbeeld 
zelfs op klaarlichte dag niet precies de afstand tot de volgende auto bepalen. Een deel 
van je onzekerheid komt dus door verstorende ruis in je hersenen. Deze ruis kan van 
moment tot moment variëren in sterkte, waardoor je wereld niet altijd even precies 
waarneemt. Dit gold ook voor de plaatjes die onze proefpersonen zagen. Die werden 
8. Deze simpele plaatjes hadden we uitgekozen omdat we hiervan redelijk goed begrijpen hoe, en waar ze in 
de hersenen worden verwerkt. Je herinnert je misschien nog dat de primaire visuele hersenschors zich vooral 
bezighoudt met het herkennen van randjes in het beeld. De lijntjespatronen die wij lieten zien bestonden 
in feite volledig uit dit soort randjes. Zo wisten we dus dat de primaire visuele hersenschors, en andere 
hersengebieden die dit soort simpele analyses uitvoeren, een belangrijke rol zouden spelen in het verwerken 
van deze plaatjes.
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soms meer, en soms minder nauwkeurig waargenomen door de visuele hersenschors. 
Hierdoor konden proefpersonen ons soms heel precies vertellen welke oriëntatie het 
lijnenpatroon had, terwijl ze op andere momenten er behoorlijk ver naast zaten. Grotere 
onzekerheid in de hersenen zou dus gepaard moeten gaan met grotere fouten in de 
antwoorden van de proefpersonen.
Tijd
a b
Echte oriëntatie
Afwijking
Figuur 6: Illustratie van de taak die proefpersonen moesten uitvoeren in de scanner. (a) Om 
de zoveel tijd werd er een plaatje getoond op het scherm van een zwart-wit lijnenpatroon. 
De lijnen hadden een bepaalde oriëntatie die je als proefpersoon moest onthouden (en die 
niet van tevoren te voorspellen was). In dit voorbeeld staan de lijnen een beetje diagonaal 
van linksonder naar rechtsboven, maar een andere keer stonden ze bijvoorbeeld net wat meer 
verticaal, horizontaal, of schuin een andere kant op. Enkele seconden nadat het lijnenpatroon 
van het scherm was verdwenen kwam er een nieuw lijntje op het scherm. Dit lijntje moest 
je draaien (door op knoppen te drukken voor linksom of rechtsom) totdat het naar jouw 
inschatting dezelfde oriëntatie had als de lijnen die je daarvoor had gezien (de witte pijlen 
in de illustratie stonden in het echt niet op het scherm). Gedurende het hele experiment 
moesten proefpersonen hun blik richten op het fixatiepunt in het midden van het scherm. 
Elke vijf minuten kregen mensen een korte pauze, en in totaal brachten ze maximaal twee uur 
door in de scanner. (b) Illustratie van een antwoord van de proefpersoon. De stippellijn geeft 
de werkelijke oriëntatie aan van het lijnenpatroon in a. Het antwoord van de proefpersoon 
(het ononderbroken lijntje) heeft ten opzichte hiervan een kleine afwijking tegen de klok in, 
aangegeven in grijs.  
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De vraag was nu of onze decoder deze onzekerheid in het brein kon meten. Als dit 
zo was, en wij dus (indirect) toegang hadden tot dezelfde neuronen als waarop 
proefpersonen hun gedrag baseerden, dan zou de door ons gemeten onzekerheid dus 
ook voorspellend moeten zijn voor de fouten die proefpersonen maakten. Dit bleek 
inderdaad het geval: wanneer de gedecodeerde onzekerheid hoog was, maakten 
mensen over het algemeen grotere fouten bij het rapporteren van de oriëntatie van het 
lijnenpatroon (Fig. 7).
Gemeten 
onzekerheid
Antwoorden v.d. 
proefpersoon
Hogere gemeten onzekerheid 
gaat gepaard met lagere precisie
Hogere gemeten onzekerheid 
gaat gepaard met grotere biases
Figuur 7: De belangrijkste bevindingen van mijn onderzoek. In de bovenste rij zie je de 
antwoorden van een proefpersoon die een aantal keer de taak heeft gedaan. De verticale 
stippellijn geeft de werkelijke oriëntatie van het lijnenpatroon aan. Elk van de ononderbroken 
lijntjes is één antwoord van de proefpersoon. De onderste rij toont de kansverdeling 
gedecodeerd uit de visuele hersenactiviteit. Een bredere kansverdeling betekent een grotere 
onzekerheid. De linker- en rechterkant van het figuur illustreren de twee belangrijkste 
onderzoeksresultaten. Links zie je dat de antwoorden van de proefpersoon erg nauwkeurig 
zijn (dichtbij de echte oriëntatie liggen) als de gemeten onzekerheid laag is. Bij een hoge 
gemeten onzekerheid zijn de antwoorden juist veel minder precies, en liggen ze vaak ver van 
het juiste antwoord vandaan. Dit is precies wat we van tevoren voorspelden over de relatie 
tussen de gemeten onzekerheid en het gedrag van de proefpersonen. Hieruit kunnen we 
dus opmaken dat onze decoder de onzekerheid van de visuele informatie in de hersenen 
van de proefpersoon kan meten. De rechterkant van het figuur laat zien dat de proefpersoon 
ook een systematische afwijking (of ‘bias’) heeft, die afhangt van onzekerheid. Bij een hogere 
onzekerheid zijn de antwoorden niet alleen minder nauwkeurig, maar heeft de proefpersoon 
ook meer de neiging om een bepaalde richting op te gaan met zijn of haar antwoorden. In de 
illustratie zie je bijvoorbeeld dat deze proefpersoon het antwoordlijntje meer aan één kant van 
de werkelijke oriëntatie plaatst, wanneer de onzekerheid in visuele cortex hoog is. Dit betekent 
dat de onzekerheid in de visuele schors gecommuniceerd wordt naar andere hersengebieden, 
waar de beslissing wordt genomen over het te geven antwoord. 
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Hieruit konden we concluderen dat de onzekerheids-schattingen die we kregen van 
onze decoder inderdaad reflecteerden hoe nauwkeurig de visuele informatieverwerking 
was op dat moment, en hoeveel onzekerheid er dus zat in de visuele waarneming door 
het brein9. Dit was nog nooit eerder gedaan, en dus een belangrijke ontwikkeling in de 
technieken waarmee we als neurowetenschappers de activiteit in de hersenen kunnen 
interpreteren.
De gemeten onzekerheid wordt gebruikt in beslissingen
De hierboven beschreven resultaten laten zien dat de informatie, die beschreven wordt 
door neuronen in de visuele hersenschors, consistent is met meerdere interpretaties. 
Ietwat kort door de bocht: de neuronen die aan de rest van het brein moeten vertellen 
wat ze gezien hebben, zijn hier dus inderdaad onzeker over. En deze onzekerheid kunnen 
we meten met onze nieuwe methodiek. Maar is de onzekerheid van deze neuronen ook 
de onzekerheid die we ervaren op het moment dat we een beslissing moeten nemen? 
Als we bijvoorbeeld twijfelen over de afstand tot de volgende auto, en onze snelheid 
minderen, komt dat dan omdat de neuronen in de visuele hersenschors hun onzekerheid 
hebben gecommuniceerd naar het deel van het brein dat zulke beslissingen neemt? 
Of heeft de klassieke theorie toch gelijk, en vertellen deze neuronen alleen wat ze 
hoogstwaarschijnlijk hebben gezien (en niet hun onzekerheid daarover)? In dat geval 
zouden andere hersengebieden de onzekerheid over visuele informatie niet direct 
doorkrijgen uit de visuele hersenschors, maar gebruik kunnen maken van ‘trucjes’ om 
deze onzekerheid toch in te schatten. Zo’n trucje kan bijvoorbeeld zijn “het is mistig, dus 
ik weet dat de visuele informatie nu minder betrouwbaar moet zijn”. Op deze manier 
zou een hersengebied, dat moet beslissen of je rijafstand nog veilig is, dus indirect via 
zulke trucjes kunnen afleiden dat de visuele informatie over deze afstand een grotere 
foutmarge heeft, hoewel de visuele schors die foutmarge niet had gecommuniceerd.
Welke theorie heeft gelijk: de klassieke of de probabilistische? De probabilistische theorie 
zei dat neuronen de waarschijnlijkheid van alle mogelijke interpretaties doorgeven aan 
de rest van het brein. Hersengebieden die betrokken zijn bij het maken van beslissingen 
zouden deze onzekerheid dan dus ook door moeten krijgen. In ons experiment moesten 
proefpersonen een beslissing nemen over de oriëntatie die ze hadden gezien, en aan 
ons gingen rapporteren. Speelde de onzekerheid in hun visuele cortex een rol bij het 
nemen van deze beslissingen? Zo ja, dan zou dit betekenen dat de “beslissingsgebieden” 
in de hersenen deze onzekerheid inderdaad door hadden gekregen, wat bewijs zou zijn 
voor de probabilistische theorie. Maar hoe konden we weten of deze hersengebieden 
de visuele onzekerheid meenamen in hun beslissingen? Hiervoor maakten we gebruik 
9. Dit resultaat wordt beschreven in hoofdstuk 4 van dit proefschrift.
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van eerdere bevindingen over hoe mensen beslissingen maken. Eerder onderzoek had 
namelijk aangetoond dat als mensen geconfronteerd worden met onzekere zintuiglijke 
informatie, ze meer vertrouwen op andere informatie, zoals bijvoorbeeld voorkennis die 
ze hebben opgedaan uit eerdere ervaringen. In Figuur 8 zie je dezelfde voetafdrukken 
bijvoorbeeld als hol (in het zand gedrukt) of bol (opstekend uit het zand), afhankelijk 
van welke kant van de foto boven staat. De visuele informatie is hier namelijk niet 
eenduidig genoeg om goed de diepte in het beeld te kunnen inschatten. Je hersenen 
vertrouwen daarom op hun ervaring dat licht in de omgeving normaal gesproken van 
boven komt, en niet van onderen. Hierdoor kunnen ze diepte afleiden uit de richting 
van de schaduwen in de foto. Zet je de foto op zijn kop, dan komt het licht eigenlijk 
van onderen, en wordt de diepte dus ook omgekeerd ingeschat. Hoe onzekerder de 
zintuigelijke informatie, hoe meer de hersenen vertrouwen op dit soort voorkennis. 
Figuur 8: Je ziet hier twee keer dezelfde foto van voetstappen in het zand, alleen de rechterfoto 
staat op zijn kop. Dit geeft de illusie dat de voetstappen in de rechterfoto uit het zand 
omhoogkomen. Dit komt omdat je hersenen ervan uitgaan dat het licht beide foto’s min of 
meer van boven komt (en in het dagelijks leven is dat ook vrijwel altijd zo). Met licht van boven 
werpt een opstaande rand namelijk een schaduw naar beneden. Omdat de schaduwen in de 
rechterfoto omgekeerd staan (en het licht dus eigenlijk van onderen komt, terwijl je hersenen 
er nog steeds vanuit gaan dat het van boven is), lijkt een opstaande rand dan ineens een 
inkeping, en vice versa. 
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Naast voorkennis maken de hersenen ook gebruik van de informatie van andere 
zintuigen. Ook hiervoor geldt dat als de informatie van een zintuig onzeker is, het brein 
meer afgaat op andere zintuigen. In het donker is je visuele informatie bijvoorbeeld 
minder betrouwbaar, en zul je meer vertrouwen op tast en gehoor. Je hersenen 
combineren dus verschillende vormen van informatie, en geven daarin het meeste 
gewicht aan meer betrouwbare (minder onzekere) informatie. Dit wordt vooral duidelijk 
wanneer de informatie van verschillende bronnen net een wat andere interpretatie 
hebben. Beeld je bijvoorbeeld in dat je over een dichtbegroeid pad loopt, en je opeens 
iets ziet ritselen op de grond voor je. Tegelijkertijd hoor je het onmiskenbare geluid van 
een ratelslang. Maar waar houdt het beest zich schuil? Je krijgt hier informatie over via 
je ogen en je oren, maar deze zintuigen geven je elk net een andere schatting van de 
positie van de slang (Fig. 9). Je brein voegt deze informatie samen tot één schatting 
(met een bepaalde onzekerheid), en vertrouwt hierin het meest op de meer zekere 
informatie. Is de visuele informatie meer onzeker, dan ligt de gecombineerde schatting 
dus dichtbij de plek waar je de slang had gehoord. Is juist de informatie van je oren 
onbetrouwbaar, dan verschuift de uiteindelijke schatting meer richting de plek waar je 
slang had gezien. 
In onze experiment leken proefpersonen ook gebruik te maken van andere informatie 
dan alleen wat ze direct doorkregen via hun ogen. Als ze namelijk alleen afgingen op 
hun visuele informatie, zou je verwachten dat de fouten in hun oriëntatie-schattingen 
compleet willekeurig waren: soms te veel de ene kant op, en soms juist de andere. Maar 
dit bleek niet het geval. Zo hadden proefpersonen bijvoorbeeld systematisch de neiging 
om de oriëntatie van de getoonde lijnpatronen meer diagonaal in te schatten (ten 
opzichte van de werkelijke oriëntatie), en ook om te rapporteren dat opeenvolgende 
lijnpatronen (sterker dan in werkelijkheid) op elkaar leken. Zulke systematische 
afwijkingen verraden het gebruik van andere bronnen van informatie10. Ze tonen 
namelijk aan dat de waarneming van de proefpersoon is verschoven ten opzichte van 
de puur visuele informatie, doordat er extra informatie aan de oriëntatie-schatting is 
toegevoegd.
10. De neiging om een (fictieve) gelijkenis te zien tussen opeenvolgende plaatjes duidt er bijvoorbeeld op 
dat proefpersonen visuele informatie combineerden over verschillende plaatjes. Dit is een strategie die in het 
dagelijks leven waarschijnlijk goed werkt, aangezien wat je op dit moment ziet meestal sterk lijkt op wat je 
kort geleden hebt gezien. Kijk je bijvoorbeeld naar een boom, en dan naar een vogel in de lucht, en dan terug 
naar dezelfde boom, dan ziet die boom er doorgaans nagenoeg hetzelfde uit. In ons experiment bestonden 
zulke verbanden niet: twee opeenvolgende plaatjes konden net zo goed heel verschillend zijn (in oriëntatie), 
als precies hetzelfde. Maar je hersenen zijn volledig ingespeeld op hoe het in de echte wereld werkt, en dus 
zul je als proefpersoon in ons experiment nog altijd informatie uit het heden en het verleden met elkaar 
combineren, ook al haal je hier eigenlijk geen voordeel uit.
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?
Waar heb ik de slang gehoord?
Waar heb ik de slang gezien?
Gecombineerde schatting
Figuur 9: Waar is de slang? Om dit zo goed mogelijk te kunnen inschatten, combineren je 
hersenen informatie die je via verschillende zintuigen binnenkrijgt; in dit geval je ogen en je 
oren. De visuele informatie geeft je een schatting (blauw verticaal streepje) van waar de slang 
is, met een bepaalde onzekerheid daar omheen (blauwe horizontale pijlen). De auditieve 
informatie geeft net een andere schatting en onzekerheid (donkerrood streepje & pijlen). 
De hersenen combineren deze schattingen, en vertrouwen daarbij vooral op de meer zekere 
informatie (in dit geval de visuele informatie). De gecombineerde schatting (paars) ligt dus het 
dichtst bij de schatting op basis van de visuele informatie alleen. Je ziet ook dat de onzekerheid 
over de gecombineerde schatting lager is dan die van de oorspronkelijke schattingen van elk 
zintuig alleen. Twee zintuigen weten immers meer dan één, en dus ben je zekerder wanneer je 
hun informatie op deze manier combineert.
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Uit eerder onderzoek weten we dat de hersengebieden die verschillende vormen van 
informatie combineren, rekening houden met zintuiglijke onzekerheid. Ze vertrouwen 
namelijk meer op relatief zekere informatie. Maar wordt deze onzekerheid hen direct 
verteld door de hersengebieden waar de zintuiglijke informatie verwerkt wordt, zoals 
de probabilistische theorie voorstelt? Zo ja, dan zou de visuele informatie minder 
invloed moeten hebben op de oriëntatie-schattingen van de proefpersonen, wanneer 
de onzekerheid in de visuele hersenschors hoog was. De systematische afwijkingen in 
hun antwoorden, die veroorzaakt worden door het meenemen van andere informatie, 
zouden dan dus juist sterker moeten worden. Deze voorspelling bleek inderdaad uit te 
komen: als onze decoder een hoge onzekerheid aangaf in de visuele hersenactiviteit, 
waren proefpersonen meer geneigd om diagonale oriëntaties te rapporteren, en om een 
grotere gelijkenis te zien tussen het huidige en het voorgaande lijntjespatroon (Fig. 7). 
Dit toont dus aan dat de onzekerheid in de visuele cortex inderdaad meegenomen werd 
door ander hersengebieden, bij het nemen van beslissingen11. Daarmee pleiten deze 
resultaten tegen de klassieke theorie, waarin de neuronen in de visuele hersenschors 
niets over hun onzekerheid zouden vertellen aan hun collega-neuronen in andere 
hersengebieden. 
Conclusies
Mijn promotieonderzoek begon met de vraag of de neuronen in onze hersenen 
zintuigelijke informatie met elkaar communiceren in de vorm van waarschijnlijkheden 
en kansverdelingen. Op deze manier zou het brein namelijk optimaal kunnen omgaan 
met de onzekerheid in zintuigelijke informatie. Om dit te onderzoeken hebben we eerst 
een techniek ontwikkeld om de zintuigelijke onzekerheid in de visuele hersenschors te 
kunnen meten. Deze techniek bleek succesvol: de gemeten waarden leken inderdaad 
overeen te komen met de onzekerheid in de visuele waarneming van onze proefpersonen. 
Zulke metingen van onzekerheid in de hersenen waren nog niet eerder gedaan. 
Vervolgens hebben we getest of deze visuele onzekerheid ook gecommuniceerd werd 
naar andere hersengebieden, zodat hij meegewogen kon worden in de beslissingen 
van de proefpersoon. We zagen dat mensen meer vertrouwden op andere bronnen van 
informatie, in plaats van op hun visuele waarneming, wanneer de onzekerheid in de 
visuele hersenschors groot was. Dit betekent dat deze onzekerheid dus inderdaad een 
rol speelde in hun beslissingen, die genomen worden in andere hersengebieden. 
Wil dit zeggen dat de hersenen inderdaad kansverdelingen gebruiken om onzekere 
informatie te communiceren? Op deze specifieke vraag geeft mijn onderzoek nog geen 
sluitend antwoord. Hoewel mijn resultaten suggereren dat onzekerheid wel op de een 
11. Deze bevindingen worden gerapporteerd in hoofdstukken 4 & 5 van dit proefschrift.
163
N E D E R L A N D S TA L I G E  S A M E N VAT T I N G
of andere manier meegenomen wordt in de elektrische code die het brein gebruikt, 
kunnen we nog niet zeggen of dit inderdaad gebeurt door middel van een volledige 
kansverdeling. Het is ook mogelijk dat neuronen bijvoorbeeld alleen de breedte van 
de kansverdeling doorgeven (de mate van onzekerheid), of op een andere manier 
de zintuiglijke onzekerheid weergeven in hun activiteit. Wat echter wel blijkt uit mijn 
bevindingen is dat het klassieke idee, dat neuronen in hun signalen alleen de meest 
waarschijnlijke interpretatie van de zintuiglijke informatie aanduiden, waarschijnlijk 
niet juist is.  Al met al kunnen we dus concluderen dat onzekerheid vermoedelijk wel 
fundamenteel in de “taal” gewoven is die neuronen met elkaar spreken, maar hoe precies 
is een vraag die nog meer onderzoek behoeft.

165
B IOGRAPHY
BIOGRAPHY
Ruben van Bergen was born in Harderwijk on July 11th, 1990. He studied Liberal Arts & 
Sciences at University College Utrecht (UCU), majoring in neuroscience and molecular 
cell biology, with a minor in clinical psychology. As part of his undergraduate studies, 
he also spent a semester on exchange at University College Cork. Ruben graduated 
from UCU in 2010 (BSc, magna cum laude), and went on to do a Master’s program in 
Neuroscience at the University of Oxford, which he completed in 2011. In Oxford, he 
spent some time in the lab of Dr. Wyeth Bair, working on a computational model of 
color vision in the retina and primary visual cortex. Still interested in this computational 
approach to neuroscience, he applied for a research assistant position in the Visual 
Computation & Neuroimaging lab, headed by Dr. Janneke Jehee, at the Donders Institute 
in Nijmegen. He started this job in December 2011 and has remained in Janneke’s group 
since then, being “upgraded” along the way to PhD candidate (in April 2012) and then 
to postdoctoral researcher (in December 2016). During his PhD studies, he spent a very 
enjoyable interlude in a German castle, at the European Summer School of Vision in 
Rauischholzhausen – an experience he recommends to all budding vision scientists! In 
2016, Ruben received the Radboud UMC Sensory Disorders Talent Award, and in 2017, 
the Vision Sciences Society Student Travel Award.
Ruben’s research, including the doctoral work presented in this thesis, focuses on the 
way the brain deals with variable and uncertain information about the external world. 
To investigate this, he uses a combination of fMRI, psychophysics and computational 
models. Ruben’s work as a postdoc builds on the findings from his PhD studies, and 
explores the origins of internal variability and uncertainty. Specific questions this 
research will target include how the brain arrives at an (approximately) optimal 
representation of the external world, and how uncertainty might arise when neural 
computations are in fact sub-optimal. His broader scientific interests include machine 
learning, statistics and computer vision.

167
L I S T  O F  P U B L I C AT I O N S
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS
van Bergen, R.S., & Jehee, J.F.M. (in press). Uncertainty in fMRI activity is revealed when forward 
models include correlated noise. NeuroImage
van Bergen, R.S., Ma, W.J., Pratte, M.S., & Jehee, J.F.M. (2015). Sensory uncertainty decoded from 
visual cortex predicts behavior. Nature Neuroscience, 18(12), 1728-1730.
Jehee, J.F.M., Ling, S., Swisher, J.D., van Bergen, R.S., & Tong, F. (2012). Perceptual learning 
selectively refines orientation representations in early visual cortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 
32(47), 16747-16753.
In preparation
van Bergen, R.S., & Jehee, J.F.M. Uncertainty in cortical stimulus representations predicts serial 
dependence effects in orientation perception.

169
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
It is a truth mathematically provable, that as the number of people who deserve to be 
thanked increases, the probability that one of them will be forgotten rapidly approaches 
100%. But let’s try to beat the odds!
Janneke, thank you, first of all, for offering me a place in your lab, and for your supervision 
and advice over the last few years. Thank you also for everything you have taught me, by 
instruction or by example. I admire your knowledge about the work and the people in 
our field, and your ability to determine those questions that are not just important and 
unanswered, but ripe to be answered. I have learned many new skills and techniques 
under your guidance, and your dedicated feedback has made me a better writer and 
presenter. In addition to all this, you have an unmatched enthusiasm for science, your 
work and your students. When other people might have taken a step back, you kept at 
it and were always there for us. Resilience is your motto, and you certainly practice what 
you preach. I have greatly enjoyed working with you over the last years, and I’m glad 
we’ll continue to do so for a while longer.
Wei Ji & Mike, all those probability distributions would have stayed hidden within the 
brains of our participants, never to be decoded, had it not been for our collaboration. 
Thank you for sharing your knowledge and your time, and for your (often short-notice) 
feedback on manuscripts and other submissions. I have learned a great deal from you 
both. 
Wyeth, although it wasn’t very long, my time in your lab and our collaboration 
afterwards were very formative for me. I really appreciated your patience and precision 
of thinking, regularly sitting down with me for hours to walk through every detail of 
some computation or algorithm. If nothing else, I’ll never forget that a Gaussian in the 
spatial domain is a Gaussian in the Fourier domain! 
Frans, some important seeds for my subsequent academic life were sown during your 
course on perception at UCU. Not only was this my first proper introduction to the 
field of visual neuroscience, but your personal encouragement pushed me to pursue a 
Master’s degree abroad, and thus played a great role in bringing me where I am today.
I would like to thank all past and present members and affiliates of the Visual 
Computation Group, for the scientific discussions we’ve had over the years, and the 
feedback and advice you gave me. In order of appearance (I think), thank you Sam, 
Sander, Rosanne, Tim, Klaudia, Jasper, Sri, Koen, Ilona (on iPad ;-) ), Joachim, Denise, 
Andrea, Juraj, Laura and Andrey! 
170
APPENDICES
Many of my Wednesday evenings were spent not knowing the answers to trivia 
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D O N D E R S  G R A D UAT E  S C H O O L  F O R  CO G N I T I V E  N E U R O S C I E N C E
DONDERS GRADUATE SCHOOL FOR COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
For a successful research Institute, it is vital to train the next generation of young 
scientists. To achieve this goal, the Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour 
established the Donders Graduate School for Cognitive Neuroscience (DGCN), which 
was officially recognised as a national graduate school in 2009. The Graduate School 
covers training at both Master’s and PhD level and provides an excellent educational 
context fully aligned with the research programme of the Donders Institute. 
The school successfully attracts highly talented national and international students in 
biology, physics, psycholinguistics, psychology, behavioral science, medicine and related 
disciplines. Selective admission and assessment centers guarantee the enrolment of the 
best and most motivated students.
The DGCN tracks the career of PhD graduates carefully. More than 50% of PhD alumni 
show a continuation in academia with postdoc positions at top institutes worldwide, 
e.g. Stanford University, University of Oxford, University of Cambridge, UCL London, 
MPI Leipzig, Hanyang University in South Korea, NTNU Norway, University of Illinois, 
North Western University, Northeastern University in Boston, ETH Zürich, University of 
Vienna etc.. Positions outside academia spread among the following sectors: specialists 
in a medical environment, mainly in genetics, geriatrics, psychiatry and neurology. 
Specialists in a psychological environment, e.g. as specialist in neuropsychology, 
psychological diagnostics or therapy. Positions in higher education as coordinators or 
lecturers. A smaller percentage enters business as research consultants, analysts or head 
of research and development. Fewer graduates stay in a research environment as lab 
coordinators, technical support or policy advisors. Upcoming possibilities are positions 
in the IT sector and management position in pharmaceutical industry. In general, the 
PhDs graduates almost invariably continue with high-quality positions that play an 
important role in our knowledge economy.
For more information on the DGCN as well as past and upcoming defenses please visit:
http://www.ru.nl/donders/graduate-school/phd/
